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Introduction to a Future Way of Thought
Kostas Axelos was a Greek-French philosopher with an 
emphasis on the studies of Karl Marx and Martin Heidegger. 
His two doctoral theses were on Heraclitus and Marx. In 
addition he translated Heidegger, Georg Lukács, and Karl 
Korsch. He is best known for his works on the concept of the 
world—particularly the 1969 book Le jeu du monde—, as one 
of the editors of the journal Arguments, and as editor of the 
book series of the same name published by Les Éditions des 
Minuit.
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Introduction: Kostas Axelos— 
A Left-Heideggerian or a 
Heideggerian-Marxist
Stuart Elden
Kostas Axelos was born in 1924 in Athens and died in 2010 in 
Paris. He had left Greece in 1945 at the end of the civil war, under 
sentence of death from the royalists for his involvement with the 
communists.1 Along with Cornelius Castoriadis and Kostas Papaï-
oannou he was one of those that boarded the ship Mataroa.2 
Axelos was fluent in French and German, and chose recently 
liberated Paris as his new home. Almost immediately on arriving 
in France he got in touch with the Parti Communiste Français,3 
but found them at once “too Stalinist and too conservative,” 
both politically and in the cultural sphere.4 Intellectually, France 
1 On the civil war, see Kostas Axelos, “La guerre civile en Grèce,” in Arguments 
d’une recherche (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1969), 125–39.
2 Christoph Premat, “A New Generation of Greek Intellectuals in Postwar 
France,” in After the Deluge: New Perspectives on Postwar French Intellectual 
and Cultural History of Postwar France, ed. Julian Bourg (Lanham: Lexington 
Books, 2004), 103–23.
3 Rémy Rieffel, La tribu des clercs: Les intellectuels sous la Ve République, 
1958–1990 (Paris: Calmann-Lévy / CNRS Éditions, 1993), 290.
4 Kostas Axelos, “Mondialisation without the World,” interview by Stuart Elden, 
Radical Philosophy, no. 130 (March/April 2005): 25.
10 at the time was dominated by Marxism and existentialism—a 
combination Jean-Paul Sartre, among others was trying to 
realize—yet neither fully satisfied the young Axelos. He found 
the philosophy of university professors similarly uninspiring.5 He 
nonetheless studied at the Sorbonne, and conducted research at 
the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique between 1950 
and 1957, where he undertook the work that would comprise 
his primary and secondary theses on Marx and Heraclitus, both 
later published as books.6 He returned to the Sorbonne where 
he taught between 1962 and 1973. His first book of essays was 
published in Athens in 1952. He became a very important intellec-
tual in postwar France, known not just for his own writings, but 
also as an editor, translator and interpreter. Axelos had a wide 
range of intellectual contacts, including Jacques Lacan, Jean 
Beaufret, and, through them, Martin Heidegger; Pablo Picasso, 
whose partner Françoise Gilot ended up living with Axelos; 
Jacques Derrida, Gilles Deleuze, Henri Lefebvre, André Breton 
and Georges Bataille.7 He attended seminars by Karl Jaspers 
and had his thesis examined by, among others, Paul Ricoeur and 
Raymond Aron.8 He is cited approvingly by Jacques Derrida in Of 
5 Ibid.
6 Kostas Axelos, Marx penseur de la technique: De l’aliénation de l’homme à la 
conquête du monde, 2 vols. (1961; Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1974); translated 
by Ronald Bruzina as Alienation, Praxis and Techne in the Thought of Karl 
Marx (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1976); Héraclite et la philosophie: 
La première saisie de l’être en devenir de la totalité (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 
1962).
7 Françoise Gilot and Carlton Lake, Life with Picasso (New York: McGraw Hill, 
1964), 356–57, mentions Axelos briefly. On meeting these figures, see Axelos, 
“Mondialisation without the world,” 26.
8 Much of this biographical detail comes from Eric Haviland, Kostas Axelos: Une 
vie pensée, une pensée vécue (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1995), esp. 41 and 65; Henri 
Lefebvre and Pierre Fougeyrollas,“Notice Bio-Bibliographique,” in Le Jeu de 
Kostas Axelos (Montpellier: Fata Morgana, 1973), 97–99; and Ronald Bruzina, 
“Translator’s Introduction,” in Axelos, Alienation, Praxis and Techne, xxv.
11Grammatology and his books were reviewed in Critique by Gilles 
Deleuze and in Esprit by Henri Lefebvre.9 
From 1958 until 1962 he was one of the editors of the very 
important Arguments journal. Edgar Morin and Roland Barthes 
were also involved, and contributors included Lefebvre, Maurice 
Blanchot, Gilles Deleuze, and Claude Lefort.10 Axelos co-trans-
lated works by Georg Lukács, introduced translations of Theodor 
W. Adorno and Karl Korsch, and the journal also translated some 
of the late writings of Heidegger. The journal was short lived 
(1956–62) but important in shaping debates for a non-Stalinist 
left, with links to other journals across Europe: Ragionamenti in 
Italy, Praxis in Yugoslavia, Nowa Cultura in Poland, and directly 
inspired the German Das Argument.11 Its links to the British 
9 Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), 326, n. 14; Gilles Deleuze, 
“Faille et feux locaux, Kostas Axelos,” review of Vers la pensée planétaire, 
Arguments d’une recherche and Le jeu du monde, by Kostas Axelos, Critique, 
no. 275 (April 1970): 344–51; Henri Lefebvre,“Marxisme et technique,” review 
of Marx penseur de la technique, by Kostas Axelos, Esprit, no. 307 (1962): 
1023–28; review of Vers la pensée planétaire: le devenir-pensée du monde et 
le devenir-homme [sic] de la pensée, by Kostas Axelos, Esprit, no. 338 (1965): 
1114–17. The last is translated in State, Space, World: Selected Essays, ed. Neil 
Brenner and Stuart Elden, trans. Gerald Moore, Neil Brenner and Stuart 
Elden (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009) 254–58. See 
also Lefebvre and Fougeyrollas, Le Jeu de Kostas Axelos, 97–99; and Henri 
Lefebvre, “Le monde selon Kostas Axelos,” Lignes, no. 15 (1992): 129–40; 
translated as “The World According to Kostas Axelos,” in State, Space, World, 
259–73.
10 All the issues of the journal have been reissued in a two-volume set, with 
facsimile pages and the addition of short prefaces by Axelos, Edgar Morin, 
and Jean Duvignaud, as Arguments 1956–1962: Édition intégrale (Toulouse: 
Privat, 1983). All subsequent references are to the issues found in this 
collection, although the volume number and pages accord to the original 
issue. For a much more extensive discussion of the journal and the series, 
see Stuart Elden, “Kostas Axelos and the World of the Arguments Circle,” in 
Bourg, After the Deluge, 125–48.
11 Rieffel, La Tribu des clercs, 297; Axelos, Arguments d’une recherche, 161.
12 New Left Review were less formal.12 The journal was closed by 
its editors, not for lack of money or readers, but because the 
intellectual project had run its course. The journal ended just as 
the first books under Axelos’s own name had appeared, in 1961 
and 1962, on Marx and Heraclitus. The thinkers translated in 
Arguments, and the work published in its pages, would have an 
important impact on his subsequent career and work: “a great 
laboratory or fusion of ideas.”13 Axelos stressed that it was not a 
reflection of a homogenous vision, and the differences between 
the editorial team and contributors continued throughout. He 
sketched its key contributions as “an attempt at an open Marxism 
. . . a revised and corrected Freudo-Marxism and, finally, a post-
Marxist and post-Heideggerian thought.”14 And he stressed it was 
important a journal “that was definitely of the Left was open” to 
Heidegger, “a great thinker.”15
By this time, Axelos had also created a book series of the same 
title with Les Éditions de Minuit, which continued this mode of 
intellectual plurality. The journal had been an entirely collab-
orative venture, whereas the book series was the vision of Axelos 
alone. It stood alongside Georges Bataille’s Critique series at the 
forefront of French thought. The Arguments book series included 
texts by Bataille, Beaufret, Blanchot, Deleuze, Lefebvre, René 
Lourau, Morin, and Didier Franck’s important studies of Husserl 
and Heidegger, as well as almost all of Axelos’s own works. Also 
important, as with the journal, was the program of translations: 
these comprised Marxists and non-Marxists, often their first 
works translated into French. Lukács’ Histoire et connaissance de 
classe was the first book in the series, appearing in 1960, with 
12 See Mariateresa Padova, “Entretien avec Edgar Morin (Paris, 28 September 
1978),” in Studi Francesi , no. 73 ( January–April 1981): 69.
13 Kostas Axelos and Oliver Corpet, “Le fonctionnement,” La revue des revues, 
no. 4 (1987): 17; see Axelos, “Mondialisation without the world,” 26.
14 Axelos, “Mondialisation without the world,” 27.
15 Ibid.
13an important preface by Axelos himself.16 The English trans-
lation only appeared in 1971, and its translator acknowledges the 
importance of the French.17 Works by a range of other thinkers, 
including the dissident Marxism of Karl Korsch and Herbert 
Marcuse; Louis Hjelmslev and Roman Jakobson’s pioneering work 
on linguistics; and the phenomenology of Karl Jaspers and Fink 
were also included in the series. Axelos also commissioned trans-
lations of Eugen Fink’s Spiel als Weltsymbol—play, or the game, as 
symbol of the world—and Wilfrid Desan’s The Planetary Man, to 
which Axelos contributed an afterword.18 Fink was Husserl’s assis-
tant for many years and co-organized with Heidegger a seminar 
on Heraclitus.19 His work, principally on the world, was profoundly 
important to Axelos, especially regarding their shared project of 
elaborating Heraclitus’s famous fragment that declared time, the 
world, or the universe was “like a child playing a game.”20 Axelos 
believed that unorthodox or open Marxism could be reconciled 
with Heidegger and the post-Heidegger thought of figures like 
Fink. His attempt at a left-Heideggerianism or a Heideggerian 
Marxism is found throughout his works but in two places above 
all: his book on Marx and technology, and in this book, On Marx 
and Heidegger. 
16 Kostas Axelos, “Preface de la presente édition,” in Georg Lukács, Histoire et 
connaissance de classe: essais de dialectique marxiste, trans. Kostas Axelos 
and Jacqueline Bois (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1960), 1–8.
17 Georg Lukács, History and Class Consciousness, trans. Rodney Livingstone 
(London: Merlin, 1971).
18 Eugen Fink, Le Jeu comme symbole du monde, trans. Hans Hildenbrand 
and Alex Lindenberg (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1966); Wilfrid Desan, The 
Planetary Man: A Noetic Prelude to a United World (Washington: Georgetown 
University Press, 1961) and L’Homme planétaire: prélude théorique à un 
monde uni, trans. Hans Hildenbrand and Alex Lindenberg (Paris: Éditions de 
Minuit, 1968); Axelos’s “Postface: Qui est donc l’homme planétaire,” 151–57, 
is reprinted in Arguments d’une recherchere, 181–86. Axelos discusses Fink in 
this text.
19 Martin Heidegger and Eugen Fink, Heraclitus Seminar 1966/67, trans. Charles 
E. Seibert (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press), 1979.
20 See Stuart Elden, “Eugen Fink and the Question of the World,” Parrhesia, no. 
5 (2008): 48–59.
14 Axelos is little known in English-speaking contexts, partly due to 
a lack of translations. Before this current volume, the only book 
translated into English had been the one on Marx and technology 
and a small number of essays. The situation is very different in 
other languages, with his works available in multiple translations, 
especially in Spanish and Italian. He wrote most of his books in 
French, with four in Greek and one—this volume—in German. 
There is also a lack of secondary literature in English. Mark 
Poster’s Existential Marxism in Postwar France (1975) and Ronald 
Bruzina’s introduction to his translation of Alienation, Praxis, and 
Techne in the Thought of Karl Marx provide the most substantial 
treatment.21 My own Understanding Henri Lefebvre traces some of 
the interrelations between Lefebvre and Axelos.22
Reading Marx and Heidegger
There are a number of crucial themes in Axelos’s appropriation 
of Marx. As the references in this volume attest, he read Marx 
from early to late—from the 1844 “Economic and Philosophical 
Manuscripts” to Capital, the Grundrisse and the “Critique of the 
Gotha Programme.” He found the early writings crucial for their 
analysis of alienation and the critique of political economy to 
be a deepening of these claims. Axelos shows how alienation, a 
major concern of Marx, especially in his early writings, is related 
to Heidegger’s notion of the “forgetting of being.”23 Alienation 
in Marx, according to Axelos, can be found not only in ideology 
21 Mark Poster, Existential Marxism in Postwar France (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1975); Bruzina, “Translator’s Introduction,” in Axelos, 
Alienation, Praxis and Techne, ix–xxxiii.
22 Stuart Elden, Understanding Henri Lefebvre: Theory and the Possible (London: 
Continuum, 2004); “Lefebvre and Axelos: Mondialisation before Glob-
alisation,” in Space, Difference, Everyday Life: Reading Henri Lefebvre, ed. 
Kaniska Goonewardena, Stefan Kipfer, Richard Milgrom, and Christian 
Schmid (New York: Routledge, 2008), 80–93.
23 Kostas Axelos and Dominique Janicaud, “Entretiens du 29 janvier 1998 et du 
mars 2000,” in Dominique Janicaud, Heidegger en France (Paris: Albin Michel, 
2001), 2: 11.
15and economics but in technology as well. Marx’s own writings 
examine this most thoroughly in the labor process and the 
circulation of capital. Axelos reads Marx widely to investigate 
this issue, including lesser-examined works, such as The German 
Ideology and The Poverty of Philosophy. In Axelos’s reading, 
pushing Marx further, it is technology that challenges the way 
in which we deal with nature, the world, and the entirety of our 
social relations. This examination of a Heideggerian question in 
Marx both provides a new way to analyze Marx and provides a 
more progressive politics to Heideggerian inquiries. It would then 
characterize much of his work from the early study of Marx to the 
current volume and through to many of his later works.
Axelos describes modern technology as an échafaudage, a 
scaffold or a framework,24 and thinks this has become the 
“worldwide technical échafaudage.”25 Such a description becomes 
clearer when we recognize that “échafaudage” is the term Axelos 
suggests best translates the Heideggerian notion of das Ge-stell, 
usually translated as “en-framing,” or, in French, as arraissonment 
or dispositif.26 Axelos, building on Heidegger, suggests that the 
way that we conceive of the world is founded upon a particular 
ontological determination, conceiving of the world as calculable, 
measurable, and therefore controllable and exploitable. This 
determination, coming out of European modernity, leads to the 
present planetary era. For Axelos, “[t]his era is global and world-
wide, errant, planing and flattening, planning, calculating and 
combinative [Cette ère est globale et mondiale, errante, aplanissante 
24 See, for example, Kostas Axelos, Problèmes de l’enjeu (Paris: Éditions de 
Minuit, 1979), 16 and 66.
25 Kostas Axelos, Contribution à la logique (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1977), 80, 
see 121.
26 Kostas Axelos, note to Heidegger, “Principe d’identité,” trans. Gilbert Kahn, 
Arguments, no. 7 (1958): 5, n. 1. Kahn, the translator of the piece, uses la 
com-mande. For a brief discussion of the term in French, see Stuart Elden, 
Mapping the Present: Heidegger, Foucault and the Project of a Spatial History 
(London: Continuum, 2001), 110–11.
16 et aplatissante, planificatrice, calculatrice et combinatoire].”27 
Much of the terminology in this formulation will appear in the 
present text. In particular, Axelos is interested in the idea of 
errancy, wandering or error. He regularly picks up on the Greek 
description of a planet as a wandering star—aster planétes—
and uses this to describe both the world and humanity. For 
Axelos, following Heidegger, the framework that makes modern 
technology achievable precedes it as its condition of possibility. 
Marx’s critique of political economy is based upon trying to 
comprehend the reduction of phenomena to value—use or 
exchange—a numerical measure of productivity and power. By 
technology [technique] Axelos means something much broader 
than tools or techniques. Rather he is concerned with inter-
rogating their underlying logic.
Technology founds, undoubtedly, the possibility and 
effectiveness of machines, industry, the exploitation of 
atomic energy and of all other energy, but it goes far beyond 
apparatuses and machinery. And it is planetary technology 
which orders the new worldwide politics, the planetary 
politics.28
But Axelos, as well as finding a Heideggerian problematic devel-
oped in Marx, reads Marx in much the same way as Heidegger 
reads Nietzsche, as the final figure of Western metaphysics, in 
whom the most radical challenge and the exhaustion of pos-
sibilities comes together.29 In his own writings, Heidegger only 
briefly discusses Marx, and the role that Marx plays in the final 
stages of metaphysics—Axelos discusses the key passages in 
27 Axelos, Arguments d’une recherche, 174. In Horizons du monde (Paris: Éditions 
de Minuit, 1974), 112–13, this notion is linked to the idea of the end of history. 
On technology generally, see the essays in Kostas Axelos, Métamorphoses: 
Clôture–Ouverture (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1991),
28 Kostas Axelos, Vers la pensée planétaire: Le devenir-pensée du monde et le 
devenir-monde de la pensée (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1964), 297.
29 Axelos, Arguments d’une recherche, 168; Marx penseur de la technique, 2: 
120–21; Alienation, Praxis, and Techne, 246.
17this work. It is interesting to note that the principal places where 
Heidegger does deal with this theme are in relation to French 
promptings—in the “Letter on Humanism” to Jean Beaufret, and 
in the “What is Philosophy?” lecture at Cerisy-la-Salle: an event 
for which Axelos acted as interpreter. When Axelos suggested 
that Heidegger has not sufficiently dealt with Marx’s insights 
into technology, or indeed Marx at all, Heidegger replied that he 
should undertake this work himself.30 In this present work, and in 
the book on Marx and technology, we find Axelos doing precisely 
that. In addition, like Heidegger, Axelos turns to pre-Socratics 
thinkers, especially Heraclitus. As well as the book on Heraclitus 
he translated and edited a collection of the available fragments 
with commentary.31 Lefebvre even went so far as to describe 
Axelos as the “new Heraclitus,”32 because of his dialectical, his-
torical way of thinking. Lefebvre additionally praised Axelos as 
the most significant thinker to have grasped Heraclitus’s teaching 
of thought of the world and thought in the world.33
On World
The concept of “world,” le monde, and processes of its thinking 
and transformation had been discussed extensively in the 
Arguments journal. A key early text was “Thèses sur la mon-
dialisation,” by Pierre Fougeyrollas in 1959. Here it was suggested 
that “to the mondialisation of problems we must respond with the 
mondialisation of thought and action.”34 A subsequent issue of 
30 Axelos and Janicaud, “Entretiens,” 15; Haviland, Kostas Axelos, 56.
31 Kostas Axelos, Héraclite et la philosophie; Les Fragments d’Héraclite d’Ephèse, 
edited and translated by Kostas Axelos (Paris: Éditions Estienne, 1958). For 
a similar agenda by another member of the Arguments group, see François 
Châtelet, Logos et praxis: Recherches sur la signification théorique du Marxisme 
(Paris: Société d’Édition d’Énseignement Supérieur, 1962).
32 Lefebvre, “Au-delà du savoir,” in Lefebvre and Fougeyrollas, Le jeu de Kostas 
Axelos, 32.
33 Henri Lefebvre, Qu’est-ce que penser? (Paris: Publisad, 1986), 13; see also “Au-
delà du savoir,” 24–26.
34 Pierre Fougeyrollas, “Thèses sur la mondialisation,” Arguments, no. 15 (1959): 
38–39.
18 the journal devoted a theme section to the topic of “the planetary 
era”; and in their 1960 manifesto, the editors suggested that one 
of its explicit purposes was to make sense of the “second half 
of the twentieth century: a planetary age of technology; an iron 
age of a new industrial civilization; a new age of the human.”35 
In addition one of the two divisions of the Arguments book was 
entitled “The Becoming-Thought of World and the Becoming-
Worldly of Thought.”36 This phrase picks up on a key claim in 
Marx’s doctoral thesis: “the world’s becoming philosophical is at 
the same time philosophy’s becoming worldly, that its realization 
is at the same time its loss.”37 Axelos regularly cited this as an 
aphorism and it could be said to serve as a guiding theme for his 
entire work.38 Marx’s point is that in its becoming worldly, that 
is in its actualization, philosophy is transcended and overcome. 
What is interesting here, in relation to the book series, is that 
“philosophy” is replaced by “thought”—another Marxist theme 
transfigured through Heidegger.
Mondialisation is the process of becoming-worldly, something 
which relates to the Anglophone term “globalization” but cannot 
be simply equated with it. The argument of Axelos and his 
journal collaborators is that the 1960s saw a new era of planetary 
technology and mondialisation.39 They put the emphasis on the 
process of becoming worldly, the seizing and comprehending 
of the world as a whole, as an event in thought, rather than 
on the spread of phenomena of economics and politics across 
the surface of the globe. In other words, the second process, 
globalization, is in a sense only possible because of this prior 
35 “Manifeste no. 2 (1960),” in Axelos, Morin, and Duvignaud, Arguments 
1956–1962, xxx.
36 Axelos, Arguments d’une recherche, 164–65. For a discussion, see Vers la 
Pensée planétaire, 13, 30.
37 Karl Marx, Writings of the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society, ed. Loyd D. 
Easton and Kurt H. Guddat (New York: Doubleday, 1967), 62.
38 Axelos, Marx penseur de la technique, 1: 4, 2: 50, 162; Alienation, Praxis and 
Techne, v, 202, 271; Problèmes de l’enjeu, 177; and the present volume.
39 See Axelos, Arguments d’une recherche, 162.
19comprehending of the world, mondialisation. Although the dis-
tinction between the two terms has been blurred in more recent 
French writings, it is important in understanding the concepts in 
their usage at the time. This issue is explored in much detail in 
Axelos’s writings, and was developed, for example, in Lefebvre’s 
work on the state and production on the world scale.40 These are 
some of the earliest usages of the term in French literature, and 
predate the discussion of the notion of globalization in English-
language scholarship. As Axelos suggested much later, when 
globalization was much more widely discussed, the term glob-
alization—affecting the globe—misses the “world” and so-called 
world history.41
Globalization names a process which universalizes 
technology, economy, politics, and even civilization and 
culture. But it remains somewhat empty. The world as an 
opening is missing. The world is not the physical and his-
torical totality, it is not the more or less empirical ensemble 
of theoretical and practical ensembles. It deploys itself. The 
thing that is called globalization is a kind of mondialisation 
without the world.42
The issue of the world, particularly in relation to the notion of 
play or the game—le jeu—was a recurrent concern of Axelos’s 
own writings. Axelos would pick up on Heidegger’s suggestion 
that “the essence of being is the game itself [das Spiel selber].”43 
In numerous works, notably Vers la Pensée planétaire, Horizons du 
monde, Le Jeu du monde, and the third part of the present volume, 
40 See, in particular, Henri Lefebvre, De l’État, 4 vols. (Paris: UGE), 1976–78; 
some of the chapters in State, Space, World, and for a commentary, Elden, 
Understanding Henri Lefebvre, chap. 6.
41 Kostas Axelos, Ce questionnement: Approche-Éloignement (Paris: Éditions de 
Minuit, 2001), 40.
42 Axelos, “Mondialisation without the world,” 27.
43 Martin Heidegger, “Identität und Differenz,” in Gesamtausgabe, vol. 11, 
Identität und Differenz, ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann (Frankfurt am 
Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2006), 72. See also Axelos, Vers la Pensée plan-
étaire, 22.
20 Axelos developed his thoughts on this question. The major work 
is Le Jeu du monde, which took him fifteen years to write, but there 
the ideas are presented in difficult, aphoristic style across more 
than four hundred pages without references or discussion of 
related thinkers. His 1984 book, Systématique ouverte, one chapter 
of which is available in English translation, provides a much more 
approachable distillation of his ideas.44
For Axelos therefore:
The world cannot be reduced either to an ensemble of 
intraworldly phenomena, nor to “creation,” or to the Cosmic 
Universe, to which is adjoined a social and historical world, 
nor to the totality of that which human representation 
understands, nor to the total scope of technical activity.45
The work on the world and on technology are closely inter-
related. Axelos suggests that talk of an “atomic” or “nuclear 
era” at the time he was writing was not sufficiently thought 
through. What was actually being named? For him, both des-
ignations are symptoms of the much wider context of planetary 
technology, a new destiny of the world.46 Axelos describes this 
as the “becoming-worldly of technology, and the becoming-
technological of the world,” in another twist to the Marxist 
phrase.47 The crisis facing humanity has therefore developed: 
if Nietzsche discussed European nihilism,48 which Heidegger 
44 Kostas Axelos, Systématique ouverte (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1984), part 
translated by Gerald Moore as “The World: Being Becoming Totality,” 
Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 24, no. 5 (2006): 643–51.
45 Axelos, Problèmes de l’enjeu, 30.
46 On this in detail see “La question de la technique planétaire,” in Axelos, Ce 
Questionnement, 15–35.
47 Axelos, Métamorphoses, 132.
48 See especially, Martin Heidegger, GA, vol. 48, Nietzsche: Der europäische 
Nihilismus. A shorter version is translated as Nietzsche, vol. 4, Nihilism, ed. 
David Farrell Krell, trans. Frank A. Capuzzi (San Francisco: Harper Collins, 
1991).
21analyzed in his final lecture course on Nietzsche, Axelos now saw 
nihilism on the worldwide level.49 
In this mode of thinking, the term “world” does not simply signify 
the whole, or the totality of all that exists; it is concerned with 
relations, interplay, and the game—le jeu.50 For Axelos, following 
Heidegger, while we cannot equate the world and the human, 
neither should we think of them entirely separately: “Neither 
of them is the other, but they cannot act [ jouer] without the 
other.”51 Heidegger calls this ‘being-in-the-world’, which should 
not be understood in a primarily spatial sense, but rather as an 
integration of the human and the environment. Axelos underlines 
this point: “there is not the human and world. The human is not 
in the world.”52 What this means is that we are not so much in 
the world but of the world, just as the world is not in space-time, 
but is spatiotemporal.53 Our relation with the world is the crucial 
issue; it is both something within and outside our control:
The world deploys itself as a game. That means that it refuses 
any sense, any rule that is exterior to itself. The play of the 
world itself is different from all the particular games that 
are played in the world. Almost two-and-a-half thousand 
years after Heraclitus, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Fink and I have 
insisted on this approach to the world as game.54
49 Pierre Fougeyrollas, “Au-delà du nihilisme,” in Lefebvre and Fougeyrollas, Le 
jeu de Kostas Axelos, 77.
50 Kostas Axelos, Lettres à un jeune penseur (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1996), 10, 
n. 1, 13.
51 Ibid., 13.
52 Axelos, Ce Questionnement, 56.
53 Axelos, Lettres à un jeune penseur, 19. See also Axelos, Systématique ouverte, 
40–54. This chapter is translated by Gerald Moore as "The World: Being 
Becoming Totality."
54 Axelos, “Mondialisation without the world,” 28.
22 The human is the great partner of the play of the world, yet 
the human is not only the player, but is equally the “out-
played” [déjoué], the plaything [ jouet].55
—
On Marx and Heidegger is an unusual book in Axelos’s overall 
trajectory. It comprises texts originally composed in German 
and some of his own translations of texts originally published 
in French. The major, first part of the book is on the Marx and 
Heidegger relation, a neglected topic that Axelos is one of the 
very first to examine in detail.56 The second part of the book 
comprises a sequence of “Theses on Marx,” which build upon and 
parody Marx’s own “Theses on Feuerbach” (the title is Engels’s) 
and a text discussing the concept of world in Heidegger. This 
interest in the world, or the ‘planetary’ leads to the third part of 
the book, which discusses technology, praxis and science.
The combination of Marx and Heidegger was, and continues to 
be, provocative. Axelos was a Marxist in thought and a com-
munist in political action, and the work in this book was begun 
barely a decade after Heidegger had been banned from teaching 
because of his political actions under the Nazi party. Axelos knew 
Heidegger, acting as his interpreter for the Cerisy-la-Salle lecture 
in 1955—and co-translator, with Beaufret, of the published text, 
and staying with Heidegger in the Black Forest hut.57 Over the 
next few years, Axelos also acted as interpreter for Heidegger’s 
meetings with René Char and Georges Braque, and spent several 
55 Kostas Axelos, Entretiens, réels, imaginaires et avec soi-même (Montpellier: 
Fata Morgana, 1973), 53.
56 See now Laurence Paul Hemming, Heidegger and Marx: A Productive Dialogue 
over the Language of Humanism (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 
2013).
57 Martin Heidegger, “Qu’est-ce que la philosophie?,” trans. Kostas Axelos 
and Jean Beaufret, in Questions I et II (Paris: Gallimard, 1968), 317–46. For an 
account of his Christmas 1955 visit, see Vers la Pensée planétaire, 224–25.
23days at Lacan’s country house in the company of Beaufret, 
Heidegger, and Lacan.58
Axelos was no uncritical Heideggerian. While he made extensive 
use of his ideas, and—especially in On Marx and Heidegger—
aspired to write like him, he did not shy away from the political 
aspects of Heidegger’s career. He repeatedly questioned 
Heidegger about his allegiance to the Nazi party, but claims he 
never got much beyond straightforward explanations. As he said 
in 2004: 
The discussion of the political question with Heidegger 
never advanced very far. One must say, the political realm 
in general eluded him. He was a great thinker and a narrow-
minded petty bourgeois at the same time; he did not really 
understand what had happened and was happening on this 
level. In the discussions, he tried to exonerate himself, saying 
that he had committed a great error, that in the beginning 
National Socialism was not what it later became, that he had 
distanced himself from Nazism, and so on. All this was wholly 
insufficient. But despite the National Socialist enticement 
of Heidegger, his thought can absolutely not be reduced or 
limited to Nazism. It is an opening, but it remains covered by 
a shadow. This shadow cannot and must not be forgotten, 
but all reductive attempts to explain it fail entirely.59
Heidegger would claim to Axelos that “in my work, there is no 
trace of Nazism.” Yet even on the basis of materials available at 
that time Axelos knew that this was clearly false.60 Newly pub-
lished materials have confirmed this impression, though they 
undoubtedly make it more explicit. Yet as early as 1959, Axelos, 
Beaufret, François Châtelet, and Lefebvre had debated numerous 
aspects of Heidegger’s work, including his relation to Marx and 
58 Axelos and Janicaud, “Entretiens,” 12; Haviland, Kostas Axelos, 50.
59 Axelos, “Mondialisation without the world,” 26.
60 Axelos and Janicaud, “Entretiens,” 14; see Haviland, Kostas Axelos, 52–53.
24 his Nazi past.61 This should give the lie to any suggestion that 
French Heidegger scholarship neglected this question until Victor 
Farías’s book in 1987: the question had also been discussed in 
Les Temps modernes as early as the 1940s.62 Axelos thought you 
could be a Heideggerian without being on the political Right, but 
that this could not be at the expense of a detailed and careful 
interrogation of the relationship between his politics and his 
thought.63 
As with most of Axelos’s books, On Marx and Heidegger is a whole 
composed of fragments. Only a few of his books have a stronger 
narrative arc than this. The key exceptions are his early studies 
of Marx and Heraclitus and his masterwork Le jeu du monde [The 
play (or game) of the world]. Several other books are collections 
of essays or lectures—Horizons du monde, Vers une pensée plan-
étaire: Le devenir-pensée du monde et de devenir-monde de la 
pensée, Arguments d’une recherche. 
Axelos viewed most of his output in terms of trilogies. He 
discusses the relation between them in a number of places, 
particularly in Problèmes de l’enjeu.64 The books on Marx and 
Heraclitus, his primary and secondary theses, were partnered 
by Vers la pensée planétaire in the first trilogy. His works on logic 
61 Kostas Axelos, Jean Beaufret, François Châtelet, and Henri Lefebvre, “Karl 
Marx et Heidegger,” in Axelos, Arguments d’une recherche, 93–105; originally 
published in France Observateur, no. 473, May 28, 1959. See also Vers la Pensée 
planétaire, 223–25.
62 Victor Farías, Heidegger and Nazism, trans. Paul Burrell and Gabriel R. Ricci 
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press), 1989. See Axelos and Janicaud, 
“Entretiens,” 15. Karl Löwith, “Les implications politiques de la philosophie 
de l’existence chez Heidegger,” Les Temps modernes, no. 14 (November 1946): 
343–60.
63 Axelos, Vers la Pensée planétaire, 224. See also Métamorphoses, 16–17, n. 
1. This is a position shared with some more recent interventions. See 
Dominique Janicaud, L’Ombre de cette pensée (Grenoble: Jérome Millon, 1990); 
and my own Speaking Against Number: Heidegger, Language and the Politics of 
Calculation (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006).
64 Axelos, Problèmes de l’enjeu, 188–90. For an overall schema of his work, see 
Haviland, “Le déploiement de l’œuvre,” in Kostas Axelos, 77–134.
25and ethics were the first and third volumes of the second trilogy, 
joining Le jeu du monde. The final trilogy comprised Arguments 
d’une recherche, Horizons du monde, and Problèmes de l’enjeu. 
Each of these trilogies were given an overall title: the unfolding, 
unfurling, or deployment [deploiement] of errance, of the game, 
and of an inquiry. Le Jeu du monde is therefore the central book in 
the central trilogy.
The Trilogy of Trilogies—Axelos’s Principal Writings
Le déploiement de 
l’errance Le déploiement du jeu
Le déploiement d’une 
enquête
Héraclite et la philosophie 
(1962)
Contribution à la logique 
(1977)
Arguments d’un 
recherche (1969)
Marx penseur de la 
technique (1961) Le jeu du monde (1969) Horizons du monde (1974)
Vers la pensée planétaire 
(1964)
Pour une éthique 
problématique (1972)
Problèmes de l’enjeu 
(1979)
On Marx and Heidegger sits within the time-frame of these 
studies, being composed between 1957 and its 1966 publication, 
and discusses related themes. One short piece also appears 
in Vers la pensée planétaire, but otherwise the overlap is only 
thematic. Axelos describes the first trilogy as a certain grasp of 
the play [saisie du jeu] of the history of thought and the thought 
of history; and the second trilogy as presenting, without rep-
resenting, “a systematic of thought: a logic and a methodology; 
a questioning and encyclopedic ontology, fundamental, and 
animating regional ontologies; an anthropology and an ethic.”65 
These are major themes and claims, and the three trilogies 
and his other writings are extremely self-referential and have 
the impression of an almost Kantian architectonic. Yet they are 
presented in such a way to resist the idea that he was building 
a system, but rather an “open systematic.”66 Within this the 
65 Axelos, Contribution à la logique, 7.
66 See Axelos, Systématique ouverte, especially 36.
26 overarching theme had been the question of the world, the play 
or the game of the world, and the relation of the human to that 
world of which they are both part and creator.
Axelos is therefore extremely important in terms of his network 
of contacts and because of the way in which he brought into print 
a range of texts showing disparate interests. His importance 
as a facilitator of translation alone is worthy of note. In his own 
writings the principal interlocutors are Heraclitus, Marx, and 
Heidegger. Other figures—Hegel and Nietzsche for example—are 
mentioned, and there are studies of Pascal, Freud, and Rimbaud, 
but these three are the central ones.67 On Marx and Heidegger 
gives an excellent introduction to the way he thinks about these 
two thinkers: with them, through them, and beyond them.68 It 
therefore opens up a route to understanding his work more 
generally, especially his still timely thought of the world, the plan-
etary, of which the third section of this volume gives some initial 
indications.
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Notes on the Translation
The following work occupies a relatively early position in the—
French and German—oeuvre of Kostas Axelos, although many 
works still await translation into the English language.
Even here, the importance of the key concepts “game” 
and “errance”—indispensable for an understanding of his 
philosophical ductus and work as a whole—is evident.
Although continuity has been sought for this translation in 
respect to Alienation, Praxis, and Techne in the Thought of Karl 
Marx by Axelos, translated by Ronald Bruzina (University of Texas 
Press, Austin & London, 1976), this only proved to be necessary 
to a very limited degree and the following translation, including 
quotations from Nietzsche, Heidegger, and others, are new. 
As regards translations of Heideggerian terminology, the solution 
used here also seeks a certain continuity with the dedicated and 
seminal work of Theodore Kisiel (The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being 
and Time, University of California Press, Berkeley/Los Angeles/
London, 1993), with Michael Inwood (A Heidegger Dictionary, Black-
well Publishers, Oxford, 1999), and others.
Kenneth Mills
In the editing process, all Greek terms were transliterated, the 
few French words were translated in brackets following the 
phrase, and we have provided some of the original German when 
the specific words used are worth noting. 
In common with many recent translations we have translated das 
Sein as “being” and das Seiende as “a being” or “beings.” In cases 
where there may be ambiguity we have provided the German. 
We have translated the phrase das Nichts as the Heideggerian 
“the nothing” rather than the more Sartrean “nothingness.” 
Dasein is the only word left untranslated—its meaning is at once 
32 “existence” and a technical term in Heideggerian thought. In one 
instance it appears in a quote from Marx—there we have trans-
lated as “existence” and provided the German.
Axelos uses both parentheses and square brackets in the text; 
the latter especially to mark his interpolations in passages he 
quotes. These are usually clearly marked, and should not there-
fore be confused with translator additions.
Axelos provides both footnotes and some in text references. 
We have taken these all into the notes, where we additionally 
provide modern edition references (in the case of Heidegger 
and Nietzsche) and available English translations. We have not 
followed existing translations in all instances, to ensure consis-
tency throughout the text. The page numbers are provided for 
reference and wider context. Two abbreviations are used:
 – GA: Martin Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe, ed. Friedrich von Herr-
mann et. al. (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1975).
 – KSA: Friedrich Nietzsche, Kritische Studienausgabe, ed. Giorgio 
Colli and Mazzimo Montinari (Berlin and Munich: Deutscher 
Taschenbuch Verlag and Walter Gruyter, 1980).
If not marked, notes are by Axelos. Translator and editor notes 
are marked as TN and EN, respectively. In one instance where 
Axelos’s comments follow an editor note, this is marked AN. I 
have provided a bibliography of Axelos’s books, with indications 
of English translations in part or whole.
Stuart Elden


I N T R O D U C T I O N  T O  A  F U T U R E 
WAY  O F  T H O U G H T 
KO S TA S  A X E L O S

Foreword
The following essays, lectures, theses, texts, and discussions, 
which were written, held, and repeatedly revised in the German 
language between 1956 and 1966, represent an attempt to 
introduce the thought of the future in a multi-dimensional yet 
holistic manner. They think along with Marx and Heidegger as 
well as about them. About [Über]—as dictionaries tell us—can 
mean not only peri, de, von, sur, but also metá, trans, hinüber, and 
au-delà.1 By thinking through Marx and Heidegger, we can even-
tually think beyond them. At the same time, this form of reflection 
also engenders anticipatory thought. The thought of the future 
we must be introduced to is inseparable from thought which 
has gone before and from current thought—as well as from that 
which has not yet been thought. Moreover, this thinking should 
also be inseparable from past, current, and future experience. 
The experience of the world. Thus, the matter at hand is to allow 
a form of world thinking corresponding to worldly experience and 
1 EN: The first set of words—Greek, Latin, German, French—mean “on” or 
“about”; the second set, “beyond”.
38 its praxis to evolve, a kind of thinking which obeys both the prose 
and poetry of the world.
Such an elementary and future way of thought, together with 
a traditional, a becoming, and a failing lifestyle, belongs to the 
selfsame reality: the fragmentary one-all, which unfolds within 
time as errance and the game,2 and then expires. In this way, 
reflection leads to the anticipatory thought into which we are 
initiated. The new reveals the old, which had concealed itself. 
This anticipatory thought is not noncommital prophecy. The 
thought of the future—predicted and foreseen, predicting and 
foreseeing—corresponds to the futurum approaching us (which 
corresponds to the growing physis).
The reflective and anticipatory thought attempted here reaches 
back to the roots established by the poetic thought of Heraclitus, 
it positions itself beneath the constellation of Hegel, Marx, Nie-
tzsche, and Heidegger, but also strives to supersede them: in 
order to introduce into the mundane game a new way of thinking 
fragmentary wholeness—at once worldly and historical, plan-
etary, open, multi-dimensional, inquisitive, and playful. The 
mundane game outplays everything.
For today and tomorrow, world history appears to be dominated 
by a fusion of technology and science. This dominance 
itself unfolds in the form of what we call world history. The 
predominant technology places everything in question and must 
be questioned itself. Does planetary technology require plan-
etary thought? Technicized science and scientific technology are 
taking over art, religion, and philosophy, and dissolving them. 
However, the fusion of technology and science does not solve the 
tasks of thought. Can this fusion evade thought and can thought 
evade this fusion? Is such a thing even possible? Might it lie within 
the potential of a coming—and already pre-existent—mode 
2 TN: Italics from the translator. These are standard terms from the Axelos 
corpus.
39of thought to experience its own power and powerlessness 
beyond idealism and materialism, beyond the metaphysical or 
anti-metaphysical dichotomy or gap, while intimately associated 
and merged with action? Can metaphysics be overcome and not 
merely reversed? This attempt places demands on our efforts. 
But how can the play of thought execute a transcendence that 
has somehow already achieved completion?
For some time now, humanity—as individuals, as members of 
society, and as fragments of world history—has been striving to 
live and to love, to speak and to think; humans work, they fight, 
they die. For what? For questionable pleasures and attainable 
prosperity—whereby more and more is never enough for them—, 
for recognition—which has of course become an increasingly 
relative notion—, for the realization of peace on earth and all-
encompassing, negotiated reconciliation? What drives them on 
and where are they being driven to? And why? What can we still 
make of logical or mythological causes, or the power of historical 
momentum, or the aims pursued by humanity? Do they vacillate 
in their play? They materialize in a history that has already played 
out, they dissipate, they repeat and become outplayed once again 
without end. Does this mean the only recourse we have—without 
backward-looking desire, without a crude depreciation of the 
present, and without eschatological utopias—is to pursue the 
game with yet more width, depth, and breadth? Without a “why”?
The future way of thought is not only something that always 
remains a thing of the future. It was already there, it is already 
here, it has yet to arrive. It can demystify us and encourage us 
somewhat, but at the same time it will experience and effect new 
one-dimensionalities and superficialities. It is part of the new 
wealth and the new misery—which are and remain inseparable 
from the old way of living and loving, speaking and thinking, 
working and fighting, playing and dying. This is how it “is” with 
and in the play of time, which gathers and annihilates everything, 
while resting in its wholeness. This is the play of errance in whose 
game the foundation of all motion rests.

I :  M A R X  A N D  H E I D E G G E R

Marx and Heidegger: Guides 
to a Future Way of Thought
We are nothing; what we seek is everything.  
(Hölderlin, preliminary notes to Hyperion1)
I
In a letter to his Parisian friend Jean Beaufret, in the “Letter on 
‘Humanism,’” Heidegger writes: “Homelessness is coming to be 
the destiny of the world. Hence it is necessary to think of this des-
tiny in terms of the history of being. The alienation of humanity, 
which Marx recognized in an essential and significant sense 
based on Hegel, has roots extending back to the homelessness of 
man in the modern era. This has been summoned, indeed, from 
the destiny of being in the form of metaphysics and concretized 
by the latter, but concealed by it as homelessness at the same 
1 EN: Friedrich Hölderlin, “Fragment von Hyperion,” in Sämtliche Werke und 
Briefe in drei Bänden, ed. Jochen Schmidt, vol. 2, Hyperion. Empedokles. 
Aufsätze. Übersetzungen (Frankfurt am Main: Deutscher Klassiker Verlag, 
1994), 199.
44 time. As Marx has entered an essential historical dimension with 
the experience of alienation, the Marxist [it would have been 
better to state: Marxian]2 view of history is superior to competing 
versions. However, due to the fact that neither Husserl nor—
as far as I have seen up until now—Sartre has recognized the 
essential nature of historicity in being, neither Phenomenology 
nor Existentialism is able to enter that dimension within which 
a productive dialogue with Marxism first becomes possible.”3 
Thus, a productive dialogue with Marxian thought—and with 
Marxism—should be sought here, and it could well be the case 
that it is extremely important to facilitate such a dialogue. We 
read further: “All the same, in this context it is also necessary 
that one frees oneself of naive conceptions about materialism 
as well as the cheap refutations meant to attack it. The essence 
of materialism does not exist in the mere claim that everything 
is material, but much rather in the metaphysical determination 
which maintains that all beings [alles Seiende] appear as the 
material of work. The metaphysical essence of work character-
istic of the modern era is prefigured in Hegel’s Phenomenology 
of Spirit as the self-manifesting process of unconditional 
production, it is the substantialization of the real through the 
human individual experienced as subjectivity. The essence of 
materialism conceals itself in the essence of technology, which is 
indeed much discussed but seldom thought about.” Heidegger 
attempts to trace the materialism of Marxism and communism 
back to the essence of work and technology. And he continues: 
“In its essence, technology is a destiny of the history of being 
whose truth lies in oblivion. In fact, it not only goes back to the 
tékhne of the Greeks in name, it also originates from tékhne in the 
history of being as a mode of aletheuein, which means a mode of 
2 TN: The passages in brackets were added to the original text by Axelos.
3 Martin Heidegger, Über den Humanismus (1947; Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio 
Klostermann, 1949), 27. EN: “Brief über den Humanismus,” in Gesamtaus-
gabe, vol. 9, Wegmarken, ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, 339; “Letter 
on ‘Humanism,’” in Pathmarks, ed. William McNeill (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), 258–59.
45revelation of beings. As a form of truth, technology has its ground 
in the history of metaphysics. This itself is an excellent—and up 
to now—the solely assessable phase in the history of being. One 
can have varying opinions about communist doctrines and their 
foundations, but in terms of the history of being it is evident that 
an elementary experience of world history has been expressed 
in them. Whoever takes ‘communism’ to be merely a ‘party’ or 
‘worldview [Weltanschauung]’ is thinking as cursorily as those who 
use the term ‘Americanism’ and mean only a lifestyle, and this in 
a derogatory manner.”4
In order to begin a discussion with Marxism, should we not first 
involve ourselves in a dialogue with Marx himself? But with 
which Marx? The philosopher? The economic scientist? The 
politician? Does Marx have many faces, and what lies hidden 
behind the various layers and faces? Perhaps Marx has ceased to 
4 Heidegger, Über den Humanismus, 27–28. EN: GA, vol. 9, 340–41; “Letter 
on ‘Humanism,’” 259. AN: How different Jaspers’s reflections on Marxism 
sound. In one of the three guest lectures he held in Heidelberg (1950), 
Jaspers intends to present to his listeners a concise, compact, and uniform 
sketch of Marxian thought—as national economics, philosophy, and ethics, 
and of Marxism—as “science” and “faith.” The title of the lecture is: “The 
Demands of Scientificity [Forderung der Wissenschaftlichkeit].” (These three 
lectures also appeared in print: Vernunft und Widervernunft in unserer Zeit 
(Munich: Piper, 1950) [EN: translated by S. Godman, as Reason and Anti-
Reason in Our Times (London: SCM Press, 1952)]). The lecture is intended 
to address Marxism and psychoanalysis. The result is a presentation in 
school philosophy, a brief summary of basic Marxist (and psychoanalytic) 
principles, and a myopic interpretation of Marxism as a “substitute religion,” 
as alleged absolute knowledge, which must be exposed: “The absolute 
knowledge of Marx must be exposed as a form of the supposed knowledge 
already realized by Hegel, which Marx reiterated in this form in an old-
fashioned manner but with specifically modern content” (14 [EN: Reason and 
Anti-Reason, 16]). Admittedly, a particular form of truth is also attributed 
to Marxism—professorially. In effect, however, the whole of this absolute 
knowledge, this absolute plan in its entirety, succumbs to “fundamental 
erring,” the “wrong track,” “error” and “going astray”—understood as “mon-
strous falsity”—, contrasted with those illuminated by truth which informs 
“possible existence through reason.” These are the reflections of Jaspers, a 
proponent of “unlimited communication.”
46 be a philosopher. In a lecture held in Cerisy (Normandy), “What 
is Philosophy?,” Martin Heidegger poses the question: “Where 
should we seek the culmination of philosophy in the modern 
era? With Hegel or first in the later philosophy of Schelling? And 
what is the case with Marx and Nietzsche? Have they already 
abandoned the path of philosophy in the modern era? If not, how 
should their status be determined?”5 
Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, Hegel appear to us as the 
philosophers who have set standards and laid down the law. 
Behind and between them stand the pre-Socratics, Plato, Augus-
tine, Descartes. All of them originated from an historical soil 
[Boden], which they influenced and which was influenced by them. 
Plato-Aristotle-Augustine-Thomas Aquinas-Descartes-Hegel 
dominate Greek-Christian-Modern thinking. Plato establishes 
Platonism, i.e., philosophy and any philosophy as idealism and 
dualism, Aristotle the onto-theo-logical methodology. Augus-
tine Christianizes Platonism and Platonizes Christianity, Thomas 
Aquinas arms Christianity and allows it to speak with Aris-
totelianism. Descartes introduces the ingenious compromise 
of the modern era between the Platonic-Aristotelian idea, the 
Christian belief in revelation, and the “liberated” thinking ego of 
modern man—res cogitans, which is argued to dominate, pos-
sess, govern, and transform res extensa, within the confluence of 
philosophy and science. Somehow, Hegel concludes this entire 
chapter synthetically, historically, and systematically. All of these 
thinkers are interconnected in sundry ways, follow and pursue 
each other. From Plato-Aristotle, it runs—through the Roman 
era—to the Christian theology of Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, 
and from them—through Descartes and Kant—to Hegel. And 
5 Martin Heidegger, Was ist das – die Philosophie? (Pfullingen: G. Neske, 1956), 
42. EN: “Was ist das – die Philosophie?,” in GA, vol. 11, Identität und Differenz, 
24; What is Philosophy? trans. and introd. Jean T. Wilde and William Kluback, 
German-English edition (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1956), 88–89. 
Axelos was the interpreter at this lecture, and the translator of the pub-
lished French text.
47from Hegel it leads to Marx and Marxism, which strive to overturn 
the idealistic and speculative dialectic of Hegel both materialis-
tically and practically. “The fact that medieval theologians study 
Plato and Aristotle, i.e., reinterpreting them, is comparable to 
how Karl Marx appropriates Hegelian metaphysics for his political 
agenda. Viewed correctly, however, it is not the intention of 
the doctrina christiana to provide knowledge about beings [das 
Seiende] and what this actually means, as its truth is absolutely 
a truth of salvation. Its objective is ensuring salvation for the 
individual immortal soul.” These are the somewhat uninspired 
comments about the relationship between Marx and Hegel in 
Heidegger’s book about Nietzsche.6 For all productive inter-
pretations are reinterpretations, attempts to tame the Odyssean 
voyage of world history—including the world history of thought. 
Nostalgia and the yearning for faraway places correspond to one 
another, like departure and return. Upheavals, reinterpretations, 
revaluations belong with the very things they contest to the same 
adventurous process, which works off opposites and opposing 
forces both uniformly as well as alternately. Within this process, 
Nietzsche appears as the one who strives to reverse and reval-
uate Platonism-Christianism; he himself considers his thought to 
be “Platonism turned round”; thus, as overturned Christianism as 
well, if Christianity is understood as “Platonism for the ‘people.’” 
At the same time, Nietzsche intends to enter the fray as the 
identifier and over-comer of nihilism.
As a result, Platonism-Aristotelianism, Christianism, Cartesianism, 
Hegelianism-Marxism-Nihilism—their entire development and 
turning points, which include all upheavals—are and remain the 
dominant course of a reeling world history. Whether this course 
is experienced in the pre-philosophical mode (with Heraclitus 
and the pre-Socratics), in the philosophical-metaphysical mode, 
i.e., onto-theologically (from Plato to Hegel), in the devout and 
6 Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche, vol. 2 (Pfullingen: G. Neske, 1961), 132. EN: GA, 
vol. 6.2, Nietzsche II, 116; Nietzsche, vol. 4, Nihilism, ed. David Farrel Krell, 
trans. Frank A. Capuzzi (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1982), 88.
48 Christian mode, in the bourgeois mode, socialist mode, nihilistic 
mode, or even anti-philosophical and anti-metaphysical modes, 
as well as non-philosophical and extra-metaphysical modes, 
it must be ascertained, or more importantly—experienced, 
whether the meta-philosophical path (opened by Marx and Nie-
tzsche) can still be traversed.
Marx might well not be a philosopher any more, if philosophy 
begins with Plato—as philosophy—and achieves its completion 
with Hegel, which must not imply that completion, demise, and 
conclusion have converged here, let alone that their telos remains 
puzzling. Marx might well not be a philosopher any more, but 
still belongs to the modern era, to the epoch of subjectivity; he 
could even be one who wishes to generalize subjectivity and 
raise it to the level of a societal category. Nonetheless, even as 
a non-philosopher, perhaps even as a wayfarer, Marx remains 
a thinker. What does he think? In the “Letter on Humanism,” 
Marx’s thought and main direction are characterized briefly and 
accurately as follows: “Marx demands that the ‘human’s humanity 
[menschliche Mensch]’ be recognized and acknowledged. Marx 
finds it in ‘society.’ He views the ‘social human’ as the ‘natural 
human.’ In ‘society,’ the human ‘nature,’ i.e., the whole of ‘natural 
needs’ (nourishment, clothing, procreation, economic survival) 
[the elementary?] is equably secured.”7 Heidegger places the 
terms “human’s humanity”, “society,” “nature,” and “natural” in 
quotation marks. Why? Because Marx makes use of them? Not 
only, and not primarily, for this reason. Rather, because they are 
problematical terms, since we do not quite know how we should 
comprehend them. The demands placed by Marx—the res-
olution of externalization and divestiture, the radical resolution 
of alienation through the destruction of its “real” foundations, 
of private property, of the capitalistic division of labor as well 
as the traditional means of production and work, and the 
7 Heidegger, Über den Humanismus, 10. EN: GA, vol. 9, 319; “Letter on 
‘Humanism,’” 244.
49
acknowledgement of the natural, societal, human’s humanity—
are and remain problematical. But they nevertheless remain 
demands which allow elementary forces to express themselves 
and which put these forces to practical application.
Does Heidegger himself attempt to enter into a dialogue with 
Marx? Does he initiate a productive discussion with Marxism? 
Heidegger does not often mention Marx. In spite of this, his own 
thinking has ties to Marxian thought. In the year 1932, Marx’s 
most important philosophical work was published, the Parisian 
economic-philosophical manuscripts of 1844, “Nationalökonomie 
und Philosophie” [National Economy and Philosophy];8 this work 
had not appeared in print prior to this. The first 1932 edition, with 
Kröner, was obtained by Siegfried Landshut, who was a student of 
Heidegger, and in this way Heidegger was granted direct access to 
the Parisian manuscripts. Since this point in time, this profound 
but also incomplete and fragmentary text has required a cor-
respondingly profound interpretation, which in turn presupposes 
an interpretation of Hegel, as the main topic on this Marxian 
work is a coming to terms with Hegel, and most pointedly, with 
the Phenomenology of Spirit, “the true birthplace and secret of 
Hegelian philosophy” according to Marx’s own formulation.9
Heidegger does not provide us with the guidelines of a Marx 
interpretation. He never occupied himself with Marx to any 
significant extent, as was the case with Anaximander, Heraclitus, 
Parmenides, Plato and Aristotle, Leibniz, Kant, Hegel, and Nie-
tzsche. In spite of this, Marx was not absent from Heidegger’s 
intellectual ventures by any means. By attempting to grasp the 
essence of modern technology—even of planetary technology—, 
8 EN: This is a literal translation of the title Axelos uses. The more standard 
English title is simply “Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts” or “1844 
Manuscripts.” A complete translation under the first of these titles is found 
in Early Writings, trans. Rodney Livingstone and Gregory Benton (London: 
Penguin in association with New Left Review, 1975), 279–400.
9 EN: Marx, “Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts,” 382–83.
50 by attempting to bring light to the roots of the era of mech-
anization—and of the atomic age—, by attempting to intellec-
tually question the world destiny of homelessness and root-
lessness, Heidegger gives us the sense that Marx stands behind 
this endeavor10 The object of this questioning is the essence of 
10 There are Parisian Marxists, e.g., Lucien Goldmann and Joseph Gabel, who 
are of the opinion that a relationship exists between Heidegger and [Georg] 
Lukács. First of all, they want to draw attention to a number of biographical 
facts: During the pre-WWI period, Heidegger and Lukács moved in the 
wake of the Southwestern School of Neo-Kantianism. Both stood in a close 
relationship with Emil Lask. Secondly, and primarily, this opinion has the 
objective of substantiating that Heidegger had adopted important topics 
from Lukács. Die Seele und die Formen and Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein 
by Lukács appeared in 1911 and 1923. Sein und Zeit appeared in 1927. Themes 
taken up by Lukács which constitute the tragedy of life, reification, totality, 
history, and conscious being, are argued to have become Heidegger’s 
inauthentic and authentic Dasein, being-toward-death, objectification, being 
as a whole, time, historicity, and being. Both strive to resolve the reification 
and objectification predominant in the capitalist and modern world with a 
new historical concept of being, and to open a new historical horizon. The 
comparison between Lukács and Heidegger is intended to underscore a 
predominance by Lukács. Accordingly, the young Lukács is purported to 
have been a catalyst for Heidegger. A history of influences and encounters, 
anticipations, etc., always remains a confusing affair. The tendency 
implied by this comparison is quite evident. Does this reveal anything of 
significance? Does the Marxist, historical and philosophical, ideological 
and sociological school of thought espoused by Lukács exist at the same 
level as the metaphysical and ont0logical school of thought established by 
Heidegger with its failure to think the history of being, which is intended 
to overcome philosophy (metaphysics)? Should we not seek the roots of 
Heidegger’s thought in a different place and with different means? When 
such questions are asked, this simultaneously identifies the locus of their 
suitable answer. —The young Lukács grew older, and as a result, he entered 
another dimension: within the latter, he complained about Heidegger 
and piecemealed what he was no longer able or willing to comprehend 
sufficiently with polemical intent: see “Heidegger redivivus” (in Sinn und 
Form 1949, third no., a polemical work against the “Letter on ‘Humanism;’” 
Existentialismus oder Marxismus? (Berlin 1951); Die Zerstörung der Vernunft 
(Berlin 1954). EN: The texts by Lukács mentioned by Axelos are, respectively: 
Die Seele und die Formen (Berlin: Egon Fleischel & Co, 1911); translated by Anna 
Bostock as Soul and Forms, ed. John T. Saunders and Katie Terezakis (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2010); Geschichte und Klassenbewußtsein: 
51technology. Industrial labor and machines are manifestations of 
technology whose essence is still concealed from us. Marx enters 
an essential historical dimension; despite this, he could not yet 
fully answer the fundamental questions concerning technology, 
as we today are also still unable to. In his Freiburg lectures, 
“What is Called Thinking?” (1951/52), one could hear and now 
one can read the following: “Neither the industrial laborer, nor 
the engineers, nor even the factory owners, and least of all the 
state, are able to conceive of how humanity is actually situated 
today, when it exists in any relation to machinery or parts of a 
machine. None of us are already aware about the kind of hand-
work modern man must undertake in the technological world, 
and still must undertake even when they are not a worker in the 
sense of a laborer at a machine. Neither Hegel nor Marx were 
able to know this and ask the right questions, as their thinking 
could not yet avoid being obscured by the shadow of the essence 
of technology, for which reason they were never able to reach the 
free space where they could perceive this essence sufficiently.”11
Heidegger has often been accused of animosity towards 
technology, the rejection of technology, as well as a regressive if 
not reactionary attitude and approach. According to this all too 
widespread critique, romantic desire as well as an unmodern and 
non-progressive attitude characterize Heidegger’s work, to which 
the accusation of its unscientific quality is often added. Are these 
claims substantiated? Even if something correct is expressed 
in this manner, does this critique manage to reach the level of 
the essential? Does it address the fundamental tone and main 
Studien über marxistische Dialektik (Berlin: Malik, 1923); translated by Rodney 
Livingstone as History and Class Consciousness (London: Merlin, 1971); 
“Heidegger Redivivus,” Sinn und Form, no. 3 (1949): 37–62 (untranslated); 
Existentialismus oder Marxismus? (Berlin: Aufbau, 1951) (untranslated); Die Zer-
störung der Vernunft (Berlin: Aufbau 1954); The Destruction of Reason, trans. 
Peter R. Palmer (London: Merlin, 1980).
11 Martin Heidegger, Was heißt Denken? (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1954), 54–55. EN: 
GA, vol. 8, Was heißt Denken?, 27; What is Called Thinking?, trans. J. Glenn Gray 
and Fred D. Wieck (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), 24.
52 direction of Heidegger’s intellectual venture, which, as he says 
himself, is an attempt as well as a way of thinking which acquires 
its own failure as a gift? Is it indeed the case that this failing 
thought does not want to take note of the dawning planetary 
age? Must an age directed at success remain closed and foreign 
to such a failing intellectual venture, or are the crisis itself, the 
breach, and the alienation, which inhabit this epoch, coming up 
for discussion here?
Heidegger warns his readers about the passage quoted above 
regarding Hegel and Marx, whose thinking could not yet avoid 
being obscured by the shadow of the essence of technology. He 
warns about the kind of misunderstanding that rashly rein-
terprets that which has been said and heard. When Heidegger 
speaks, he frequently speaks of shepherds, farmers, and land, of 
field paths and timber tracks [Holzwege], of trees and mountains. 
All of that sounds agrarian, farmer-like. The Black Forest seems to 
be a dark mountain that obscures the lucid view of the unfolding 
of modernity. In the lecture What is Called Thinking, where he 
attempts to speak of the essence of technology and thinking as 
exceptional handwork, he chooses as an example the crafts-
manship of the village carpenter. He chooses this example. 
Certainly. But he warns: “The craft of the carpenter was chosen 
as an example and at the same time it was assumed that nobody 
would fall for the idea that choosing this example amounts to 
the announcement of the expectation that the condition of our 
planet can be transformed into a rural idyll in the near future, or 
indeed ever again.”12 Thus, the matter at hand is not to expect 
that the condition of the earth will ever be transformed back into 
a rural paradise.
Marx speaks very explicitly about the externalization, divestiture, 
objectification, alienation of modern man. Heidegger speaks 
of the objectification of all things which have being through 
12 Heidegger, Was heißt Denken?, 53–54. EN: GA, vol. 8, 26; What is Called 
Thinking?, 23.
53the will of subjectivity, of the homelessness of humanity in the 
modern era, of the abandonment by being, of the oblivion of 
being. Marx says that technicized labor leads to the denial of the 
human, and not only humans are alienated from their essence, 
but objects from their essence as well. Concerning a human 
he states: “as their life expression is also an alienation of life, 
their realization is an undoing of reality, an alien reality.”13 The 
realities undergoing alienation are the essential powers of the 
human, “the ontological essence of human passion,”14 “. . . as 
all human activity up to now has been labor, i.e.: industry, an 
self-alienated activity—we have in the mode of alienation the 
objectified essential powers of humanity before us in the form of 
sensual, foreign, useful objects.”15 Marx’s basic mood is not one of 
desire; Marx does not demand any return—“the humanism of 
Marx does not require a return to antiquity,” is what we read in 
the “Letter on ‘Humanism’”16 —, he expects even less that world 
history reverts to a rural idyll. In spite of this, however,—or for 
this very reason—Marx can write: “The dwelling in the light [the 
word ‘light’ is emphasized by Marx], which Prometheus names as 
one of the great gifts with which he made humans from savages, 
ceases to exist for the worker.”17 All humans have become 
workers, and what Marx sees and says not only concerns indus-
trial laborers: “The savage in his cave—that natural environment 
offering use and protection without reservation—does not feel 
more estranged, but feels as much at home as a fish in water. 
But the basement dwelling of the poor man is a hostile dwelling, 
13 Karl Marx, “Nationalökonomie und Philosophie,” in Die Frühschriften, 
ed. Siegfried Landshut (Stuttgart: Kröner, 1953), 239. EN: “Economic and 
Philosophical Manuscripts,” 351.
14 Marx, “Nationalökonomie und Philosophie,” 296. EN: “Economic and 
Philosophical Manuscripts,” 375.
15 Marx, “Nationalökonomie und Philosophie,” 244. EN: “Economic and 
Philosophical Manuscripts,” 354.
16 Heidegger, Über den Humanismus, 11. EN: GA, vol. 9, 321; “Letter on 
‘Humanism,’” 245.
17 Marx, “Nationalökonomie und Philosophie,” 256. EN: “Economic and 
Philosophical Manuscripts,” 359.
54 which binds him like some alien power and which only responds 
to his blood and sweat, and which he cannot consider a refuge 
where he could finally say: I am at home here, for he exists in the 
house of another, in an alien house . . .”18 After they are thrust into 
objectification and reification, the things themselves lose their 
essence: “Private property not only alienates the individuality of 
humans, but also that of objects as well. Land has nothing to do 
with ground rent, machines have nothing to do with profit.” This 
is the way the founder of Marxism chose his words.19
And what does Heidegger say? He says: “The decline [of the 
truth of beings] occurs most evidently in the collapse of a world 
defined by metaphysics and the desolation of the earth caused by 
metaphysics. Collapse and desolation achieve their characteristic 
consummation based on the fact that the human of metaphysics, 
the animal rationale, has been ‘held fast’ [‘fest-gestellt ’ ] as a 
laboring animal.”20 Heidegger says: Work “achieves the metaphys-
ical rank of the unconditional objectification of all that is present, 
which has become manifested as will to will.”21
II
The passages quoted here from the writings of Marx and 
Heidegger are not simple quotations intended to prove 
something. They do not intend to prove—and they do not intend 
to prove anything—that Marx and Heidegger are naming similar 
things. At best, they can indicate what Marx and Heidegger—in 
18 Marx, “Nationalökonomie und Philosophie,” 266. EN: “Economic and 
Philosophical Manuscripts,” 366.
19 Karl Marx, Die deutsche Ideologie (1845/46; Berlin: Dietz, 1953), 234. EN: The 
German Ideology (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1964), 248.
20 Martin Heidegger, “Überwindung der Metaphysik,” in Vorträge und Aufsätze 
(Pfullingen: G. Neske, 1954), 72. EN: GA, vol. 7, Vorträge und Aufsätze, 70; 
“Overcoming Metaphysics,” in The End of Philosophy, trans. Joan Stambaugh 
(London: Souvenir Press, 1975), 86.
21 Heidegger, “Überwindung der Metaphysik,” 72. EN: GA, vol. 7, 70; “Over-
coming Metaphysics,” 85.
55differing ways—attempt to think of as the same thing: within 
the cohesion of disjunction. The objection one can raise against 
this juxtaposition is correct. The objection goes: Marx thinks 
“ontically,” and in accordance with logic and dialectic, which 
means historically and epochally, sociologically, economically, 
anthropologically, politically; he is concerned with experience, 
true knowledge and the recognition of the empirical, real, realist, 
practical, concrete, objective, and sensually perceptible states 
of the modern world, in order to change it in an empirical, real, 
realist, practical, concrete, objective, sensual and meaningful 
way, through the true acknowledgement of the natural and social 
human, which should then lead to the actual satisfaction of their 
basic needs. Heidegger, on the other hand, thinks “ontologically 
and metaphysically,” as well as speculatively, which means in 
terms of the history of being and the world, he questions the 
difference, the rift between being [Sein] and beings [Seiendes]; he 
is concerned with thinking being itself, the being lying dormant in 
the oblivion of being, in a world that has become a surrounding 
world [Umwelt / environment], and he attempts to utilize his ques-
tioning to overcome metaphysics as the history of this oblivion of 
being, in order to open a new horizon in the receding clearing of 
the world.
All of that is correct. Marx and Heidegger do not say similar things 
by any means—their thought moves within the “selfsame.” This 
sameness encompasses both. Both stand on the bottomless 
foundation of the modern era, the epoch of subjectivity; both 
dare the attempt to overcome philosophy; both fight for a new 
understanding of being. Marx does not construe the difference 
between being and beings [Sein und Seiendem]; and perhaps 
Heidegger himself does not focus on certain vital aspects of 
being.
In a worldless world, one could reply in response to the 
comparison between Marx and Heidegger that neither Marx 
nor Heidegger are deep and significant thinkers who are able to 
say anything about the world. But in the name of what thought 
56 could the thinking of both of these thinkers be appraised? In the 
end, one could also reach a two-fold conclusion: that Marx is the 
greater of the two, subsuming Heidegger in his thought, so that 
only a Marxian—or even Marxist—interpretation of Heidegger 
remains. That Heidegger’s thought becomes lucid and com-
prehensible in the light of Marxian thought. Conversely, one 
could be of the opinion that Heidegger subsumes Marx, that 
Marx—and Marxism—can be completely and satisfactorily sub-
ordinated to Heidegger’s thought, or put roughly, that Heidegger 
supersedes Marx by going farther and taking a higher look. The 
history of philosophy influenced by doxography, philosophical 
studies, school philosophy, cultural philosophy, and cultural 
sociology tend to proceed in this way. They are not concerned 
with the “truth” but only with “opinions” that can be assimilated 
by one-dimensional thinking. The fact that a great thinker cannot 
supersede another great thinker, that the truth of thought and 
thinking the truth are and remain multi-dimensional, that the 
openness of the world cannot be exhaustively comprehended by 
one form of thought—as great as it may be, these are realizations 
denied by historians, ideologues, orthodox or heterodox sup-
porters or opponents of “-isms,” professors, and journalists. 
Higher-level ambiguity is none of their affair.
One wants to know, i.e., think very little about the subject of 
thought and being; one desires scientific interpretations above 
all. Thought and being? Being and thought? In the horizon of 
time? “Thought and being are indeed different [emphasized by the 
author himself] but simultaneously in unison with one another.” 
Who pronounced this sentence? Marx or Heidegger? Is it Marxian 
or Heideggerian? Does it exist in Marx’s Parisian manuscript or in 
Heidegger’s letter to his Parisian friend?
In order to understand Marx and Heidegger really and truly, 
it would be necessary to conceive of the history of philosophy 
both metaphysically and metaphilosophically. The pre-Socratics 
loom in the background, and both Marx and Heidegger make 
reference to Greek thinkers of early antiquity. In the opinion of 
57the one, Plato and Aristotle represent the beginning of system-
atic ideological alienation, whereas the other holds them to be 
the philosophical and metaphysical start of the oblivion of being. 
Christianity with its two worlds, as well as the claim to power of 
Christianity, are taken as seriously by the one as the other—but 
it must always be repeatedly asked in a banal tone: in different 
ways? The philosophy of German idealism and its culmination 
with Hegel, the last philosopher, are the points of departure for 
Marx. With Hegel, a great epoch ends and a complicated history 
begins. The collapse of German Idealism and Romanticism allows 
the rift in the world to appear. “The diremption [Diremption] of 
the world is not causal, if its sides are totalities. Thus, the world 
is ruptured and comes into relation to a philosophy that is an 
intrinsic whole. As a result, the appearance of the activity of this 
philosophy is also fragmented and contradictory; its objective 
generality converts to the subjective forms of individual con-
sciousness where it is alive. Common harps can be played by 
any hand; Aeolian harps only respond to the force of a storm. 
However, one should not be led astray by this storm, if one 
is following a great, a world philosophy,” are the words in the 
doctoral dissertation of the young Karl Marx, “The Difference 
Between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature.”22 
But does this imply that after Hegel a new way of thinking has 
stormed into existence? As was mentioned above, an adequate 
interpretation of Marx presupposes an interpretation of Hegel. 
We do not have one yet. It is not at all as simple as it might seem 
to discuss the relationship between Marx and Hegel. Marx does 
not place the Hegelian dialectic on its feet in a crystal-clear 
manner. And what does he do with the head of the Hegelian 
dialectic? Does Marx merely transcend Kantian and Hegelian 
analysis? Does he in fact fall short of their standards as well? The 
22 Karl Marx, “Aus der Doktordissertation” (1840), in Die Frühschriften 13. EN: 
“Notes to the doctoral Dissertation” (1839–41), in Writings of the Young Marx 
on Philosophy and Society, ed. Loyd D. Easton and Kurt H. Guddat (New York: 
Doubleday, 1967), 52–53.
58 fundamental approach taken by Marx can be used as a pivotal 
point: he no longer wishes to think speculatively and metaphys-
ically, as this way of thinking remains subjected to alienation; he 
desires to ascertain in a practical mode and effect change in a 
practical mode. But what occurs during this transformation?
An immediate historical leap does not lead from Hegel and 
Marx to Heidegger. Kierkegaard and Nietzsche also appear on 
the scene. For his part, Kierkegaard considers himself to be an 
opponent of Hegel; he fights for the exception, for existence, for 
the (lost) connection to God; is he merely or primarily a “relig-
ious author,” as Heidegger once described him? Nietzsche is a 
persevering puzzle: the lightning bolt that decimates everything, 
including the one who perceived it. Nietzsche’s thought, his 
terminology and thoughts remain puzzling; the words “puzzle” 
and “puzzling” here are not intended to conjure up any secret: 
they are only an expression of what cannot yet be said. For 
what should we, may we, and can we say? God is dead. The will 
to power rules. Nihilism begins its reign in the growing desert. 
The Übermensch has not yet arrived. Nobody experiences the 
innocence of becoming any more. The eternal recurrence of 
the same hides itself and becomes blocked. The supernatural, 
metaphysical and theological, divine Truth that bestows all 
meaning, God as a figurehead [Gestalt] of divinity, the whole of 
godliness are no longer present. God has been murdered. By the 
human? By the human as the plenipotentiary of the will to power? 
Is the time of nihilism also the time-space of the world game that 
peruses and plunges the earth-globe [Erdball]—this wandering 
star [Irrstern]—into errant being [ins Irrende wandernd]? Hidden 
in a nihilism beyond good and evil, neither meaningful nor 
meaningless, can we find the erring “truth” itself, “being” thrust 
into becoming, perhaps even the “divine madman,” whom 
Socrates was able to allude to so playfully? Let us reflect upon the 
Heraclitean-Platonic Cratylus where truth, aletheia, is interpreted 
as ale theia, divine madness, but only for a moment—in a Socratic 
and ironic, Heraclitean but Sophistic, misleading but truthful 
59
manner.23 Does the nothing, which is itself destroyed by nihilism, 
annihilate being and its truth, annihilate beings and its meaning? 
Does nihilism open a new temporal and planetary play-room 
[Spiel-Raum], which is only lacking the Übermensch? Salvation 
from revenge, consummated nihilism and nihilism overcome, 
resolved detachment and indifference—will they become a world, 
an innocent becoming, and allow it to flourish? A becoming which 
no longer opposes being? As regards the eternal recurrence of 
the same, we can indeed see what it obscures: the rotational 
movement of technology, the orbit of the planet earth, the plan-
etary rings, and the revolutions of world history. In all of these 
circles, the eternal recurrence of the same remains hidden, and 
eternity forms the mask of time.
Why have we attempted to repeat these questions from Nie-
tzsche’s thought? To what extent do they concern—or not con-
cern—Marx and Heidegger? Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche, Heidegger 
. . . Four names, four thinkers; four thinkers, who—each at his 
own pace—take and fall off the same path [auf demselben Wege 
gehen und fallen]. 
III
Marx describes a “world order” of divestiture, externalization, 
foreignness, and alienation. Nevertheless, a new destiny can 
ignite the world and allow world history to first evolve through 
this event. The necessary possibility is: the resolution of 
alienation, a “complete and conscious return of the human on the 
basis of the entire wealth of the prior development”24, a “true dis-
solution of the conflict between existence and essence, between 
objectification and self-affirmation, between freedom and 
23 Plato, Cratylus 421b. EN: Plato, Cratylus, trans. Harold N. Fowler, 
Greek-English edition (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1921), 421b.
24 Marx, “Nationalökonomie und Philosophie,” 235. EN: “Economic and 
Philosophical Manuscripts,” 348.
60 necessity.”25 This return to the essence of the human and world 
history, which has never been realized before, is a leap in the 
direction of the future and means the unfettering of technology 
and productivity. The “resurrection of nature,” which Marx speaks 
of, is at the same time and predominately the “consummated 
humanism of nature,” the practical acquisition of the natural 
being of the societal human. Marx also realizes on occasion that 
the essence of communism cannot manifest itself, that no true 
dissolution of the conflict must occur. He speaks of the “prereq-
uisite” of socialism-communism, and even writes on a tattered 
and barely legible page of the Parisian manuscript: “When we 
still describe communism—as the negation of negation, as the 
acquisition of human essences which actualizes itself through the 
negation of private property—for these very reasons as not yet 
the true position [emphasis by Marx], as it does not begin with 
itself, but much rather with private property,”26 this must imply 
that alienation has not actually been resolved. In spite of this, the 
path of abolishing private property must be taken. This measure 
must be carried out. “For us, communism is not a condition that 
should be established or an ideal according to which reality 
should direct itself. We call communism the actual movement 
that offsets the status quo. The conditions of this movement 
arise from the currently existing prerequisite,” are passages from 
another work which also was not published by Marx himself.27 
The activity that establishes communism is not a final one: com-
munism is “the actual momentum of human emancipation and 
self-recovery necessary for the coming historical development. 
Communism is the necessary form and energetic principle of 
the near future, but communism is not as such the objective 
25 Marx, “Nationalökonomie und Philosophie,” 235. EN: “Economic and 
Philosophical Manuscripts,” 348.
26 Marx, “Nationalökonomie und Philosophie,” 264. EN: “Economic and 
Philosophical Manuscripts,” 365.
27 Marx, Die deutsche Ideologie, 32. EN: The German Ideology, 47.
61of human development—the form of human society.”28 Com-
munism—provided that it has manifested itself in accordance 
with its essence or even: according to its empirical manifestation, 
i.e., its “impure” and rough realization—will be overcome itself. 
The activities and the movement, the active process that lead to 
communism, in order to realize it, will be overridden. “History 
will cause it to happen [this active process] and that movement, 
which we already know in thought as one that supersedes itself 
[eine sich selbst aufhebende], will undergo a very crude and wide-
ranging process in the empirical world. Nonetheless, we must 
consider it to be true progress that we have acquired in advance 
a consciousness that both apprehends limitation as the objective 
of historical development and is able to transcend it as well.”29 
Thus spoke the founder of Marxism, prior to the actualization of 
communism, about the negated process of socialization; what has 
already become negated in thought can only be overcome and 
negated within the process of its concrete manifestation (which 
is simultaneously negated manifestation). Not only the young 
Marx thinks this way. The young Marx cannot be separated from 
the mature and old Marx any more than the early Heidegger from 
the later, although there is a bridge that leads from their early 
to their later thought. The thought of a mature thinker can be 
even more elementary and more original, or also guide one onto 
steadier tracks—in relation to its initial development. In any case, 
a Marx who has grown older writes in the “Foreword” to the first 
volume of Capital (1867) what the younger Marx had already said 
earlier: “Along with modern exigencies, we are burdened by an 
entire series of inherited exigencies which have arisen from the 
continuing vegetation of ancient, outmoded means of production 
with their train of anachronistic social and political conditions. We 
do not only suffer because of the living, we also suffer because 
28 Marx, “Nationalökonomie und Philosophie,” 248. EN: “Economic and 
Philosophical Manuscripts,” 358.
29 Marx, “Nationalökonomie und Philosophie,” 265. EN: “Economic and 
Philosophical Manuscripts,” 365.
62 of the dead. Le mort saisit le vif!”30 The dead (le mort) which assails 
the living (le vif ) does not possess merely an economic, political, 
and social character.
The world order intended to bring order to the world as a world, 
does not appear to be a matter for tomorrow. Perhaps it is not 
even possible to bring the world in order with order. “Humanity 
strives in vain to bring the earth-globe in order with its plans,” 
are the words of Heidegger wandering along his field path 
[Feldweg],31 where he dares to go off the beaten track [Holzwege]. 
“World-withdrawal and world-decay cannot ever be reversed,” 
he writes in Off the Beaten Track.32 So—what should we think 
and do? Go marching ahead? To where? For what? Prepare new 
growth and cultivate it immediately? “As reality consists in the 
regularity of predictable calculation, the human must also cope 
with uniformity in order to measure up to reality”; such is the 
message of a phrase from that intellectual pursuit dedicated to 
“overcoming metaphysics,” i.e., the overcoming of philosophy 
as “correspondence that gives speech to the beckoning of the 
being of beings”33,—a correspondence which allows the truth of 
being to rest within the oblivion of being. Marx—although in a 
different sense—also aimed for the negation of philosophy, to 
which Nietzsche likewise made a powerful contribution. Is it all 
30 Karl Marx, Das Kapital: Kritik der politischen Ökonomie, Bd. 1 (Berlin: Dietz, 
1955), 7. EN: “Preface to the First Edition,” in Capital: A Critique of Political 
Economy, vol. 1, trans. Ben Fowkes (London: Penguin in association with New 
Left Review, 1976), 91.
31 Martin Heidegger, Der Feldweg (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klausmann, 
1953), 4. EN: “Der Feldweg,” in GA, vol. 13, Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens 1910–
1976, 89; “The Pathway,” trans. Thomas F. O’Meara, rev. Thomas Sheehan, in 
Heidegger: The Man and the Thinker, ed. Thomas Sheehan (New Brunswick, 
NY: Transaction Publishers, 1981), 69–71.
32 Martin Heidegger, “Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes,” in Holzwege (Frankfurt 
am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1950), 30. EN: GA, vol. 5, Holzwege, 26; “The 
Origin of the Work of Art,” in Off the Beaten Track, ed. and trans. Julian Young 
and Kenneth Haynes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 20.
33 Heidegger, Was ist das – die Philosophie?, 46. EN: GA, vol. 11, 26; What is 
Philosophy?, 96–97.
63that important to stress the differences here? Do differences still 
exist? The oblivion of being forgets the divide [Unterschied]—the 
difference [Differenz]—, which holds sway between being [Sein] 
and beings [Seiendes]. But has not everything today become 
undifferentiated to the highest degree, indifferent, detached? 
“Indiscrimination affirms the priorly ensured existence of the 
non-world of the abandonment by being. Earth appears as the 
un-world of errancy [Irrnis]. In terms of the history of be-ing 
[Seyn], it is the wandering star [Irrstern]”.34 Errance itself, which 
is more deeply fundamental than going astray, nevertheless 
demands to be experienced and apprehended by thought. 
Philosophy, as metaphysics, was unable to think errance in a 
truthful manner; can then metaphysics, which culminates in 
planetary technology, still provide assistance in understanding 
errance? But if a triumphant metaphysics was unable to accom-
plish this, how can a philosophy that has already attained 
completion successfully analyze the “essence” of errance? Will a 
future way of thinking be capable of experiencing the “truth” as 
“errance” and “errance” as the truth—but without any disjunction 
whatsoever? It appears that it would be necessary first of all to 
consider being on the wrong track, the destiny of the wandering 
star in world history. The planetary form of thought, which has 
been given this dangerous gift, still lingers behind the planetary 
thought of the future. The planetary horizon has not yet opened. 
Let us return once again to Heidegger’s intellectual attempt to 
overcome metaphysics in order to be able to dare later to advance 
even further; one reads: “Metaphysics in its completion, which 
is the ground for the planetary form of thought, provides the 
structure for a presumably long-term order of the earth. This 
order does not require philosophy any more, as philosophy 
already forms its basis. But the end of philosophy does not 
imply that thought has also reached its end, it is much rather in 
34 Heidegger, “Überwindung der Metaphysik,” 97. EN: GA, vol. 7, 96; “Over-
coming Metaphysics,” 108–9. Seyn is Heidegger’s archaic spelling of Sein—
beyng in place of being, or be-ing.
64 transition to another beginning.”35 The planetary form of thought 
certainly does not imply the consummation of planetary thought 
exclusively. On the entire surface of the earth, the planetary form 
of thought generalizes the whole history of metaphysics and its 
mode of thought scientifically and philosophically, ideologically 
and metaphysically, anthropologically and psychologically, in a 
universally historical manner and sociologically, literarily, and 
aesthetically. The planetary form of thought necessarily belongs 
to planetary technology, and the union of both is bound to the 
becoming of the wandering star. As a consequence, planetary 
thought, provided that it may be termed as such, experiences 
errance as the history of being and the world, espies as an 
intellectual faculty a new beginning, and is directed towards the 
future. By attempting to liberate world history from the burden 
of the brute past in order to allow time to temporalize and man-
ifest itself as the having-been, as presence, and primarily, as the 
future, Marx and Heidegger are perhaps guides to this future 
thought of tomorrow. The “destruction” which they carry out 
fragmentarily is the destruction of the externalized production 
of life and its ideological superstructure, the destruction of an 
understanding of being still bound by metaphysics and lost in the 
oblivion of being.
Both know that world and the human (being and Dasein)—as 
they are—are at the same time nothing; what they seek is 
everything—the one-all. Naturally, i.e., historically, both of them 
are also in error. But perhaps not enough so. The Thinker as Poet 
gives us a hint, as Heidegger writes: “Whoever thinks greatly, 
must err greatly”36. This erring, however, should not be mis-
understood in an all too erroneous and trite manner. Marx and 
Heidegger are on the way to turning logic and rationality upside 
35 Heidegger, “Überwindung der Metaphysik,” 83. EN: GA, vol. 7, 81; “Over-
coming Metaphysics,” 95–96.
36 Martin Heidegger, Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens (Pfullingen: G. Neske, 1954), 
17. EN: “Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens,” in GA, vol. 13, 81; “The Thinker as 
Poet,” in Poetry, Language, Thought (New York: Harper Perennial, 2001), 9.
65down. It is not at all the case that Marx is attempting to grasp 
the transformation and the “conversion of history into world 
history”37 in the name of “reason.” He is not even striving for a 
dialectical logic, let alone that he had ever spoken of “dialectical 
materialism.” But just as little as Heidegger does he demand anti-
reason, irrationalism. When Heidegger dares to say: “Thinking 
first begins when we have experienced that reason, which has 
been glorified for centuries, is the most stubborn nemesis of 
thought,” he is not merely wandering Off the Beaten Track;38 he is 
taking intellectual pains, in a preliminary manner, to prepare the 
way for the planetary thought of the future, for a language that 
errs and thinks, and attempts to develop a questioning reply to 
the beckoning of planetary destiny in world history, but which 
perseveres in openness without ever becoming inflexible or 
rigid.39
IV
Who among us does not know that Marx is concerned with 
praxis, with “practical, human and sensual activity,”40 and that the 
main point is to change the world concretely and revolutionarily 
37 Marx, Die deutsche Ideologie, 44. EN: The German Ideology, 48.
38 Martin Heidegger, “Nietzsches Wort ‘Gott ist tot,’” in Holzwege, 247. EN: GA, 
vol. 5, 267; “Nietzsche’s Word: ‘God is Dead,’” in Off the Beaten Track, 199.
39 As a convention under Heidegger’s supervision was taking place in 
Cerisy-la-Salle (Normandy) in the August of 1955, and after the lecture 
“What is Philosophy?” / ”Was ist das – die Philosophie?” (“Qu’est-ce que la 
philosophie?”) had been held, a turbulent and confused discussion broke 
out. Everyone wanted to finally know the truth about Heidegger’s thought. 
At the end of the initial day of discussion, Heidegger ended the session with 
the following words of the painter Braque: Les preuves fatiguent la vérité [EN: 
Proofs tire truth]. And after seven days, at the conclusion of the session, 
Heidegger once again closed with another excellent thought from Braque: 
Penser et raisonner font deux [EN: Thought and rationality are two things]. 
Another notation from Braque indicates the same; it reads: L’erreur n’est pas 
le contraire de la vérité [EN: Error is not the opposite of truth].
40 Karl Marx, “Thesen über Feuerbach,” no. 8. EN: This is actually a reference to 
Thesis no 5. “Concerning Feuerbach,” in Early Writings, 422.
66 instead of merely interpreting it in various ways philosophically 
and theoretically?41 Everything, the entirety of beings, should 
enter the circle of productive human praxis and be brought 
forth through the same; certainly: this “everything” should be 
reflected by “human praxis” and gain its form through the latter; 
however, Marx also adds: “and by the comprehension of this 
praxis”42; thus, the intellectual comprehension of intervening 
praxis appears on the scene, although as a subsidiary power and 
machination. On the other hand—but what does “on the other 
hand” mean when Heidegger himself calls our attentions to it: 
“If there were adversaries in thought and not merely opponents, 
the situation for thought would be more favorable”43—isn’t it the 
same Heidegger who demands that we liberate ourselves from 
a technical interpretation of thought? “Its beginnings date back 
to Plato and Aristotle. Thought itself is regarded as techne there, 
a process of deliberation in the services of doing and making. 
In this context, however, deliberation is viewed in relation to 
praxis and poíesis. For this reason, thought—regarded on its 
own terms—is not ‘practical.’ The characterization of thought as 
theoria and the determination of apprehension as a ‘theoretical’ 
behavior occurs within the ‘technical’ interpretation of thought. 
It represents the reactive attempt to save the autonomy of 
thought after all in comparison with acting and doing.”44 Does this 
mean, then, that thinking is not an activity, or—provided that it 
is a peculiar form of action or could become one—that it would 
no longer be conceptual thought? It is difficult for us to under-
stand how a form of thought attempting to think ahead into the 
truth of being (the “meaning” of “being”) can at the same time 
surpass all theoretical contemplation and knowledge as well as 
all practical activity and production. “Thus, thinking is an activity. 
41 Marx, “Thesen über Feuerbach,“ no. 1. EN: “Concerning Feuerbach,” 423.
42 Marx, “Thesen über Feuerbach,“ no. 8. EN: “Concerning Feuerbach,” 423.
43 Heidegger, Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens, 9. EN: GA, vol. 13, 77; “The Thinker 
as Poet,” 5.
44 Heidegger, Über den Humanismus, 6. EN: GA, vol. 9, 314; “Letter on 
‘Humanism,’” 240.
67But an activity that at the same time surpasses all praxis.”45 Why 
can’t we set off on our way, inspired by a form of thought which 
is neither theoretical nor practical—i.e., more fundamental than 
this distinction—, whilst considering “that there is a thought more 
strict than conceptual thought”?46 Is it truly impossible for us to 
liberate ourselves from the instrumental use of “thought,” from 
the institutional and cultural business of thinking, and unite with 
its most considerable aspects?
When Sartre defines his Existentialism as humanism and brings 
it into association with Marxism (within the empire of “-isms”), 
he simultaneously views existence as entirely rootless and 
restrictive, the humanity of humankind too anthropologically, 
and fails to grasp the essence of Marxism. He is unable to enter 
a dialogue with Marxism, as he remains caught in sundry pros 
and contras, merely occupies himself with particularities, and is 
not in a position to perceive the greater whole. For this reason, 
Heidegger writes to Jean Beaufret, using specific terms from 
Sartre: “Thought is not only l’engagement dans l’action for and 
through beings [Seiendes] in the sense of the reality of the current 
situation. Thought is l’engagement through and for the truth of 
being. Its history is never past, it always stands shortly before. 
The history of being bears and determines every condition et situ-
ation humaine.”47
Therefore, the matter at hand is destiny, our destiny, the his-
tory of being, world history (and not universal history). Who 
among us does not know that for Marx the world—the true, 
real, effected—world is to be viewed as “the sensual world, as 
the total living sensual activity of the individuals constituting” 
45 Heidegger, Über den Humanismus, 45. EN: GA, vol. 9, 361; “Letter on 
‘Humanism,’” 274.
46 Heidegger, Über den Humanismus, 41. EN: GA, vol. 9, 357; “Letter on 
‘Humanism,’” 271.
47 Heidegger, Über den Humanismus, 56 [EN: a typo for 5–6]. EN: GA, vol. 9, 314; 
“Letter on ‘Humanism,’” 240.
68 it?48 The extrasensory belongs to the superstructure and is 
determined by religious and ideological alienation, it is an “ideal 
supplement” to the real world. Heidegger is also aware of this 
and can even state: “The extrasensory becomes an empty by-
product of the sensual.”49 This “degradation ends in meaningless-
ness.”50 The extrasensory world is, however, the metaphysical 
world; “If, then, the essence of nihilism is borne in a history in 
which the appearance of beings as such as a whole [das Seiende 
als solches im Ganzen] in the truth of being does not occur, and 
accordingly, being itself and its truth are nothing, it follows that 
metaphysics—as the history of the truth of all things that have 
being as such—is nihilism in its very essence. If metaphysics is 
the complete historical foundation of Occidental and European 
world history, then this history is nihilistic in an entirely different 
sense.”51 Nihilism as the empire of the mastery of the will to 
will—already Nietzsche saw that: the will “would rather will the 
nothing than not will”—, and as the epoch of technology (itself 
understood as “metaphysics in completion”), perhaps forms the 
core of Marxism, its driving truth. A metaphysics both com-
plete and “overcome,” which converts to technology and thus—
changed and transformed—“returns” and remains in dominance, 
becomes one with nihilism. “Nihilism is the world-historical 
movement of the peoples of the earth drawn into modernity’s 
sphere of power.”52 But it is not “only” that. “Nihilism means: with 
everything in every respect, the nothing is going on. ‘Everything’ 
means beings as a whole. However, a being exists, when it is 
experienced as a being in each of its aspects. Nihilism means that 
48 Marx, Die deutsche Ideologie, 42. EN: The German Ideology, 59.
49 Heidegger, “Nietzsches Wort ‘Gott ist tot,’” 193. EN: GA, vol. 5, 209; “The Word 
of Nietzsche: ‘God is Dead,’” 157.
50 Heidegger, “Nietzsches Wort ‘Gott ist tot,’” 193. EN: GA, vol. 5, 209; “The Word 
of Nietzsche: ‘God is Dead,’” 157.
51 Heidegger, “Nietzsches Wort ‘Gott ist tot,’” 244. EN: GA, vol. 5, 264; “The 
Word of Nietzsche: ‘God is Dead,’” 197.
52 Heidegger, “Nietzsches Wort ‘Gott ist tot,’” 201–202. EN: GA, vol. 5, 218; “The 
Word of Nietzsche: ‘God is Dead,’” 163–64.
69it is nothing in relation to the whole of beings as such. But beings 
[Seiendes] are what they are and how they are due to being [Sein]. 
Assuming that all that ‘is’ is so due to being, then the essence of 
nihilism consists in its being nothing in relation to being itself. 
Being itself is being in its truth, and this truth belongs to being.”53 
Nevertheless, the experience of being itself—its meaning and 
truth—has never occurred. Not with the pre-Platonic thinkers, 
either. “The history of being begins—and indeed necessarily—
with the forgetfulness of being.”54 This is itself an event—but not 
the event [Ereignis]—and it is not merely an omission; the destiny 
of being, within the oblivion of being, should not be attributed 
to a diminished faculty of human thinking. Being itself conceals 
itself, detaches itself, and remains absent. However, this absence 
always takes place by virtue of “a presence and is determined by 
this presence,”55 and presence itself pervades this transcendence, 
transcending that which disappears. The nothing that negates, 
the nothing that belongs to being—and not merely the nothing 
that is void and destructive and annihilated—, “much rather 
affirms [. . .] itself as an exceptional presence, and veils [. . .] 
itself as such a presence.”56 The nothing—which negates, which 
even becomes present as “the other” to all things which have 
being, as non-being, essences “as being”57—is more fundamental 
than this other negation as well as every “not.” As absence, the 
nothing disrupts presence [Anwesen], negates it, but does not 
annihilate it. History is and remains the history of the oblivion 
53 Heidegger, “Nietzsches Wort ‘Gott ist tot,’” 245. EN: GA, vol. 5, 265–66; “The 
Word of Nietzsche: ‘God is Dead,’” 198
54 Heidegger, “Nietzsches Wort ‘Gott ist tot,’” 243. EN: GA, vol. 5, 263; “The 
Word of Nietzsche: ‘God is Dead,’” 196.
55 Martin Heidegger, Zur Seinsfrage (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 
1956), 32. EN: “Zur Seinsfrage,” GA, vol. 9, 413; “On the Question of Being,” in 
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56 Heidegger, Zur Seinsfrage, 23. EN: GA, vol. 9, 402–3; “On the Question of 
Being,” 304.
57 Martin Heidegger, Was ist Metaphysik?, 5th ed. (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio 
Klostermann, 1949), 41. EN: ”Nachwort zu ‘Was ist Metaphysik? ’,” in GA, vol. 9, 
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70 of being, and leads into the beginning planetary consummation 
of nihilism, with which the final phase of nihilism only and first 
begins. Being itself, its truth and its meaning, be-ing [Seyn], has 
always remained forgotten. The being of beings remains absent 
and even undergoes annihilation in the oblivion of being, which 
is only now beginning to reach completion. But now, the truth of 
beings also perishes and a world characterized by metaphysics 
collapses. “The decline of the truth of beings implies: the reveala-
bility of beings, and only beings lose the previous singularity 
of their authoritative claim.”58 Nihilism negates and annihilates 
being that has always been forgotten, being that has been 
“crossed out,” but simultaneously “the essence of the nothing in 
its former kinship with ‘being,’”59 and consummates the decline 
of the truth of beings. The nihilism that pervades being on the 
wrong track is not, however, “untrue,” it is not by any means 
a going astray. “The essence of nihilism is neither curable nor 
incurable [heilbar noch unheilbar], it is the heal-less [das Heil-lose], 
but as such a unique reference to the salutary [ins Heile].”60 In any 
event nihilism—as the “normal state” of humanity—cannot be 
overcome exclusively through “reactive attempts against [it] that 
strive for the re-establishment of previous circumstances instead 
of coming to terms with its essence.”61 Overcoming nihilism can 
only become an option subsequent to its realization, its con-
summation, and the beginning of its final phase. This end and the 
new beginning are not yet perceptible. Perhaps we are as of yet 
far removed from an experience of the truth of nihilism. In this 
context, the truth of nihilism means: that which corresponds to 
the essence of the oblivion of being, the collapse of the world, the 
58 Heidegger, “Überwindung der Metaphysik,” 72. EN: GA, vol. 7, 70; “Over-
coming Metaphysics,” 85.
59 Heidegger, Zur Seinsfrage, 29. EN: GA, vol. 9, 410; “On the Question of Being,” 
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60 Heidegger, Zur Seinsfrage, 9. EN: GA, vol. 9, 388; “On the Question of Being,” 
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61 Heidegger, Zur Seinsfrage, 13. EN: GA, vol. 9, 392; “On the Question of Being,” 
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71essence of technology and labor, absolute productivity, the will 
to will. In nihilism, it is not only the being of beings which remains 
absent, being “crossed out” (being as being, be-ing [Seyn], rests 
from its essential origins within the oblivion of being); it is not 
only void (in the sense of the detached nothing as well as the 
nothing that negates and yet belongs to being) in relation to this 
being; the nothing itself remains absent. Man as the “shepherd 
of being” and “governor of the nothing” experiences neither 
being nor the nothing, and this concealment conceals itself and 
cannot be reduced to the activities or omissions of humanity. 
The consummation and overcoming of nihilism could—much 
likelier than “being”—allow the nothing (which neither possesses 
meaning nor is meaningless) to manifest itself. Heidegger poses 
the question in the following way and attempts to respond to it: 
“Does the nothing disappear with the consummation, or at least, 
the overcoming of nihilism? Presumably, this overcoming will only 
then occur when the essence of the nothing in its kinship with 
‘being’ can arrive and find refuge with us mortals, instead of the 
appearance of the nihilative nothing.”62 Dare we comprehend the 
playroom of nihilism as a space reserved for the nothing? May 
one dare to perceive the play of time itself as an open horizon 
within which the nothing-being of world-being [Nichts-Sein des 
Welt-Seins], which is neither meaningful nor meaningless, neither 
extrasensory nor sensual, will act as a game and unfold its errant 
truth in a planetary manner?
Heidegger asks: “To where do being and the nothing belong, 
between which the play [emphasized by me] of nihilism unfolds 
its essence?”63 We shall dare to make reference to the world game 
of nothing-being, within the dimension where nihilism is over-
come, and to the play of time of true errance as the possibility 
of an entirely new clearing of being, as the possibility of an open 
62 Heidegger, Zur Seinsfrage, 29. EN: GA, vol 9, 410; “On the Question of Being,” 
309–10. 
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72 world that will survive the consummation of nihilism and persist 
beyond it. The “game of mirrors of the world” which Heidegger 
refers to, from which things become, become present, occur, and 
manifest themselves,64 could be—as a world game—this open 
temporal space where being (even in its truth) and the nothing 
have negated themselves. The experience of absence is perhaps 
the fundamental experience of tomorrow. This new possibility 
of a clearing of nothing-being, this possibility of a new and 
open world-being, this possibility of an understanding of being 
within the game is perhaps already a necessity, a possibility cor-
responding to world exigency. After nihilism has not only voided 
the being of beings [Sein des Seienden], but even beings [Seiendes] 
as well, if we are prepared to realize that no previous unfolding 
of truth and no revelation of the world as a whole was true, and 
also could not remain as it was, we shall also be ready to put 
everything at stake against the horizon of the world play of world 
time.
V
Our topic was and is: Marx and Heidegger. And we arrived at 
nihilism. Why did we arrive at nihilism? How did nihilism come to 
us? On the way to Marx, on the way to Heidegger? Or is nihilism 
itself the main road? It could appear that we had forgotten Marx 
somewhat in favor of Heidegger. But is that actually the case? 
Do not externalization and divestiture, objectification, and 
alienation, just as much as the oblivion of being, homelessness, 
and unconditional objectification of beings, belong to the essence 
of nihilism? At the same time, does not the practical attempt 
to resolve alienation belong to the essence of nihilism, whilst 
even consummating the latter and allowing it to first achieve 
dominance in its unconditional “truth”? Did even Marx know 
about this when he realized that an opposite remains bound to 
64 Martin Heidegger, “Das Ding,” in Vorträge und Aufsätze, 180. EN: GA, vol. 7, 
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73its antithesis? “The supersession of self-estrangement takes the 
same course as self-estrangement.”65 This thought occurred to 
Marx and stands before us now.
Neither Heidegger nor this work attempt in the least to degrade 
Marxian thought. Is it not Heidegger who gives the history 
of being—of truth—expression while commemorating the 
oblivion of being? Being that gives of itself and denies of itself, 
that culminates in destiny, does it not achieve manifestation in 
sundry ways? “With its inversions through Marx and Nietzsche, 
absolute metaphysics belongs to the history of the truth of 
being. Whatever originates from it, cannot be affected or much 
less eliminated by refutation. [. . .] All refutation in the sphere of 
essential thought is foolish. The dispute between the thinkers 
is the “ ‘lovers’ quarrel’ of the matter itself,” is a quotation from 
the “Letter on ‘Humanism.’”66 Marx inverts metaphysics with 
metaphysical means, and thus remains within the domain of the 
dichotomy: sensual-extrasensory; Marx does not transcend the 
concept of subjectivity; he even over-generalizes it. At the same 
time, however, he opens another space. It would not be correct 
to maintain that—in the case of Marx and Heidegger—different 
interpretative approaches to the same circumstances can be dis-
cerned. All the same, the circumstances remain obscure.
The dialogue between Heidegger and Marx, provided that such 
a dialogue is at issue here, requires an appropriate space and 
the correct time. If we intend to subjugate this dialogue to the 
polemic “Heidegger and Marxism,” it will probably not be pos-
sible to find an exit, let alone a way that leads to the asking of the 
question. It is a fact that Heidegger says nothing about class con-
flict, about the proletariat, about capitalistic exploitation. He says 
nothing in favor of them and nothing against them. Just as he says 
65 Marx, “Nationalökonomie und Philosophie,” 232. EN: “Economic and 
Philosophical Manuscripts,” 345.
66 Heidegger, Über den Humanismus, 23–24. EN: GA, vol. 9, 336; “Letter on 
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74 nothing about sexuality and eroticism. Can we not read in The 
Essence of Reasons in regard to the neutrality of Dasein in relation 
to “sexuality [Geschlechtlichkeit]”: “All essential propositions of 
an ontological analytic of Dasein in humans regard this being 
[Seiendes] in advance in its neutrality”?67 Heidegger also attempts 
to think through so-called societal or political neutrality. He 
knows that the “private existence” bent on staying away from the 
“dictatorship of the public arena” does not at all coincide with the 
“free human being.” Setting aside and withdrawal to the private 
sphere remain rigidly dependent—in a peculiar fashion—upon 
that which has been rejected, and receive their nourishment 
with reluctance, in servitude, from dominance. The event of 
encounter within affiliation does not have its roots in the ego 
or in “the they [das Man]”—and not in the connection between 
being and human. “If humans wish to come into the nearness of 
being once again, they must first learn to exist in namelessness. 
Similarly, they must learn to recognize both the seduction of the 
public as well as the powerlessness of the private. Before a word 
is uttered, the human must first be spoken to by being again, 
and perceive the risk that this aspiration may entail having little 
or seldom anything to say.”68 These “once again” and “again” do 
not imply a mere return to the past, as little as an unhistorical 
recurrence, a repetition. Marx also characterizes the process of 
historical movement “as reintegration or the return of the human 
as such.”69 A return to the origins, an origin that was never factual 
in the sense of an original situation played out in some past time, 
means: a leap into the future. Often, Heidegger has no term for 
this leap. In his way of proceeding, Heidegger neither evades the 
voice of stillness nor keeping silent.
67 Martin Heidegger, Vom Wesen des Grundes, 4th ed. (1929; Frankfurt am Main: 
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75Do superiority or shortcomings conceal themselves in this 
thought? Have we said anything when we answer: neither-
nor? Do we progress anywhere when we attempt to transcend 
the question: either-or through our very questioning? Has the 
question been resolved with the claim: Heidegger opens a 
horizon within which class conflicts and sexual encounters, past 
occurrences and preparations for the future are acted out and 
squandered? Is justice a concern for Heidegger? Which justice? 
One that we do not yet understand: “In order to prepare an 
understanding of justice [. . .] we must neutralize all conceptions 
about justice that originate from Christian, humanist, Enlight-
enment, bourgeois, and socialist morality,” is a passage from Off 
the Beaten Track.70 Does this imply then that Heidegger wants to 
surpass Marxism and socialism, or does he even fail to penetrate 
their problematical essence? Does he stand on this side or that 
side of the issue and which way does he go? All of this appears 
to be so completely inaccessible through a given methodology. 
The method—but which one?—is it a way, a methodos? Is dialectic 
the most exceptional of methods? Marx did not mention dialectic 
very much at all. He did, however, think dialectically, is the 
response one receives to this. But what does dialectically mean? 
Does anybody exist who did not think “dialectically” and was also 
considered a thinker? By interpreting Hegel, Heidegger nec-
essarily encounters the question of dialectic. He states the issue 
as follows: “Likewise, the problem may be left undecided whether 
dialectic is merely a mode of perception of whether it belongs to 
objective reality itself as something real. The problem remains 
a pseudo-problem as long as it has not been determined what 
the reality of the real consists of, to the extent this reality lies 
within the being of consciousness, and what the circumstances 
of such being are. The elaborations about dialectic are akin to 
the process of explaining a surging spring on the basis of the 
stagnant water of a sewer. Perhaps the way to the spring is still 
70 Heidegger, “Nietzsches Wort ‘Gott ist tot,’” 157. EN: GA, vol. 5, 246–47; “The 
Word of Nietzsche: ‘God is Dead,’” 184.
76 far off.”71 Therefore, dialectic cannot be adequately interpreted 
in terms of the motion: thesis, antithesis, synthesis (or: position, 
negation, negation of negation), nor as infinite negativity. It is 
neither subjective nor objective, neither logical nor ontic. What 
is it? That which remains to be comprehended from logos and 
the “dialogue,” from the correspondence to the beckoning of 
being, from language (logos) and contradiction, from dispute and 
antagonism, from “being” and becoming, from subjectivity and 
material substantiality—and their dynamic, from implication 
and confusion. Dialectic, “however, as a dialectic of the history 
of being, transmuted into historical dialectical materialism, 
determines the history of humanity today in manifold ways. The 
world historical conflict [Auseinandersetzung] of our era has much 
older origins than the political and economic power struggles in 
the foreground would like us to think.”72 Whatever is in the fore-
ground does not for this reason lose its relation to its underlying 
foundation. Its underlying foundation [Grund] and abyss 
[Abgrund]. Then: “Precisely this is what appears as that which 
must now be thought, namely: being ‘is’ the abyss [Ab-grund], 
and accordingly, being and ground [Grund] are the same. To the 
extent being ‘is’ grounded, and only to this extent, it is without 
any ground.”73 Would then being cease to have any foundation 
in order to be thrust into the game as being? The vicissitudes 
of destiny and of the evasion of being—could they be taken up 
by the world game itself and dissolved within the play of time? 
The “why” question—could it be converted into the questioning 
answer “without why,” neither groundless nor grounding, neither 
in the tone of a tragedy nor in the style of a comedy—without 
71 Martin Heidegger, “Hegels Begriff der Erfahrung,” in Holzwege, 168. EN: 
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77having to explain through beings [Seiendes] the openness of the 
open horizon?
Do the unleashed production and reduction of the world 
(genitivus subjectivus and objectivus) proceed “dialectically”? Or 
rather, does dialectic provide us with serious ontic explanations 
or a playful ontological understanding of the world? And how 
does dialectic function within the whole ontic-ontological 
relation? Every understanding of dialectic—even when it is 
endeavored knowingly—remains problematical. Heidegger states 
rightly so: “prepared by Kant, thought has been brought in certain 
aspects to the highest dimension of its possibilities through 
the efforts of the thinkers Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. Thinking 
becomes knowingly dialectical. Moving within this dialectical 
sphere, and indeed, stirred even more by its unfathomed depths, 
are the poetic minds of Hölderlin and Novalis. The theoretical and 
speculative, thoroughly executed unfolding of dialectic within 
the completeness of its purview is carried out in Hegel’s work 
with the title The Science of Logic.”74 Nevertheless, the ques-
tion still remains open: which dialectic—i.e., which language 
and which thought, which logic and which reality and in which 
relation and in which differentiated unity—comes to dominance? 
“Admittedly, as soon as dialectic is the topic, someone notes that 
there is a dialectical materialism. One takes it for a worldview, 
treats it as an ideology. But with this ascertainment we neglect 
deeper reflection on the matter, instead of recognizing that: 
today, dialectic is a reality, perhaps even the reality of the world. 
Hegel’s dialectic is one of the thoughts—brought forth from 
afar—‘that direct the world’, with equal significance there where 
dialectical materialism is believed, as well as there where—only 
74 Martin Heidegger, “Grundsätze des Denkens,” Jahrbuch für Psychologie und 
Psychotherapie 6, no. 1/3 (1958): 34. EN: GA, vol. 79, Bremer und Freiburger 
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trans.  Andrew J. Mitchell (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2012), 
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78 in a somewhat altered style of the same thought—it has been 
refuted. Behind this, as one says: ideological conflict, the war for 
world dominance rages on. Behind this war, however, a dispute 
persists through which Occidental thought remains at odds with 
itself. Its final triumph, to which it is beginning to rise, consists in 
the fact that this thought has forced nature to surrender nuclear 
energy.”75 The whole and holistic—and simultaneously frag-
mentary—“dialectical” play of world production and reduction 
cannot be comprehended by either the dynamic of thought 
and reflection, or by concrete motion and activity, although 
Heidegger is able to write: “in an earlier work published from his 
posthumous writings [‘National Economy and Philosophy ’],76 Karl 
Marx states that ‘the entire so-called history of the world is nothing 
other than the generation of humanity through human labor, 
as the becoming nature of humans.’ [. . .] Many will reject this 
interpretation of world history and the concept of the essence 
of the human underlying it. But nobody can deny that—as the 
work of the self-production of humanity—technology, industry, 
and economics decisively determine the actuality of the actual 
today. Already this determination removes us from the dimension 
of thought within which the quoted passage from Marx about 
world history as ‘the labor of the self-production of the human’ 
is moving. For in this context the word ‘labor’ does not designate 
mere activity and performance. The word speaks in the sense of 
Hegel’s concept of labor, which is conceived as the fundamental 
factor of the dialectical process that allows the becoming of the 
real to unfold and complete its actuality. The fact that Marx, 
in contrast to Hegel, does not see the essence of reality in an 
absolute spirit in the process of comprehending itself, but rather 
in humanity producing itself and its means of sustenance, does 
indeed place Marx in stark contrast to Hegel, but this contrast 
allows Marx to remain within Hegelian metaphysics; for the life 
75 Heidegger, “Grundsätze des Denkens,” 37. EN: GA, vol. 79, 88; Bremen and 
Freiburg Lectures, 84.
76 EN: The additions in brackets are from Axelos.
79and workings of reality is everywhere the process of labor as 
dialectic and, i.e., as thought to the extent the actual productive 
element of each production remains thought, whether the 
thought in question is carried out in a speculative and metaphys-
ical mode, in a scientific and technical mode, or a mixture and 
banalization of both. Every production is intrinsically re-flection, 
is thought.”77 With separation or connection, with the relation to 
being or the affiliation between logos, theory, thought, reflection, 
consciousness and praxis, techne, activity, reality, action, being—
i.e., with the question about “dialectic,” both Marx and Heidegger 
have their difficulties. In his polemical writing against Proudhon’s 
Philosophy of Poverty,78 composed in French, and although Marx 
is aware that labor represents a certain unity of “real” and 
“ideal” forces—within a matrix of interrelations—, he speaks of 
“mouvement réel de la production” and makes ironic reference to 
dialectical abstractions, products and theoretical concepts and 
pretenses of objective—practical and material—movement.79 
And in his “Introduction” to the Contribution to the Critique of 
Political Economy he emphasizes the fact that the origins of 
modern economics are first realized in the most modern forms 
of existence [Dasein] within bourgeois and capitalist economics: 
“Here, therefore, the abstraction of the category ‘labor’, ‘labor as 
such’, labor sans phrase, the initial point of modern economics, 
becomes objectively true for the first time.”80 At the same time, 
Marx knows that efficacious labor cannot be separated from 
77 Heidegger, “Grundsätze des Denkens,” 40–41. EN: GA, vol. 79, 94–95; Bremen 
and Freiburg Lectures, 90–91.
78 EN: Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, Système des contradictions économiques ou 
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Contradictions: Or, The Philosophy of Misery, trans. Benjamin R. Tucker 
(Boston: Benj. R. Tucker, 1888).
79 Karl Marx, Misère de la philosophie (1847; Paris: Costes, 1950), 51, 121–22, 
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80 thought all that simply: “What qualifies the worst architect from 
the best bee from the onset is the fact that he has built the cell 
in his head before it is done in wax. At the end of the process 
of labor, a result is produced that already existed from the 
beginning in the mind of the worker, and thus, was already present 
ideally. Not that the worker has effected merely a change in form 
of the natural object; the worker realizes at the same time his 
purpose through the natural object, a purpose he knows and 
which determines the method of his action in the way of a law, 
and to which he must subordinate his will. And this subordination 
is not an individual act. Besides the exertions of organs that must 
function, the purposeful will—which expresses itself as attention—
must be commanded for the entire duration of the labor, and all 
the more, the less this labor fully occupies the worker by virtue 
of its content and the method of its execution, and thus, the less 
the worker enjoys this labor as the play [emphasized by me] of his 
own bodily and mental powers.”81 Must, then, the way be found in 
the direction of a techno-logos uniting reality “and” thought, work 
and play? “Technology reveals the active behavior of humans to 
nature, the immediate process of production of their life, and 
hence, of the circumstances of his social life and the intellectual 
conceptions arising from them, as well.”82 A neither idealistic nor 
materialistic technology, which is capable of manifesting itself 
even meta-dialectically, does not exist.
In the final hour of his lectures about “The Principle of Reason” 
(1955/1956), which also contained the passage concerning “his-
torical and dialectical materialism”—the latter should not be 
regarded outside the context of other statements made about 
materialism in the lecture “The Principle of Reason,” namely, that 
the specter of materialism does not move all that one-sidedly, 
as: “It does not sweep in from the west with any less force than 
trans.  Martin Nicolaus (London: Penguin in association with New Left 
Review, 1973), 104–5.
81 Marx, Das Kapital, vol. 1, 186. EN: Capital, vol. 1, 284.
82 Marx, Das Kapital, vol. 1, 389. EN: Capital, vol. 1, 493, n. 4.
81from the east”83—, Heidegger concludes this lecture with a 
query about the game. He gives the game, in which being rests 
as being without any underlying foundation, the chance to be 
expressed and to become a matter of consideration. Not only in 
the play-of-time space [Zeit-Spiel-Raum] where beings appear and 
are produced. As a game without a “why,” as the highest and the 
deepest, as the destiny of being, as the one-all—perhaps this is 
how we must conceive of the meaning of being without imagining 
the game “as something that exists.” “Can the essence of the 
game be measured properly on the basis of being as ground, or 
must we conceive of being and ground, being as a-byss on the 
basis of the essence of the game, indeed, a game into which we 
mortals have been brought, the mortals that we are as those who 
dwell near death, which is the most extreme potential of Dasein, 
and thus, capable of attaining the highest in respect to the 
clearing of being and its truth?”84
As a result, thought is put at risk, inextricably tied to the game. 
Our thought is not yet able to conceive of the game. Will plan-
etary thought have the ability to think truly-errantly the world 
(the worlding world [die weltende Welt]—the clearing and dark-
ness of being) as a game, that worlds and times? The worldly time 
of world-being—will it reveal itself in the game? The game as the 
one, the open whole, the one-all, the sole and unifying—could it 
be played, too, but not only with beings? Because it is playing?
We humans, will we succeed in entering the game in a 
harmonious and planetary manner, and how can we—put at 
risk—live playfully and perish?
Against this horizon, the difference between the thought of 
Marx and Heidegger disappears. However, as a difference that 
has been taken on and resolved, it remains at risk nonetheless. 
83 Heidegger, Der Satz vom Grund, 199. EN: GA, vol. 10, 179; The Principle of 
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82 Perhaps the world game also revealed itself to Marx as a game: 
after the resolution of the alienation of labor, and even after com-
munism has been overcome, couldn’t the history of humanity—
and not only this—manifest itself as a game, a game in which the 
inviolable essence of alienation would also play a role? Whilst 
neither remaining captive in the realm of necessity nor com-
prehended as freedom, whilst neither conceived of as a uni-
fying dialectic nor as something arbitrary, could this game hold 
together everything that exits in a diffuse cohesion? Without the 
game itself, which is taking place, being something to be found in 
the midst of all beings [Seiendes]?
VI
The human has not yet found a position in the game of the world. 
Must one become a “citizen of the world” beforehand? Must 
one join the world game as a world-citizen? Marx demands the 
existence of the human within the context of world history: “The 
existence of individuals in world history, i.e., the existence of 
individuals which is immediately connected with history.”85 Here, 
world history does not yet mean the destiny of world-being; the 
citizen of the world always exists without a definite form and 
they will always remain that way. World history and the road to 
world citizenship perhaps lead—pointing beyond themselves—
to a world of openness, to a play-of-time space with different 
possibilities. In the world game of world-being and the play of 
time, could a new form of humanity be at home there, or find its 
home there? Each homeland would not be patriotic, nationalistic, 
international, or cosmopolitan; it would exist in the sense of 
the history of being and the world, in the sense of destiny, if it 
should “be” anything at all. Indeed, the wandering star within 
the play-of-time space has become exactly what it is: a planet. 
Cannot humans, too, first inhabit what their place is—within the 
play-of-time space? With nostalgia and the yearning for faraway 
85 Marx, Die deutsche Ideologie, 33. EN: The German Ideology, 47.
83places? Provided that adventure and the return home can still be 
distinguished from one another.
In order to find a way through homelessness and reach the 
world homeland, must the human of the modern epoch of sub-
jectivity (which merely becomes generalized through collectivity) 
and the objectification caused by it be overcome beforehand? 
Marx still belongs to this epoch: he views the human as the 
animal rationale of metaphysics, the rational living being that is 
driven by its (biological) drives and strives to satisfy them with 
material means, whereby technology and thought are utilized 
to achieve this purpose. Correspondingly, he himself character-
izes his thought as naturalism-humanism-socialism in com-
pletion. In departure from the animalistic—although human 
and social—nature of humanity, he strives for the humanization 
of beings through the human praxis of objectified subjectivity, 
which should lead to a unified communistic society of man. The 
Cartesian ego of the cogito, which means the res cogitans, the 
transcendental subject of Kant and the transcendental sub-
stantiality, Hegel’s absolute subject as absolute knowledge, as the 
will of the spirit, becomes in Marxian thought. “the subjectivity 
of essential objective powers whose actions are therefore also 
necessarily objective,”86 which he wishes to raise to the level of the 
all-encompassing and all-justifying societal (the social-socialistic 
level). In the “Letter on ‘Humanism,’” Heidegger, “on the con-
trary,” demands that the naturalistic, psychological, sociological, 
and humanistic conception of humans be overcome through a 
way of thinking that dares to ask in which respect the essence 
of humans belongs to the truth of being. His “objection” to 
humanism is that it does not value the humanity of humankind, 
its essence, its nature, highly enough, and does not place it in 
the clearing of being. He requires another category of essence 
in order to experience “how the human in their proper essence 
86 Marx, “Nationalökonomie und Philosophie,” 273. EN: “Economic and 
Philosophical Manuscripts,” 389.
84 becomes present to being”87, in the ecstatic interiority within the 
truth of being, in ex-istence, in Da-sein. “Through this category 
of human essence”—Heidegger stresses—“humanistic inter-
pretations of the human as animal rationale, as ‘person’, as an 
intellectual-spiritual-corporeal being are not declared to be false 
and not rejected. Much rather, the sole thought is that the highest 
humanistic determinations of human do not yet achieve the 
appropriate dignity of the human.”88 The subject of humanism, 
the subject of homelessness, of alienation, of subjectivism and 
objectivism, never encounters themselves; their essence remains 
alien to them. The human who conceives of themselves as the 
ruler of being, as the subject of beings [Seiendes] (of the object), 
remains “standing” in the midst of beings; they fall victim to the 
thoughtlessness that condemns one with such a self-conception 
(i.e. misconception of self) to remain hanging in the midst of 
beings. Humanism makes humans incapable of contemplating 
that and how they are “thrown” into the world by being with 
“their” being-in-the-world [In-der-Welt-sein]; in this way, however, 
the human cannot be brought to ex-istence where they can tend 
to the truth of being and respond to the nothing as its governor 
[Platzhalter].
This objection is not formal and not critical; it is directed at the 
affiliation between the essence of being and human. It strives for 
the liberation of human “and” of the truth of being. “One consis-
tently thinks of homo animalis, even when anima has been posited 
as animus sive mens, and later, the latter as subject, as person, 
and as mind. Such positing is characteristic for metaphysics. But 
in the process, the respect shown here for the essence of man 
is too low and its origins are not taken into consideration, for 
the origins of the essence of historical humanity always remain 
the future of that essence. Metaphysics conceives of the human 
87 Heidegger, Über den Humanismus, 19. EN: GA, vol. 9, 330; “Letter on 
‘Humanism,’” 251.
88 Heidegger, Über den Humanismus, 19. EN: GA, vol. 9, 330; “Letter on 
‘Humanism,’” 251.
85on the basis of animalitas and does not progress to the thought 
of its humanitas.”89 Do these statements made by Heidegger 
concern those things that were thought by Marx? Accordingly, 
we hear from Marx: “The human is most directly a natural being. 
As a natural being and living natural beings they are—partly 
equipped with natural powers, with vital forces—an active natural 
being; these powers exist within them as assets and skills, as 
drives;90 in part, as a natural, corporeal, sensual, and material 
being, man is a suffering, conditioned, and restricted being, just 
like an animal or a plant, i.e., the objects of their drives exist out-
side of themselves, as objects independent of themselves. But 
these objects are objects of their needs, they are objects indis-
pensable and essential for the actualization and affirmation 
of their essential powers.”91 This simultaneous positing of the 
object as an object for a subject as well as the human sub-
ject as material, this natural, corporeal, biological, concretely 
subjective-objective positing of the “essence” of the human, 
is characteristic of Marxian humanism, as naturalism in com-
pletion. The acknowledgement of the natural, human, and social 
human demanded by Marx—which we have just encountered in 
the quotations from Heidegger—, who should be able to satisfy 
all of their natural, human, and social needs through technology 
unchained within the realm of communism, is argued on the 
basis of an objective positing of a subject, a subject coerced 
by their drives, in order to achieve the concrete socialization 
of subjectivity (in collectivism). Does, then, Marx also belong 
to the epoch of subjectivity, the metaphysics of humanism? 
89 Heidegger, Über den Humanismus, 13. EN: GA, vol. 9, 323; “Letter on 
‘Humanism,’” 246–47.
90 Freud and psychoanalysis also expound in a productive manner on the 
naturalistic and “natural,” i.e., biological and psychological conception of 
instinct used by anthropology. At the same time, however, Freud releases 
the power of desire for life, love, destruction, and death, and sets the play 
of the unconscious, the preconscious, and the imaginary into incredible 
motion.
91 Marx, “Nationalökonomie und Philosophie,” 274. EN: “Economic and 
Philosophical Manuscripts,” 389–90.
86 He does indeed radicalize the dynamic whose foundations 
allow metaphysics (the extrasensory) to convert to physics (the 
sensual), although—or perhaps because—he writes the following 
(which is correct but also restrictive): “However, life requires 
above all food and drink, shelter, clothing, and other things [is 
this the elementary?]. The first historical act is, therefore, the 
generation of means to satisfy these needs, the production 
of material life itself, and this is indeed an historical act, the 
fundamental condition of all history, which must still be fulfilled 
daily and on an hourly basis today, just as it was centuries ago, in 
order just to keep humans alive.”92 And for Marx, it is production, 
technology, that should ensure life on a continually broader 
foundation. Correspondingly, the entirety of beings should be 
transformed through technical and productive labor in order to 
satisfy the needs of man.
The space of “world-being,” seen in the context [Rahmen] of 
beings [Seiendes] and only beings, must be fulfilled in this 
technical-productive manner. But can the emptiness of being 
be filled by production and technology? Being [Seiende] appears 
increasingly unsatisfactory, deficient, and technology addresses 
this deficiency with technical solutions. At the same time, it 
produces new needs in order to be in a position to satisfy them. 
There is increasingly more shortage, production increases 
more and more, and more and more is consumed and used. 
The entire earth-ball is drawn into this spiral and it appears 
to be completely consistent that this process is spreading and 
intensifying. Production appears to be the foundation of beings 
as well as their transcendence, and it is in fact the case that 
modern technology is a disclosure, a challenge, a fabrication. By 
disclosing and establishing beings in this way, is the humanity 
of modern and already planetary technology responding to the 
beckoning of unconcealment, or does it contradict the latter? 
Perhaps humanity corresponds to it by virtue of contradiction, 
92 Marx, Die deutsche Ideologie, 24. EN: The German Ideology, 39.
87and perhaps humanity sublates its subjectivity as well as its 
characteristic substantiality in this way. Perhaps humanity 
achieves a new openness on this path—if it is indeed a path—, 
which overcomes objective subjectivity and objective sub-
stantiality, and which dissolves and transcends the subject-object 
dichotomy so omnipresent for modernity. Something new is 
added to the flux of reality. However, that which unconceals 
itself is always a clearing that unconceals and conceals itself; 
that which reveals itself withdraws at the same time. In a certain 
sense, Marx and Heidegger (but not the latter in the way of the 
former)—one on the basis of the emptiness of beings, the other 
on the basis of the oblivion of being—strive for the same thing: 
to expand our awareness of technology, technology as a destiny 
but not as an unavoidable course and “fate.” Without pursuing it 
blindly, or—which would be the same thing—damning it as the 
work of the devil, we should in fact open ourselves explicitly to 
the essence of technology. For and only “if we open ourselves 
explicitly to the essence of technology, we find ourselves unex-
pectedly taken up by a liberating claim.”93
Everything that exists increasingly appears under the aspect of 
reduction, as a deficient fullness, as the growing diminishment 
of originality. However, this reduction is not the mere result of a 
given perspective. It corresponds to the productive will to power, 
it accompanies the latter and is also determined by the latter. Is 
the will to power, the will that wills itself, the unconditional will 
to will, a production of the being of beings? Is the production of 
technology a production grounded on “being”? The duel between 
reduction and production has not yet unfolded its game to its full 
extravagance. We still stand much too much within the realm of 
metaphysics, and we stagger for this reason. Of a metaphysics 
that tells us “that and how the being of beings ‘is’ [Daß und wie 
93 Martin Heidegger, “Die Frage nach der Technik,” in Vorträge und Aufsätze, 33. 
EN: GA, vol. 7, 26; “The Question Concerning Technology,” in The Question 
Concerning Technology and Other Essays, trans. William Lovitt (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1977), 26.
88 ‘es’ das Sein des Seienden ‘gibt’ ],”94 of a metaphysics as the des-
tiny of transition (of “transcendence”), of the transition of the 
being of beings. “It almost seems to be the case that the way 
metaphysics conceives of beings obliges it to be the unknowing 
limit that denies man the original relation to the being of human 
essence.”95 According to metaphysics, all “objectivity” as such is 
“subjectivity”; in this way, the foundation of beings erodes, and 
the ontological logic prevails over ontological metaphysics in 
an empty—and overfilled—space. Thus, we do not experience 
being as being, nor that the nothing which belongs to being. 
Overcoming nihilism means: overcoming and recuperating from 
metaphysics, the preparation of a new horizon. The nothing still 
remains to be experienced. “Being and nothing belong together, 
but not because both—considered in terms of the Hegelian con-
cept of thought—coincide in their indefinition and immediacy, 
but rather because being itself is finite within essence and only 
reveals itself in the transcendence of Dasein projected into the 
nothing.”96 The nothing becomes present as being. It “is” not, 
but it is also not nothing [nicht nichts]. “Being ‘is’ just as little as 
the nothing ‘is.’ But There is both [Aber Es gibt beides].”97 Both in 
one In being-nothing [Beides in einem Im Nichts-Sein]? Against a 
certain horizon, wouldn’t being and the nothing be the same? 
“Unlike beings, being does not allow itself to be conceived of and 
produced as an object. The ‘other’ to beings is in itself non-being 
[Nicht-Seiendes]. We renounce thought all-too-prematurely when 
we declare in a deficient manner that the nothing is the merely 
insubstantial and equate it with the absence of essence. Instead 
94 Heidegger, Zur Seinsfrage, 33. EN: GA, vol. 9, 413; “On the Question of Being,” 
312.
95 Martin Heidegger, Was ist Metaphysik?, 11. EN: ”Einleitung zu ‘Was ist 
Metaphysik?,’” in GA, vol. 9, 370; “Introduction to ‘What is Metaphysics? ’,” in 
Pathmarks, 281.
96 Martin Heidegger, Was ist Metaphysik?, 36. EN: ”Was ist Metaphysik?” in GA, 
vol. 9, 120; “What is Metaphysics?” in Pathmarks, 94–95.
97 Heidegger, Zur Seinsfrage, 38. EN: GA, vol. 9, 419; “On the Question of Being,” 
317.
89of yielding to the haste of vapid astuteness and sacrificing the 
perplexing ambiguity of the nothing, we must mobilize our 
singular readiness to experience in the nothing the spaciousness 
of what bestows beings with the guarantee to exist. This is being 
itself.”98 Thus, the nothing becomes present as being. The nothing 
is being itself. In Off the Beaten Track, it is said about the nothing 
once again: “it is being itself.”99 Is this the highest game, the one, 
the only, the all-unifying? The world game within worldly time? 
The game plan overcome? We must not forget that being and time 
cannot be separated. “In Being and Time ‘being’ is not something 
different than ‘time,’ to the extent that ‘time’ is used as the first 
name for the truth of being, as this truth is the becoming essence 
of being, and hence, being itself.”100 Being, time, world, nothing, 
game are—without being beings—the same reality: nothing-
being, world-time, world-being, the play of time, the destiny of 
being and the world.
The production of technology unfolds as a provocation to being, 
and thus, “also” to the nothing, it storms into world-being within 
worldly time and the play of time. Marx reduces the world to the 
productive aspects of technology; Heidegger demands that we 
explicitly open ourselves up to the essence of technology.
It is necessary to respond to the provocation of being. 
Provocation of being means: the challenge (of production) 
brought forth by world-being itself to rise to meet this 
productivity, this provocation, this challenge by technology, 
and cope with it. In this duel, the provocative and productive, 
playful cunning of world-being encounters that technology and 
98 Heidegger, Was ist Metaphysik?, 41. EN: GA, vol. 9, 306; “Postscript to ‘What is 
Metaphysics?,’” 233.
99 Martin Heidegger, “Die Zeit des Weltbildes,” in Holzwege, 104. EN: GA, vol. 5, 
113; “The Age of the World Picture,” in The Question Concerning Technology 
and Other Essays, 154.
100 Martin Heidegger, Was ist Metaphysik?, 16. EN: GA, vol. 9, 376; “Introduction 
to ‘What is Metaphysics?,’” in Pathmarks, 285.
90 productivity challenging world-being and the nothing. Each of 
both forces is provocative and provoked.
It cannot yet be envisioned how this dispute will end; will 
everything decline in void the nothing and perish? Destroy 
nothing and perish? Will nihilism be overcome? If we succeed in 
seeking refuge in nihilism, in lifting everything that exists and was 
ever made into a higher ambivalence, in subjugating ourselves 
to the game as a game and playfully participating in it, will our 
endeavors be given the chance to dwell within the game holis-
tically and disrupted, in a harmonious and planetary manner—
within the play of time? Those statements made by Marx must 
first be elevated into this higher ambiguity and borne by it. Within 
this ambiguity, Marx and Heidegger encounter one another 
and distance themselves through the things that they say, and 
through that which is not thought and not pronounced. Above 
all, they have been set in motion and united in a “third” planetary 
phase beginning to unfold. The constellation of a dawning plan-
etary age stands and moves beneath a higher motion of the stars.
The duel between man and world has not yet been unloosed by 
any means. Everything conceals itself, withdraws, appears as 
trivial. At the same time, other horizons are opening. Marx “like” 
Heidegger, each in a different language, gives expression to what 
that poet of this wandering star, who experienced his magnificent 
decline in madness , did indeed say—though in a romantic and 
utopian manner: We are nothing; what we seek is everything.


I I :  O N  M A R X  A N D  H E I D E G G E R

Theses on Marx:  
Concerning the Critique of 
Philosophy, of Political  
Economics, and  
of Politics 
Today, the whole world knows, or imagines that it knows, what 
the situation is with Marx’s undertaking. Marx wants to over-
come vulgar, naturalistic, and mechanical materialism, which 
is obscured by its object and does not acknowledge the active 
subject that objectifies itself through the act of production. 
The Theses on Feuerbach provide the most ingenious critique of 
ahistorical and undialectical materialism. In his famous epilogue 
to the second edition of Capital, Marx writes: “My dialectical 
method is not only different from that of Hegel in respect to its 
foundations, it is also its direct opposite. In Hegel’s view, the 
process of thought, which he even transforms into an auto-
nomous subject with the name idea, is the demiurge of a reality 
that only constitutes its external appearance. In my view the 
reverse is the case—the ideal is nothing other than the material 
transformed and converted by the human mind . . . [Dialectic] is 
standing on its head with Hegel. One must upright it in order to 
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discover the rational kernel within the mystical shell.”1 But what 
happens with thought according to this dialectic walking on its 
own feet? Hegel considered philosophy to be an inverted world 
and thought philosophizing implied standing on one’s head; but in 
his opinion the world of naïve consciousness is in fact the wrong 
way round and inverted. Marx intends to right the inverted world, 
although he is aware that “the inverted world is the real world,” as 
long as alienation has not been resolved. Might it be the case that 
the reality he demands is burdened by a realist conception of a 
perverted and inverted world?
Marx’s conception strives to overcome philosophical thought, 
subsequent to its realization through concrete praxis, through 
the practical subject as active materialist. What happens to the 
unity of the world as a consequence? How should—during the 
process of overcoming—the truth of materialism and idealism be 
preserved at the same time? Will one of these two forces—both 
of which should be overcome—attain an absolute dominance?
It is useful not to view Marx as a “dead dog”—he himself 
demanded that one should not treat Hegel this way—,2 but 
rather, one should question one’s own theoretical, economic, 
and political thought and everything that refers to Marx; but 
neither in order to amass scholarly works on all kinds of Marxian, 
Marxist, and Marxological topics, as they solicit themselves to 
dispassionate research, nor in the sense of Marxian, Marxist, and 
Marxological pedantry whose dissemination has only just begun. 
Since Lenin (“The Three Sources and Three Component Parts of 
Marxism”), Marxism is viewed as having borrowed from three 
sources—from classical German philosophy, from English political 
economics, and from French utopian socialism—with a sub-
division into three constitutive parts: philosophy (of historical and 
1 EN: Axelos does not provide a reference. The passage can be found in 
“Postface to the Second Edition,” Capital, vol. 1, 102.
2 EN: Marx, “Postface to the Second Edition,” 102.
97dialectical materialism), political economy (based on the theory of 
labor, value, and surplus value), and politics (of class conflict and 
the dictatorship of the proletariat).3 This is how the three fronts 
of the ideological, economic, and political struggle were con-
stituted. Perhaps it is time to allow negativity to become effective 
within each of these three forces as well, and within the unified 
center from which they grow.4
I
The main deficit of all previous versions of materialism (including 
Marx’s historical dialectic), is the fact that objects, reality, and 
materials are merely comprehended in the form of the manu-
factured objects, the material realities, and the materials of labor; 
they are in fact comprehended in this way, but they lack a ground 
and horizon. Therefore, the other metaphysical perspective—a 
contrast to the naïve or scholarly realism, which was developed 
on the basis of idealist philosophy, and which of course neither 
knows nor recognizes the so-called real world; the whole of 
figures, forces, and weaknesses of the constituted, concretized, 
and fixed world, the other side of the same and only world. Marx 
desires sensual objects, but higher objects which are actually 
distinct from objects of thought: but he does not comprehend 
human activity itself as a problematic activity. For this reason, in 
the Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy just as much 
as in The Poverty of Philosophy, Marx considers material life to 
be genuinely human, whereas thought and creative expression 
are comprehended and posited merely in their contingent and 
ideological form of appearance. Thus, he does not grasp the 
3 EN: Vladimir Lenin, “The Three Sources and Three Component Parts of 
Marxism,” in Collected Works, vol. 19 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1977), 
21–28; originally published in Prosveshcheniye, no. 3 (1913).
4 See Kostas Axelos, Marx penseur de la technique: De l’aliénation de l’homme à 
la conquête du monde, Collection “Arguments”, 2nd ed. (1961; Paris: Éditions 
de Minuit, 1963). EN: Translated by Ronald Bruzina as Alienation, Praxis and 
Techne in the Thought of Karl Marx (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1976).
98 significance of a thought which places everything in question and 
keeps these questions open, a thought which dares to see that 
every great victory is the prelude to defeat.
II 
The question as to whether (constantly errant) truth should be 
attributed to human thought, is neither a theoretical question 
nor a practical question. During this questioning, man must 
experience the truth, i.e., reality and unreality, power and failure 
of his thought and the world. The dispute about the reality 
or non-reality of praxis—which is isolated from questioning 
thought—, is a purely pragmatic question: it lacks a foundation 
that has been wrested from the abyss and confusion, it does not 
dare to shake the security of fixed positions.
III
The Marxist doctrine of changing concrete circumstances and 
education forgets that circumstances are not always coequal 
with human subjects, and that all educators mislead. There-
fore, it must divide society into two parts—of which the one 
remains predominant. The asymmetry of changing concrete 
circumstances and of human change or self-alteration can only 
be comprehended and “truthfully” understood as a permanent 
revolution that places itself in question.
IV
Marx uses the fact of economic alienation, the bifurcation of 
the world into a world as (real) base and a world of (ideological) 
superstructure as a point of departure. His work consists in dis-
solving the ideological, idealist, and ideal world into its worldly 
foundations [weltliche Grundlage]. But the fact that these worldly 
foundations set themselves apart from themselves [sich von sich 
selbst abhebt], while an autonomous empire stretches across the 
99entire surface of the earth [Erdoberfläche], can only be attrib-
uted to the lack of coherence and grounding of these world 
foundations. Therefore, this situation must be comprehended 
and revolutionized in itself as well as in its inadequacy. For 
example; after the earthly [irdische] family has been exposed as 
the alleged secret of the holy family, the institutions of the former 
must be opened out until they shatter.
V
Marx, dissatisfied with realist thought, desires praxis; but he con-
ceives of praxis not as sensual activity, which leaves the question 
of meaning undecided. In the midst of an epoch in which rampant 
planetary technology wages a deadly war against the world, 
would we not be in need of a techno-logy capable of thinking 
everything encompassed by technology as well as technology 
itself? For technology does not merely encompass those things 
expressly belonging to the spheres of the universe and cos-
mology, of life and biology, of the dynamics of the psyche and 
psychology, of society and sociology, of ideas and ideology; it 
draws beings [Seiendes]—and what has been produced—into its 
clockwork [Räderwerk].
VI 
Marx dissolves worldly essence into human essence. But human 
essence cannot rest upon itself as it could on its own foundation. 
Within the play of becoming, it is the fragment of a dialogue 
without which the human would neither strive to be human nor 
would the world “be” world [noch die Welt Welt ,,wäre” ].
Marx, who does not concern himself with this constellation of 
human and world, is therefore forced:
1. to abstract from time that is always open, posit human 
essence using a specific practical and humanistic inter-
pretation, and presume an objective human essence. He 
100 thus loses sight of the human as the essence of distance [So 
verliert er den Menschen als Wesen der Ferne aus den Augen].
2. Accordingly, this essence can only be comprehended as an 
empirical totality, as a productive and produced generality 
which unites all essences in a single category with technical 
means.
VII
For this reason, Marx does not perceive that economic 
production itself is a product and that the empirical society he 
analyzes belongs to an errant world—in whose course everything 
violent and peaceful continues to play on in its disconcerting way; 
for critique belongs to the criticized.
VIII
All social life is essentially in strife. All puzzles which guide 
thought into openness cannot find their “truthful” solution either 
in human praxis or in the simplistic or scholarly and critical com-
prehension of this praxis.
IX 
The apex of practical materialism, i.e., that materialism which 
conceives of thought as a derivative activity, is the abstract 
anticipation of the total society and the total human.
IX 
The standpoint of Marxian materialism is the socialized society; 
but a new way of thinking—without a standpoint and without a 
one-dimensional (neither spiritualistic nor materialistic, neither 
idealist nor realist) orientation—must place its focus on the game 
101of the planetary world—for the becoming being of the whole “is” 
the game.
XI
Technologists only change the world in various ways in 
generalized indifference; the point is to think the world and 
interpret the changes in its unfathomability, to perceive and 
experience the difference binding being to the nothing. 

Concerning the Experience of 
the World: On Heidegger
In his brief work The Thinker as Poet,1 Heidegger makes the 
attempt—without any claim to completeness (a sacrifice forced 
upon all thought experiments of today) and both through thought 
and poetically [denkerisch-dichterisch]—to give to language  
(full of intellectual richness although quiescent) an overture 
or sequel. Heidegger seeks the word, the truth, openness, the 
meaning of being as be-ing (Seyn). “Truth means sheltering 
that clears [lichtendes Bergen] as the primary quality of be-ing 
[Seyn],” he writes in “The Essence of Truth”;2 initially, be-ing 
already appears “in the light of a withdrawal that conceals,” and 
this sheltering that clears first makes possible and “allows the 
agreement between knowledge and beings [Seiendes] to become 
present,” hence the “correctness of ap-prehension [Vor-stellen].” 
Although Heidegger perceives the prevalence of errance “in the 
1 EN: Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens; “The Thinker as Poet.” A literal translation 
of the title would be “Concerning the Experience of the Poet.” Axelos’s title 
for this essay is a clear reference to this.
2 EN: “Vom Wesen der Wahrheit,” in GA, vol. 9, 201; “On the Essence of Truth,” 
in Pathmarks, 153. 
104 simultaneity between unconcealment and concealment”—for 
“the concealment of the concealed as well as errance belong to 
the fundamental essence of truth”—, he subjugates errance, “the 
pervasion of errance by secrecy,” to the truth: “Errance is the 
playroom [Spielraum] of that turning point in which in-sistent ex-
istence [in-sistente Ek-sistenz] agilely forgets and mistakes itself. 
The concealment of concealed beings as a whole [Seiendes] pre-
vails in the unconcealment of specific beings, as this unconceal-
ment—as the forgetting of concealment—becomes errance.”3 
Is there, however, a highest word for the prevalent and with-
drawing, open and fragmentary world play [Weltspiel] of the 
whole of being-and-the-nothing in its becoming?
Since Being and Time, Heidegger attempted to render being “as” 
time. Being is sometimes united with the nothing and expe-
rienced as the same. The enigmatic difference between being 
and beings [Seiendes], the duplicity [Zwiefalt] within which nothing 
divides being and beings (for the nothing of beings “is” being 
and being is not beings), negates both in their simplicity and 
remains inseparable from Dasein: being and human essence 
belong together, are not connected with one another; one does 
not depart from the one only to move to the other, or vice-versa. 
Sometimes even Heidegger interprets being as “the game itself 
[das Spiel selber],” but this interpretation disappears once again.4
Being is not to be saved. And neither its “necessary” playmate, 
human Dasein. The lightning bolt strikes down into the boredom 
of time, if the world itself has not been shaken in its very 
foundations. The world manifests itself as the “mirror-play.” 
Within the play-of-time space in which moving and absolutely 
motionless time, the past and the having-been, the present 
3 EN: “Vom Wesen der Wahrheit,” in GA, vol. 9, 196; “On the Essence of Truth,” 
in Pathmarks, 150.
4 EN: Martin Heidegger, “Identität und Differenz,” in GA, vol. 11, 72. The 
existing English translation by Joan Stambaugh, Identity and Difference (1969; 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), 66 is almost unrecognizable.
105awaiting us and the already temporalized future convene and 
self-destruct.
Distressed and exasperated, we must experience what we know 
with insouciance and with excitement. Nowadays, a multi-
facetted and ambiguous, productive and questioning form of 
thought seeks its way and its style, internally connected and 
intertwined with the attempt to achieve a uniform and multi-
dimensional lifestyle. Thought can no longer be experienced as a 
thing of the head—or of ideas, the mind, or be-ing [Seyn]. Worldly 
expanse and small-world spirit correspond to one another very 
often. The planetary horizon, in the four-dimensionality of its 
plans, waits for its playing-together—those supporters who can 
be neither shepherds of being nor governors of the nothing? In 
togetherness there lies a common affiliation within the game. 
When each existence is dissolved and restored, when every “is” 
becomes fixed and negated, when every word renders a thing 
and disintegrates, man throws away his deck of cards: here is too 
little of the world rather than openness to the world. Everything 
unfolds and converges and disintegrates with the play of time 
of errance. Time, world. Errance, game, are they—if they “are” 
indeed at all—names of the nameless self-identical?
This sphere of thought is “merely” the whole half of the half 
whole. And the other half? Important faces and masks of beings 
“and” being will always be neglected. Questions and counter-
questions cross and thwart one another. No problem becomes 
solved. The secret itself becomes questionable. The abstract and 
the concrete, the positive and the negative—that is, which still 
bears this name—merge inseparably. As certain stars perish, 
others appear—as well as the self-identical. Individual and uni-
verse—both finite, for us, finite beings [Seiendes] who question 
being, correspond to one another and do not correspond to one 
another. Every worldly management and every world plan fails 
due to and in the world. The single human and society cross out 
106 and become crossed out. In his work “On the Question of Being,”5 
Heidegger dares to cross out being (which one?) and to demand 
the same for the nothing. As a sign, this crossing-out points in all 
four zones, the worldly zones—of the fourfold [Geviert], which 
belong to a unity; earth and heaven, the divine (gods and God), 
the mortal (humans). The simplicity of this quartet remains intact. 
Without evading the questionable and elevating the matter to the 
level of the thought worthy, in his essay dedicated to “Building 
Dwelling Thinking,”6 Heidegger makes the attempt to preserve 
rescue, reception, expectation, and dwelling. But how can all 
of this—the one-all—persist intact, if a “new” experience of the 
world is dawning? Beings and undergoes destruction, that which 
has been crossed out, remains as the sign of crossing, pointing to 
the perspectives of the worldly fourfold, as an unknown x.
Heidegger places in question the Occidental and European 
interpretation of being handed down by world history, which 
simultaneously means the oblivion of being [Seinsvergessenheit]—
from Heraclitus to Nietzsche and Marx.7 He inquires and gives 
inquisitive answers. His attempt demands to be placed in ques-
tion itself.
Discover and conceal, 
cheerful word and dreary lie 
lie upon a single path.
Declare and deny 
err and dare 
askew to the same and other bridge.
5 EN: Heidegger, “Zur Seinsfrage,” in GA, vol. 9, 411; “On the Question of Being,” 
in Pathmarks, 310.
6 EN: “Bauen Wohnen Denken,” in GA, vol. 7, 145–64; “Building Dwelling 
Thinking,” in Poetry, Language, Thought, 145–61.
7 See Kostas Axelos, Héraclite et la philosophie. La primière saisie de l’être en 
devenir de la totalité, Collection “Arguments” (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1962).
107When the sad sunrise makes us shudder . . .
The world is shaken in its very foundations and errors uncover the 
systemic fragments of a game whose beginning and end remain in 
circular contortions and in concealment.
When gods die, man begins to dwell with the anticipation of his own 
death. In the prosaic poem about the overcoming of man just begun.
Consent to falling stars.
Thought is entry into the labyrinth of the world, which does not obey 
a highest name.
When smoke from the chimney betrays the ashes . . .
When the courage of thought is in harmony with the celestial hours of 
destiny, it gives expression to the resting course of the mad stars.
Since ancient times, seeing and hearing have made thought attentive 
and unhappy.
The coming, generalized combinatorics put everything into relation 
with everything else, generate new divisions, and release powers of 
the universe.
Every conversation brings together human creatures who are mute 
and deaf.
When bright trails become visible against a dark sky . . .
Who or what generates thought?
Dialogue is always an interlude [Zwischenspiel].
Mortals cannot fight hard for or against experience of the world. 
Success overcomes players and spectators and disintegrates. The 
wind encourages and batters to pieces.
Both in performance and in failure, dexterity and attempt are at risk. 
Masters always become mastered.
108 When the flowers of the meadow deceive us like a fairytale . . .
The manifold nature of the simple.
Image and countenance are changed through their masks, into con-
crete abstraction.
Hope and hopelessness are borne by one another.
The cunning of pain is probably more widespread in the world than 
that of pleasure.
When the wind alarms everything weak and steadfast . . .
Three unified games play [Spiele spielen] thought and world.
The world game itself, which is placed under regulations.
The game of thought that constantly derails on examples. It must dis-
solve every existence, dwell clumsily and without boundaries, which it 
is only seldom able to do.
The game of humanity: fancying danger has been avoided when man 
desires to be the player.
When a locality opens and closes: like a wound and a flower . . .
In the voice of silence, enunciating thought seems to unfold as the 
whole half of the half whole.
How can one distinguish between thoughts and things?
A long while and a short term act out and squander themselves 
within the circle of time.
Whoever thinks great things, must they live as a Philistine?
When jagged boulders grip cunningly with their gargantuan irony 
. . .
The old and the new appear erroneously as two sides of the same 
coin.
109For this reason, comprehend foreplay as unfolding and simplification.
To be ripe means: to perceive and experience every place and 
moment, the present larvae of past and future time, as nearly 
inconceivable.
Desire and anticipation are one and at the same time different.
When the mountain conceals and stillness becomes noisy . . .
Everything emerges from stillness, returns back to it. In the interim, 
the ineffable and the unsaid befall us, the nameless and the 
unthought-of.
Doesn’t the unconditional remain chained to conditions and things?
What withdraws: things, words, language, thought, the withdrawal, 
the world?
That thought can never interpret the world game—whose success 
would fathom this?
When the shepherds are driven into the pastures by their herds, 
alluring and lured . . .
The game quality of thought as yet remains concealed.
Where it shows itself, it is similar—in time—to a utopia, which 
promises and ruins an always inappropriate visit.
But how would a chronology and topology of being and the nothing 
within the game of time and space [Zeit-Raum-Spiel] be able to 
persist and decline?
Acknowledging that essence [Wesen] is also mischief [Unwesen].
When the evening light can no longer be distinguished from the 
light of dawn . . .
To say and to think, to compose and to act are the neighboring 
branches of a puzzling tree.
110 They arise from the world and almost reach down into the root of 
errance.
Their concord provides the experience of what Novalis stutteringly 
said about their common providence:
“Truth is a complete error.”8
Question aims 
Fracture questions 
Stars rest.
Man waits 
Games aim 
Without why.
Riders fall 
Children hope 
A sound deed.
8 EN: Novalis, Werke, Tagebücher und Briefe Friedrich von Hardenbergs, ed. 
Hans-Joachim Mähl and Richard Samuel, vol. 2 (Munich: Hanser, 1978), 449.
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The Planetary: A World 
History of Technology
But let nobody claim that fate divides us! It is 
us, us! We have our pleasure when we plunge 
into the night of the unknown, into the cold 
strangeness of some other world, and—if it 
were possible—we would abandon the sphere 
of the sun and storm beyond the limits of that 
mad star. Alas! For the wild breast of man, no 
homeland is possible. (Hölderlin, Hyperion or 
the Hermit in Greece1)
I
Let us attempt with complete sobriety, plainly and flatly, to 
take into account how what we still call a world can be taken 
into account, and how we—on the threshold to the planetary 
1 EN: Friedrich Hölderlin, “Hyperion oder Der Eremit in Griechenland,” in 
Sämtliche Werke und Briefe in drei Bänden, vol. 2, 24; “Hyperion, or the Hermit 
in Greece,” in Hyperion and Selected Poems, ed. Eric L. Santner (New York: 
Continuum, 1990), 10. 
116 age—can intervene technically, planning and planing [planmäßig 
und planierend], in the whole of a world split into pieces.2
Let us assume that beings as a whole [das Seiende im Ganzen] 
constitutes the “totality” (the uncanny homeland of homeless 
modern humans),3 the entire realm [Gesamtbereich] of all 
experience. This whole no longer continues to appear as a unified 
all. The united and uniting destiny, which perhaps still pervades a 
delimited circle, cannot show itself. The all itself, and everything 
that exists, appears fundamentally divided and split into different 
regions, sectors, districts, and layers, to which different points of 
reference and perspectives are supposed to correspond, and it is 
these perspectives that delimit those areas and layers. This great, 
crude division of totality affects the difference between nature 
and history, although the only shared foundation of both “parts” 
remains unperceived and unconsidered.
Nature is considered to be the entire realm of everything that 
grows (phúetai) and shows itself (phaínetai) without having 
been produced by humans. The physis and kosmos named by 
the Greeks, which was reinterpreted by the Romans as natura 
and universum, transformed itself, i.e., became transformed 
into “nature” during the course of a long history. Thus, nature 
is viewed as “the sum-total [Inbegriff ] of all things, to the extent 
they can be the objects of our senses, and correspondingly, of 
our experience” (Kant).4 The planetary system, the earth and the 
sun, water, air, fire, matter and energy, rock formations, flora 
and fauna, and finally humans, as natural living beings, belong 
2 EN: Axelos’s terms are hard to capture in English. We have opted for 
planning—scheduling, organising—and planing—flattening or levelling.
3 EN: The German is die unheimliche Heimat des heimatlosen modernen Men-
schen—the unhomely homeland of homeless modern humans.
4 EN: Immanuel Kant, “Metaphysiche Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft,” 
in Kants Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 4 (Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1903), 467; 
“Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science,” in Theoretical Philosophy 
After 1781, ed. Henry Allison and Peter Heath (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2002), 183.
117to the powers of nature. The natural sciences that have grown 
together with technology investigate and process nature sys-
tematically—physis which has become the object of physics—, 
and each of its sectors and forces has an adequate knowledge of 
practical application corresponding to it. Cosmology, astronomy, 
mechanics, chemistry, geology, botany, zoology, and biology 
scrutinize the entire hierarchy and genesis of beings in nature. 
This hierarchy, which the Greeks knew quite well without, 
however, making a rigid schema out of it, was constructed 
methodically and edifyingly in the Book of Genesis of the Old 
Testament, and still dominates worldly interpretations of the 
sciences bearing the name developmental theory. The human is 
considered to be the culmination of this evolution.
History begins with the last creation of the architect of the world. 
The worldly events caused by the human species comprise a 
primitive “prehistory” still bound to nature in an original and 
archaic way, which the so-called “indigenous peoples” of today 
can still convey to us in a particular—although uncertain—
manner. These happenings become a “real” history after the 
Oriental and East Asian empires: the cradle of civilization in 
Mesopotamia, Egypt, India, China, Palestine realize the transition 
from nature to the spirit of culture. However, actual history 
[eigentliche Geschichte] begins in the Occident, i.e., in Greece; here, 
for the first time, the truth of destiny emerges. In Greece, the 
powers of language and thought, of literature and art, of religion 
and politics unfold, form a holistic unity, which still remains the 
foundation of all education—including planetary knowledge. 
The pre-Socratics who apprehend the essence of physis and 
give expression to logos, Socrates and Plato who establish the 
hegemony of the supernatural and non-sensual idea over the 
sensual in their battle with the sophists, Aristotle—the thinker 
of energeia and being-ness (ousia), the three abrogated schools of 
thought stoicism, Epicureanism, and skepticism, and finally, the 
encounter between heathen thought and the religious faith of 
Plotinus and the neo-Platonists (who still seek the deceased one), 
118 constitute the main phases and the internal intellectual evolution 
of Greek history.
Greece declines and Rome rises—the less thoughtful than 
proactive Rome; the realistic, republican, and imperialistic Rome 
with its republic and its imperial rule, with its history-making laws. 
Greece and Rome execute the first authentic performance of 
world-historical proportions and founded classical antiquity as a 
result.
The second great step completed by Jews and Christians leads 
to the Reformation. Its climax takes place during the Christian 
Middle Ages. The Old Testament and the Jewish prophets, the 
Gospels and the New Testament, the Church Fathers, Augustine, 
mysticism and Scholasticism provide the foundations for the pre-
vailing faith of this epoch, as they process and solidify the belief 
in the Biblical revelation of God who became human and died. 
Everything that exists appears to be a creation of the Creator and 
is subordinate to divine providence. Everything that becomes is 
a product of the divine actus purus, which every human action 
should correspond to.
The decisive historical step leading to the planetary era, however, 
is only the third: the modern European epoch. The modern 
human enters the scene, the subject that will dominate all 
objects with its thought and knowledge, action and influence. 
This third epoch desires to be a reincarnation, a renaissance, and 
cannot remain merely European for all that long: it moves along 
a track leading to a premeditated and consummated history of 
the world that encompasses all parts of the earth. An uncanny 
power drive compels the epoch of the incipient will to power. 
Descartes thinks the ego cogito, i.e., res cogitans as the objective 
subject which stands opposed to objects within the res extensa; 
he is the founder of the logic of rational intervention. Pascal 
conceives of the reason of introspection, the raison of the heart. 
Spinoza attempts to grasp all-encompassing, natural and divine 
substance. This substance manifests itself with two attributes, 
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however: extension (matter) and thinking (spirit); and his Ethics 
has a mathematical and geometrical structure. Leibniz deals 
intensively with the question: pourquoi il y a plutôt quelque chose 
que rien? [why is there something rather than nothing?]—and 
sees the answer in the general direction of the: ens percipiens et 
appetens. The subject is the ens of beings [Seiendes]; its perception 
and pursuits provide the foundations for the world order. 
Metaphysically and epistemologically, Kant establishes the power 
of the transcendental subject who usurps the existence of beings 
as its objects. The transcendence of substantiality (objectivity) 
and the transcendence of subjectivity (of non-isolated solipsism) 
subsist in the same reality. Metaphysically, Hegel ends an entire 
epoch: spirit that has become nature and human history man-
ifests itself as absolute knowledge, which consummates the truth 
of the whole through absolute self-consciousness in the form of 
absolute certainty. Marx initiates the countermovement: he con-
verts the practical human with its technical activities and effects 
into the objective subject of concrete reality. Nietzsche draws the 
conclusion: the rule of the will to power leads to the murder of 
God, to the age of nihilism, i.e., the destruction of supernatural 
meaning that had provided hold up to then. Will the Übermensch 
be able to truthfully apply the will to power in order to achieve 
the planetary dominance of earth? Will humanity that adopts, but 
also relinquishes and overcomes the human of yesterday—within 
the planetary rotation of the eternal recurrence of the same will 
to power—be able to say “yes” to this? Descartes and Pascal, 
Spinoza and Leibniz, Kant, Hegel, Marx, and Nietzsche are not 
just any profound philosophers; they are the thinkers who initiate 
present and future events.
But what should the present phase of Occidental and European 
developments in the modern era be called? The history leading to 
the planetary stage of evolution does not know all that well how 
it should be described: as the first epoch of actually realized and 
unified world history? The nuclear age? The planetary epoch?
120 The human, its “being,” and its historical evolution have been 
commandeered by an entire army of historians and scholars of 
the humanities. Can knowledge that has been conquered in this 
way provide answers to these urgent questions? The human 
body and the human soul constitute the objects of biology and 
psychology, whereas they are placed under special protection by 
medicine and psychotherapy. The so-called indigenous peoples 
are rummaged through by ethnologists. The economy, society, 
social constructs, and politics give national economies, sociology, 
and the social sciences a great deal to do. The forces that unfold 
during the course of historical events—religion, literature, and 
art—have also become objects of the proficient humanities. And, 
finally, the entire historical process, as well as everything that 
occurs in and through it, becomes assimilated and elucidated by 
historical science, i.e., history.
Thus, beings—whether they be a natural entity or a product 
of human-history—find their treatment and classification in 
accordance with the natural sciences and humanities, within a 
total plan and reconnaissance. An at least two-fold treatment is 
assigned to everything that has become the object of knowledge 
and to every matter of concern: a systematic and scientific (which 
is intended to apprehend the matter) and a chronological and his-
torical (which investigates its emergence and development).
For its part, the most distinguished deed of human perform-
ance, thinking, is taken over by philosophy, and philosophy—as 
metaphysics—analyzes the being of beings as a whole [das Sein 
des Seienden im Ganzen]: as idea, God, spirit, human, matter, 
energy, enframing [Gestell], or according to whatever inter-
pretation, and finally announces its judgment on natural events 
without faltering, while striving to construe human history. 
Accordingly, this philosophically comprehensive thought becomes 
even further subdivided to a significant extent. Metaphysics—
metaphysica generalis—, ontology, is directed at the whole, at the 
entity as entity. Logic is the judge of thought, and epistemology 
remains equally determined by the ratio. The components of a 
121developed and dissolved metaphysica specialis are concerned 
with regional ontological zones. In this way, natural philosophy, 
anthropology, historical science, ethics, and aesthetics exhaust 
nature and its powers, the power and powerlessness of his-
torical man, the virtue of action and the beauty of artworks. 
Philosophical and scientific history, i.e., the history of philosophy, 
finally investigates the historical process of doing philosophy and 
its respective stations.
Philosophy, i.e., (open) thinking which has become philosophy, 
already underwent subdivision and gradation into “logic,” 
“physics,” and “ethics” under the first philosophical academy. 
Beginning with ingenious Platonic school philosophy, strongly 
colored and systematically transmitted by the theological 
exegesis of faith in Biblical revelation, this plan leads to practical 
action in diametrical opposition to theoretical thought, all the 
way to Hegel. One ontological schema, subdivided into regional 
ontological zones and subject to the power of methodological 
perspectives, circumscribes the being of beings as a whole as well 
as the regions of totality.
The logos of the whole, its being and its truth, the dialectic of 
events (interpreted as idea, God, spirit or meaning, and the 
direction of moving, energized material), is apprehended “once 
again” by logical human thought, and becomes articulated, con-
scious of itself through human language and human conscious-
ness. As a result, logic and dialectic correspond to the logos of 
being or becoming.
The realm of nature, its matrix of order, its development, and its 
entire hierarchy have been placed under the focus of physics. 
After logos or spirit has illuminated everything, the massive 
naturalness of beings can be taken into account and adopted 
as a task by the suitable branches of knowledge and technical 
activities.
Through the human, nature is transformed into something 
different. Through the human and the spirit of human history, 
122 all empirical events enter the locus of self-consciousness. This 
attainment of certainty is the foundation of ethics and is borne by 
the latter. Humanity brings a total plan to fruition, plans system-
atically and levels that which offers resistance. Thus, we achieve 
our objective: the planetary age of the earth, this wandering star.
Everything is so perfectly in order and clear, plain and simple. 
There are beings [Es gibt Seiendes]. Metaphysics and speculative 
thought question the being [Sein] of beings, the living or dead 
God, and expose—spiritually or materialistically—the core of 
everything that exists. The being of beings is considered to be 
the logos of all that occurs, as a general and total plan with which 
human thought is said to exist in harmony. Initially, beings only 
appear within nature, which somehow began and proceeded to 
generate mankind: the natural sciences rush towards physical 
nature and penetrate it. The history of nature—and human 
creatures—fills the second great region of the totality. History 
begins with prehistory and finds no peace until it arrives at the 
consummation of planetary world history. During the course of 
this history, humanity learns to speak and think, the powers of 
religion, literature, politics, philosophy, science, and technology 
unfold, and they give expression to the whole and its various 
components, while they themselves can become the objects of 
varying perspectives.
The circle closes, and we of today investigate the being of beings, 
do work in the natural sciences, have comprehensive historical 
sciences at our disposal that encompass the whole of our efforts, 
while our thought somehow manages to apprehend everything 
adequately and at the right place. All the while, our technical 
activities intervene everywhere in order to alter things system-
atically and pragmatically. In this way, the history of the world 
is realized in a uniform and total manner as world history, all 
humans and peoples of the earth think according to the same 
plan, endeavor the same things, and are driven on by the same 
things, all are of the same breed. A variegated but focused form 
of thought, an efficacious form of science, and total technology 
123grip the entire planet and lead unified, i.e., uniformed humanity 
on to the radical domination of nature, to the satisfaction of 
all natural (and even intellectual) needs and drives. Collective 
humanity presents itself as the maker of plans; it is the objective 
subject that grasps all concrete objects in order to “actually” 
transform them with its practical and technical will that knows no 
bounds.
This total and unitary construct is present today in all coun-
tries and in all minds; its variations are part of its nature. Jews 
and Christians, positivists and idealists, citizens and Marxists 
pursue the same thing, whether they are aware of it or not. 
Everywhere everything is taught and learned, done and produced 
in accordance with this schema. The same plan is followed across 
the global surface of the earth: in a technical and theoretical as 
well as technical and practical mode.
All beings—be it an apple, the smile of a child, or a lathe—are 
taken into account in a mode compliant with technology and the 
natural sciences, pored through in accordance with historical 
criteria, and reshaped in a practical manner. Everything which 
has being is also interpreted in terms of mythology, the history of 
religion and the humanities, and all forms of manifestation within 
mythology, religion, literature, and the fine arts are subjected 
to efficient analysis. In the end, everything that has being will 
eventually be rendered as a word, concept, or sign by linguistics, 
logic, epistemology, and logistics, while metaphysics with its 
speculative thought prepares itself to tirelessly question the 
being of this being. The same holds true for every single being—
be it an apple, the smile of a child, or a lathe.
After a long prehistory, we have finally entered an age that has 
generalized beings [Seiendes], investigated them in a multi-
farious and comprehensive manner, and actually, i.e. technically 
restructured them. This age should be called planetary.
Is not everything in order this way, and is not this order itself the 
planning and planing planetary world order which is according 
124 to plan? Can a fracture be seen somewhere beneath the shining 
Sun-star, which has not been considered a planet for several 
centuries now, as well as on the earthly wandering star [irdischen 
Irrstern], which has only become a planet since the Copernican 
Revolution and then plunged into splendid rotational motion?
II
Why, however, should this present age be called planetary? 
Because its orbit is a transformative and wandering path? Or 
because it is an errant path? Because its plans are planetary, 
or because it plans to level off the universal [das All] during the 
course of its journey?5 Because the order of its plans leads to total 
planification and—in spite of this and due to this—the age of a 
wandering star that reveals itself as a wandering star comes into 
existence and remains so? Because everything is stretched over a 
faceplate [Planscheibe] whose transforming rotation persists with 
the same indifference? Or because we cannot envision this final 
plan of the entire picture and enframing [Gebilds und Gestell] and 
give adequate expression to them?
According to the Greeks, the essence of the “planetary” lies in a 
wandering that has gone errant; plázo (future) plágxomai (aor. 
pass.) heplágkthen (Latin: plango), an authentically Homeric term, 
means: to strike and to be struck and to be driven, to err, to plague, 
to wander aimlessly. The full meaning of the Odyssean adventure, 
and not only of this adventure, is alluded to in the opening verses 
of that epic quest: O Muse, tell me of the deeds of that many-sided 
man, / who journeyed off so far after the destruction of sacred Troy, 
/ who saw and learned the cities and ways of many peoples, / and on 
5 EN: Das All is not simply translated. It can mean the same as the English “all,” 
and does when Axelos talks of the “all of beings,” but in this context implies 
something closer to “cosmos” or “universe.” We have used “universal” to try 
to capture the two senses.
125the seas suffered such pain in the depths of his heart / to save his soul 
and the return of his companions.6
Human beings are struck and driven on by the being of physis, by 
destiny, by the lightning bolts of Zeus, plazómenoi, and they are 
continually one with wandering, erring individuals on an odyssey. 
They are plánetes: they are the errant ones. Mortals roam and 
go astray on earth, which is not a wandering star for the Greeks. 
They err, but not in respect to a correct truth. The aletheia reveals 
itself during this journey, and man errs and wanders within the 
clearing (of unconcealment). “The flight of the human away from 
the secret to the practicable, from the commonplace, to the next 
thing, past the secret, is erring. The human errs. The human does 
not at first enter errance. But only they ever go astray. . .”7 Erring 
should not be understood as incorrectness, as falsehood, or as 
making a mistake, as deviation: we “err” quite crudely, if we do 
so. “Not any isolated mistake, but rather the monarchy (the rule) 
of history by that inherently conspiratorial involvement of all 
forms of erring is the error. [ . . . ] The errance, in which historical 
humanity must respectively go astray in order to make its devel-
opment errant, plays an essential role in summoning the open-
ness of Dasein.”8 The Greek terms plazo heplagzthen, plazómenoi, 
plánetes, planetai, name the event of wandering and going astray, 
and thus, also give expression to errance as mistakenness (pláne); 
we ought not, however, the latter using the powers of the faculty 
of judgment [Urteilskraft].9 “The disclosure [Entbergung] of beings 
as such is at the same time in itself the concealment of beings as 
a whole. In the simultaneity of unconcealment and concealment, 
6 EN: Homer, The Odyssey, 1, 1–5.
7 Martin Heidegger, Vom Wesen der Wahrheit, 2nd ed. (1943; Frankfurt am Main: 
Vittorio Klostermann, 1949), 22. EN: “Vom Wesen der Wahrheit,” in GA, vol. 9, 
196; “On the Essence of Truth,” in Pathmarks, 150.
8 Heidegger, Vom Wesen der Wahrheit, 23. EN: “Vom Wesen der Wahrheit,” in 
GA, vol. 9, 197;  “On the Essence of Truth,” 150–51.
9 EN: Kant’s third critique was entitled the Kritik der Urteilskraft, the Critique of 
Judgment, or, more literally, of the Power, Force or Faculty of Judgment.
126 errance pervades. The concealment of the concealed and errance 
belong to the original essence of truth.”10
In the view of the Greeks, the planets are the wandering stars, 
the mad stars, the driven stars, the plánetes (asteres). The Greeks 
have neither experienced for the first time the essence of errance 
through the motion of the stars, nor have they transferred this 
essence from the human to the cosmic level. The fundamental 
experience of errance revealed itself to them but remained 
nonetheless withdrawn. The sun itself, the shining star that leads 
to unconcealment [Unverborgenheit], is a “planet” for them.
“(God) guides everything that crawls with blows.”11 This divine 
castigation (plegé), is “the lightning bolt that guides everything.”12 
Everything that crawls and wanders across the level plane is 
driven, struck, and guided.13
The unity of the all of beings, the prevailing physis, bears truth 
within it, which humans—through their errant wandering—
unconceal, e.g., generate through speech (through logos), through 
production (through poiesis), through action (through praxis). 
Thus, this wandering and going astray of mortals occurs in one 
place: the one-all (the Heraclitean hen pánta) is this true place.
10 Heidegger, Vom Wesen der Wahrheit, 23. EN: “Vom Wesen der Wahrheit,” in 
GA, vol. 9, 197; “On the Essence of Truth,” 151.
11 Heraclitus, frag. 11. EN: Here and below, Axelos cites Heraclitus by the 
standard Diels-Kranz B numbers, which enable reference to multiple 
editions. For English translations, see “Heraclitus,” in Early Greek Philosophy, 
trans. and ed. Jonathan Barnes (London: Penguin, 1987), 119.
12 Heraclitus, frag. 64. EN: “Heraclitus,” 104.
13 The determinative factor in the words: plazo (strike), plánes (wandering and 
gone astray), planétes (planet), planus (plain and level), and plânus (roaming) 
is not their shared nor their divergent etymological origins. Several lin-
guistic hypotheses make the attempt to explain these implications—by 
approaching their essential meaning (pelázo) and withdrawing from 
it. Readers can find these differences in connotation easily enough by 
in the appropriate dictionaries; however, the common meaning that is 
expressed—and the matter at hand it expresses—is much more difficult to 
conceptualize.
127Technê and physis are and remain intrinsically interconnected 
for the Greeks, and even possess a common and single origin. 
However, the mystery of their birthplace remains unsolved. 
Natural occurrence and poetic production, cosmic collapse and 
active influence (praxis) are determined by a sameness, although 
this sameness remains mysterious, and we cannot comprehend 
how something that has split asunder so violently could have 
been so intimately united at the beginning.
The emergence of the Judaeo-Christian belief in revelation 
bestows new luster on beings as a whole. God is the being 
of beings, the absolute forger of plans, and the plan of prov-
idence encompasses the entire genesis of the world: from the 
initial act of creatio ex nihilo to the apocalypse. The logos of God 
generates all of creation according to a systematic plan—of 
nature and humanity, and mortal sinners must—battling against 
nature according to plan—subjugate themselves to divine 
providence. Accordingly, humans develop the skills to com-
plete this divine plan, and everything is reflected in the plane 
mirror of fundamental belief. God who became human shows 
humanity the only way. Through this belief in revelation—as well 
as its probation and petrification by authorities of the church, 
everything that appears as “natural,” “material,” “corporeal,” 
and “sensual” becomes part of this battle, whose final objective 
remains a supernatural realm. Godlike—but fallen, sinful, and 
guilty—the human must dominate and transform everything 
through his own actions; the human has become the second 
greatest lord of creation; divine creativity has been taken over by 
godlike human production.
For us humans of the modern era, the earth-globe [Erdball] has 
become a wandering star. The history of humanity is unfolding 
across the entire surface of the earth-sphere [Erdkugel], 
enveloping it and the surrounding space. Human plans level 
anything that opposes this fate. We are the first planetary age of 
world time. A total plan takes hold of everything and ignites all 
human drives, while earth itself becomes the battlefield of these 
128 designs. Everything is meant to happen according to plan in order 
to achieve a gradation that is total and world-historical. With 
the help of technology, everything is stretched upon a faceplate 
whose rotation is presumed to parallel the rotation of the earth-
sphere. As we are the ones struck and guided by every power, 
however, we have “lost” the place for the revelation of truth.
Do we err, are we errant, or have we gone astray? The essence of 
the Greeks arose from one foundation and inspired one place; its 
errant wandering took place within the truth of beings as a whole 
[Seiendes im Ganzen]. The essence of Christianity also ignited a 
true locus through its erring. But we, on the contrary, do not have 
the truth: “The new aspect of our current position on philosophy 
[and not only on philosophy] is the conviction that no age has 
ever had before us: that we do not possess the truth. All of previous 
humanity ‘possessed the truth,’ even the skeptics.”14 The question 
remains open: perhaps the truth possesses us. In any case, truth 
has ceased to illuminate a singular place and has been drawn 
into wandering errance; it remains concealed within the circular 
motion of the planetary time-space.
The age before which and in which we stand (i.e., staggering and 
roaming), the present course of worldly time that has already 
dawned (although it has not yet truly begun), is planetary: 
planning and planing all that exists, placing it on the faceplate 
according to plan, consummating a total plan. A planned economy 
and the stubborn economic struggle leading to planification con-
stitute merely an extremely visible façade as well as one of the 
effective powers within this holistic plan of gradation; although 
economic operations are intended to lead to the satisfaction of all 
14 Nietzsche, W. W. XI, 268. EN: This is a reference to the Großoktavausgabe 
collection of Nietzsche’s works (ed. Elizabeth Förster-Nietzsche et. al., 
Leipzig: Kröner, 1894–1904) though this has been long been superseded. 
The passage in question can be found in KSA, vol. 9, 52 [Notebook 3 (19), 
from early 1880]. There is, to my knowledge, no English translation of this 
passage.
129drives and needs, and is also viewed as an impetus (in Marxism), 
it still remains subservient to the power drive.
The roots of this rootless age that is attempting to consummate 
the destiny of technology and nihilism lie in the objective positing 
of human subjectivity (as res cogitans), in the planned attack 
on the entirety of res extensa (objective and effected reality), 
in the collapse of perspective and in combinatorics, in the will 
to know and the will to dominate. There “is” no more meaning 
of being, being has become an errant and wandering genesis, 
and everything that is has become the object of a planetary 
technology according to plan, which grasps violently into this 
emptiness. The destiny of the world—i.e., of the openness of 
“becoming” being, turns upon world history, and the world—i.e., 
the non-world—appears as a work-world [Werkwelt] within which 
no space can remain for the true tasks of existence.
The destruction of the—merely extrasensory?—truth of being of 
the whole of being in its genesis [werdendes Seiendes im Ganzen], 
the “negation” of the meaningful openness of the world, and an 
active nihilism that only places sensual beings on its faceplate, 
achieve an enormous accomplishment and execute a deed 
of world-historical proportions: the power compelling them 
conquers the visible whole of the erring planet earth, unites 
humanity, unconceals all that exists by artificially elevating it 
to the object of planned production. In this way, something 
fundamentally new is created. This entire machination, this 
business of fabrication, however, possesses neither truth nor 
meaning, neither a place nor answers to the questions: Why? To 
where? For what? Despite and because of this, it does not stop 
by any means, but continues on and on; the world wars are an 
essential part of this scenario, although they—perhaps—make 
the aggressive technology employed there only superfluous.
It cannot be predicted at all whether this planetary process 
will lead to world catastrophe, to world destruction, to world 
decline. Perhaps it is the most profound foundation and final 
130 ground of beings to perish “in the end.” Perhaps. It is easy to 
state; difficult to conceive of. World destruction? Why not? Why 
not nothing? That could be a response to the question Why? by 
means of an (absent) answer. “We are making an attempt with the 
truth! Perhaps humanity will perish as a result! All right then!”15 
wrote and cried Nietzsche. The question posed by philosophical 
metaphysical thought since ancient times, the question tí tò ón, 
the question posed by Leibniz: pourquoi il a plutôt quelque chose 
que rien?, the message that can be expressed in a query by asking: 
Why are there beings at all and not, much rather, nothing?,16 being 
itself, which has become so questionable, will all of this and its 
world-being perish? And should this nothing be preconceived as 
fullness or emptiness? The speaking question is already difficult 
to hear; but it is even more difficult to pronounce the words of 
the answer.
The history of modern European thought that primarily takes 
place within metaphysics, i.e., philosophy—will it at least help us 
find the way? The event of modern Occidental thought leading to 
the planetary age—will it illuminate the course of the planet and 
where does it receive its light from? Can we calmly continue along 
our mistaken path? In any event, this thought does not execute 
sundry and varying steps. The power of this thought unfolds 
in a few strictly regimented steps leading to the realization of 
metaphysics, to the “becoming philosophical of the world” as the 
“becoming world of philosophy,” provided that this realization is 
at the same time its loss.17
15 Nietzsche, W. W. XII, 307. EN: KSA, vol. 11, 88 [Notebook 25 (305), from early 
1884]. No known English translation.
16 Heidegger, Martin, Einführung in die Metaphysik (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1953), 
1 and Was ist Metaphysik?, 20. EN: GA, vol. 40, Einführung in die Metaphysik, 
3; Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. Gregory Fried and Richard Polt (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 1; ”Einleitung zu ‘Was ist Metaphysik?,’” 
in GA, vol. 9, 381; “Introduction to ‘What is Metaphysics?,’” in Pathmarks, 289.
17 EN: Marx, “Aus der Doktordissertation,” 17; “Notes to the doctoral Dis-
sertation,” 62.
131Descartes completes the first decisive step: he posits the sub-
ject, the thinking and acting ego, the res cogitans; this subject is 
argued to dominate the entire reality of the res extensa through 
its self-reflection and effective action in order to make rational 
use of it. Since first finding expression through logos, physics 
and metaphysics were intimately interconnected in an unusual 
way. Now, metaphysics is beginning to find its culmination in 
physics and this can occur due to the fact that physics originates 
from metaphysics, whereas metaphysics is strongly influenced 
by “physics.” As a result, physics—as metaphysics—now converts 
physics to technology. The human subject, who desires to gain 
power over objects by means of rationality, is itself objective, i.e., 
posited as an object and set on its way.
Kant takes the same route: he posits the transcendental ego and 
attempts to establish its foundations. This thinking and acting 
ego apprehends objects as objects [Gegenstände als Gegenstände] 
of its experience, i.e., as objects [Objekte]. The transcendental 
quality of objectivity subsumes transcendental subjectivity and 
simultaneously gains its foundations from the latter. The tran-
scendental subject and transcendental object exist in a nec-
essarily relation to one another and have their foundations in the 
same.
Hegel strives to illuminate the meaning of the entire process: he 
interprets the total dialectical development of mind leading from 
the logos (of God) to the naive realm of nature and onwards to 
the spirit of human history, whereby the process as a whole is 
apprehended in the end as absolute knowledge by the subject, 
by self-consciousness. Truth which evolves in this manner is the 
truth of the whole—“that which is true is the whole”—, and the 
dialectic of the thinking subject gives expression to dialectic as 
the momentum of becoming being, i.e., as a dialectic of concrete 
and objective reality itself. Much rather, idea and reality are the 
same.
132 Something reaches its conclusion with Hegel; that having been 
said, we do not yet know precisely what culminates with him and 
presages a new future.18
The posited objective subject—of human being—that desires 
to dominate all objects (the whole of beings as the object) and 
transform them at the practical level through its intellectual 
faculties, its effective will, and its productive labor—begins to run 
its path once it has been set in motion. The subsequent stretch 
of the path is to be traversed by the acting and generalized 
18 Beginning and end, rise and fall, that which is past, present, and future, the 
old and the new, tradition and revolution disguise each other mutually, hide 
one another amongst themselves, and one after the other. Each of these 
powers contains its “contrary pole” in a certain sense, presupposes it, and 
is “explained” by it. They move in circles. Where and how does something 
begin, how does something stop—or find an end or its own particular end, 
how and when does something new emerge? What is transformed and how 
does something new come about? The transitions can only be explained 
with difficulty. Marx comments quite soberly on the beginnings of the 
new society: “a communist society, not as it has developed from its own 
foundations, but on the contrary, as it has directly emerged from capitalist 
society; which remains bound in every respect—economically, morally, 
intellectually—to the old society from whence it came.” (Kritik des Gothaer 
Programms (1875; Berlin: Neuer Weg, 1946), I, 3 [EN: “Critique of the Gotha 
Programme,” in The First International and After: Political Writings Volume 3, 
ed. David Fernbach (London: Penguin in association with New Left Review, 
1974), 346]). At the same time, however, as we shall see, he wants to believe 
in an entirely new future: for: “communism is different from all previous 
movements.” Heidegger claims that the present age “begins nothing new, 
but only carries to an extreme the old which was already presaged in the 
modern age.” (Unterwegs zur Sprache (Pfullingen: G. Neske, 1959), 265 [EN: 
GA, vol. 12, Unterwegs zur Sprache, 253; On the Way to Language, trans. Peter 
D. Hertz (San Francisco: Harper, 1971), 133.]) At the same time, he asks the 
question: “Are we the latecomers that we seem to be? Or are we not at the 
same time the early arrivers in the early stage of a completely different 
period of world history, which has let us abandon our previous conceptions 
of history?” (Holzwege, 300–1 [EN: GA, vol. 5, 326; “Anaximander’s Saying,” 
in Off the Beaten Track, 245–46]). We exist much more in an interlude than in 
the game itself. Compare as well: Kostas Axelos, Vers la Pensée planétaire: 
Le devenir-pensée du monde et le devenir-monde de la pensée, Collection 
“Arguments,” (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1964), primarily the concluding text 
“L’interlude.”
133objective subject. Marx intends to place Hegelian dialectic on 
its feet—for the task at hand is being able to run faster and 
faster; technological means of production will in fact be those 
forces that develop most quickly, and they do not lose the real 
ground beneath their feet. Accordingly, the technically active 
human is elevated and bestowed the dignity of the objective 
subject, whereas labor becomes the exceptional modus through 
which reality is manifested. “Therefore, the greatness of Hegel’s 
Phenomenology and its final result—dialectic as negativity, 
impetus and generative principle—is that Hegel comprehends 
the self-generation of the human as a process, objectification as 
loss of objectivity, as alienation, and as the supersession of this 
alienation; hence, the fact that he comprehends the essence of 
labor and grasps the objective human, the true, i.e. empirical 
human as the result of their own labor,” are the words of the 
young Marx.19 Nevertheless, Marx does indeed sharply criticize 
Hegel’s conception of labor: for Hegel, labor remains an activity 
of the spirit—in the opinion of Marx; in his own view, by con-
trast, labor is the concrete processing of an objective substance 
carried out by the human subject. The essence of the empirical 
(reality) consists in objective actualization by means of activated 
potentiality.
In this context, however, technically active man is not viewed 
as the individual human. The subject becomes socialized and 
generalized. It is argued that humanity itself becomes the 
objective subject through the revolutionary negation of the 
individual and the private in order to—as an objective subject—
subject itself to everything. Marx declares war on philosophical 
thought, literary and artistic activity, religious faith, and the act of 
founding the state. All of these activities are criticized as ideology, 
as idealistic and spiritualistic superstructure, as alienated 
theoretical performance, as the sublimation of the tragedy of 
19 Marx, “Nationalökonomie und Philosophie,” 269. EN: “Economic and 
Philosophical Manuscripts,” 385–86.
134 empirical being and empirical events. A demand is made for 
the full acknowledgment of the natural, i.e., social essence of 
man (the subject of objective history), the acknowledgment 
and complete realization of his objective essential powers. The 
alienation and divestiture, within which the entire previous 
history of humanity—and especially modern European his-
tory—has developed, should be ablated through the total and 
planned release (liberation) of productive powers, through the 
actualization of the potentialities of technology. Everything that 
exists becomes the material of labor, and collective, social, and 
socialistic humanity is the objective subject of this concrete and 
absolute, technical and productive praxis that never ceases to 
generate new objects. Marx clearly stated “communism is a 
highly practical movement that pursues practical objectives with 
practical means, and which is able to—above all in Germany and 
in respect to German philosophers—take a moment to tend to 
‘the essence.’”20 The effective essence of communism, the battle 
which must be fought by technology against every organic entity, 
was defined by Marx himself: “Communism is distinct from all 
previous movements in that it overturns the foundations of all 
previous relations of production and social intercourse, and for 
the first time consciously treats all organic prerequisites as the 
creations of pre-existing humans, while ridding these prereq-
uisites of their organic nature and subordinating them to the 
power of united individuals. Therefore, its establishment is 
essentially economic . . .”21 The center of Marxian thought, as well 
as the activity it engenders, consists in the generalization of the 
subject and the positing of human society as the place and sub-
ject of historical genesis. This human society is both a product 
of technology as well as the technically productive subject itself. 
Technology (in the form of labor, material production, practical 
fabrication, concrete generation) is the power that transformed 
nature into history, and constitutes the innermost driving force 
20 Marx, Die deutsche Ideologie, 218. EN: The German Ideology, 231.
21 Marx, Die deutsche Ideologie, 70–71. EN: The German Ideology, 86.
135of world history, which can first become actualized world history 
during the planetary age. The naturalism-humanism-communism 
manifested in reality is based upon man, his natural and social 
drives and needs; it negates all natural quality and it alone is 
capable of developing objective powers of production completely 
and according to plan. The driving truth and motivational power 
of Marxism lies in its comprehension of planetary technology, of 
world history as the history of objective action, of the being of the 
world as produced being. The point of departure and the result 
are meant to coincide; for: “In the same way, both the material of 
labor and the human as subject are the result and the beginning 
of the movement.”22 Everything appears in the artificial light of 
technology: “the history of industry and the objective existence 
[Dasein] of industry that has manifested itself [is] the opened 
book of the essential forces of the human.”23
The positing and posited essence of man rests in that restless 
“subjectivity of objective essential powers, whose action 
must therefore also be objective. Objective essence manifests 
itself objectively, and would not manifest itself objectively if 
objectivity did not lie within its essential nature. It creates and 
only establishes objects, as it is itself established by objects . 
. . ”24 However, up until now and due to the undeveloped state 
of technology, it holds true for the essence of man that “their 
life expression is also an alienation of life, their realization is an 
undoing of reality, an alien reality.”25 This should cease to be true 
for the first time during the epoch of thoroughly executed plan-
etary technology. All puzzles, mysteries, and theoretical problems 
will find their final solution in technical and productive praxis: “All 
22 Marx, “Nationalökonomie und Philosophie,” 237. EN: “Economic and 
Philosophical Manuscripts,” 349.
23 Marx, “Nationalökonomie und Philosophie,” 243. EN: “Economic and 
Philosophical Manuscripts,” 354.
24 Marx, “Nationalökonomie und Philosophie,” 273. EN: “Economic and 
Philosophical Manuscripts,” 389.
25 Marx, “Nationalökonomie und Philosophie,” 239. EN: “Economic and 
Philosophical Manuscripts,” 351.
136 social life is essentially practical. All mysteries caused by theories 
of mysticism find their rational solution in human praxis and the 
comprehension of this praxis.”26 Everything is determined by 
production, by material, sensual, effective, truly objective and 
concrete praxis: “Religion, family, the state, law, morality, science, 
art, etc., are merely particular modes of production and fall under 
its general law.”27
Production is that power which encloses subject and object 
within the same circle: “Therefore, production produces 
not only an object for the subject, but also a subject for the 
object.”28 In this way, subjectivity and objectivity enter into a 
new relation. The former becomes collectivized and generalized 
as objective subjectivity; the latter becomes “negated” in its 
continually renewed status as the product of production; this is 
not a standing objectivity [stehende Objektivität], but instead a 
becoming substantiality [werdende Gegenständlichkeit] that con-
stantly reshapes everything that is real. 
Planetary technology that has been unleashed and realized in its 
totality makes literature and art (techne) superfluous: “Is Achilles 
possible with gunpowder and leadshot? Or perhaps the Illiad with 
the printing press or even the printing machine? Does not the 
speech and song of the Muse necessarily end with the manual 
printing press . . . ?”29 The impulse to produce is the driving force; 
its logical consequence makes everything superfluous that has 
developed as ideology, superstructure, illusion, romanticism, 
mysticism, and speculative thought, and become entangled in 
“so-called world history.” Finally, humanity becomes an active 
26 Marx, “Thesen über Feuerbach,” no. 8. EN: “Concerning Feuerbach,” 423.
27 Marx, “Nationalökonomie und Philosophie,” 236. EN: “Economic and 
Philosophical Manuscripts,” 349.
28 Marx, “Einleitung zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie” (1857), in Zur Kritik der 
politischen Ökonomie, 247. EN: “Introduction,” in Grundrisse, 92.
29 Marx, “Einleitung zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie”, in Zur Kritik der 
politischen Ökonomie, 269. EN: “Introduction,” 111. Axelos uses the German die 
Techne here; not the Greek tekhne.
137force and exerts real dominance over beings as a whole without 
becoming alienated from the products of its labor. 
Neither supernatural ideas nor God can oppose the productive 
activity of man. “Communism makes its start (Owen) with 
atheism”30 and leads to the empirical realization of the alienated 
and metaphysical truth of philosophy. “That which was inner 
light becomes an all-consuming flame that shifts to the out-
side. This has the effect that the becoming philosophical of the 
world is at the same time the becoming worldly of philosophy, 
that the realization of philosophy is simultaneously its loss, and 
that which philosophy would battle on the outside is in fact its 
own internal deficiency . . .”31 The revolutionary resolution of the 
alienation of man, the revolution, revolts “against the previous 
‘production of life’ itself, the ‘total activity’ upon which it was 
based.”32 Nonetheless, Marx also realizes—although he does not 
take pause when confronted with this fact—that the radically new 
cannot remain without hindrances; for: “The supersession of self-
estrangement takes the same course as self-estrangement.”33 The 
revolution describes a circle.
Through this form of thinking, the all of beings is traced back and 
reduced to the totality of the concrete, sensual, productive praxis 
of objective human subjects. The world becomes a fabricated 
world and the issue at hand is: “the sensual world is conceived of 
as the total living sensual activity of the individuals constituting 
it.”34 The extrasensory (the noetic, the ideal [das Ideelle, das 
Ideale], the transcendental, the metaphysical, the mental) which 
prevails over (metá) the sensual (the real, the empirical, the 
30 Marx, “Nationalökonomie und Philosophie,” 237. EN: “Economic and 
Philosophical Manuscripts,” 349.
31 Marx, “Aus der Doktordissertation,” 17. EN: “Notes to the doctoral Dis-
sertation,” 62.
32 Marx, Die deutsche Ideologie, 36. EN: The German Ideology, 51
33 Marx, “Nationalökonomie und Philosophie,” 232. EN: “Economic and 
Philosophical Manuscripts,” 345.
34 Marx, Die deutsche Ideologie, 42. EN: The German Ideology, 59.
138 actual, the physical, the material) is overturned and placed on its 
feet, and as a consequence, everything must be stretched upon 
the faceplate [of modern technology]35 as a product of sensual 
(but how can it be meaningful as well?) and productive labor. It 
is argues here that the realm of quantity, of the number, of the 
calculating and planning intellect practically generates unheard-
of wealth. Metaphysics converts to social physics. Effective 
“subjectivity” and the effected substantiality, i.e., objective, 
concretized reality, become the same. The subject is the subject 
of an object and the object is the object of a subject; “both” are 
pursued by the same human drives.
What Marx said and thought is actually manifesting itself across 
the entire surface of the earth-sphere, whether it be in the form 
of state capitalism or state socialism. Thus, both manifestations 
move along the same path. We cannot yet know how far these 
developments will go.
Nietzsche views the same awakening world as a non-world. 
He conceives of a will to power that encircles the entire mortal 
coil [Erdenring] and desires to make conquest of the universal 
[das All]. The time space of the will to power is the game time of 
nihilism, i.e., of the God who is deceased, as He was killed. The 
“mad man,” i.e., the de-ranged, place-less “planetary” human 
pronounces the word: “Where has God gone? he called, I will tell 
all of you! We killed him –you and I! All of us are his murderers! But 
how did we do this? How could we drink up the sea? Who gave us 
the sponge to wipe away the entire horizon? What did we do as 
we unchained this earth from its sun? Where is the earth moving 
to now? Away from all suns? Are we not continually falling? And 
backwards, sidewards, forwards, to all sides? Do above and 
beneath still exist? Haven’t we gone astray in unending nothing? 
Doesn’t the empty space breathe upon us? Hasn’t it grown colder? 
Doesn’t the night and still more night come all the time? Mustn’t 
lanterns be lit in the early morning? Do we still hear none of the 
35 TN: Addition for the sake of clarity.
139noise of gravediggers who are burying God? Do we still smell 
none of the divine decay?—for gods decay, too! God is dead! God 
remains dead! And we killed him.”36
Will a future mode of being human, will the ascending and 
descending “Übermensch” know how to—and choose—to gain 
dominance of the entire planet? Will that human entity of a 
“Caesar with the soul of Christ” be able to affirm the eternal 
recurrence of the selfsame will to power? Will the new humans, 
who have taken on but also superseded humanity of the past, 
be correspondingly in bondage to this being (beings as a whole 
[Seiendes im Ganzen]), being that has gone through becoming and 
is because of it? These questions—should it even be possible 
to ask them in such a severe manner—can only remain open. 
The spheres of hermeneutics and the combinatorics of inter-
pretations and connections between interpretations seem to 
gain increasing dominance over the texts themselves. Already 
Nietzsche knew something about this, namely: how every text 
“disappears” beneath its interpretations.
Heidegger’s thought experiment takes up the same questions. 
“Nietzsche’s metaphysics is the completion of philosophy. This 
means: it has gone through the circle of designated possibilities. A 
completed metaphysics, which is the foundation for the planetary 
mode of thought, provides the matrix for an order of the earth 
that has presumably lasted for a long time. This order no longer 
requires philosophy, as it is already the foundation of the latter. 
But the end of philosophy does not also mean the end of thought, 
for thought is in transition to a different beginning,” are state-
ments we can read in Vorträge und Aufsätze.37 However, what we 
must never misconstrue is the way in which the consummation of 
36 Friedrich Nietzsche, Die fröhliche Wissenschaft, no. 125. EN: KSA, vol. 3, 
480–81; The Gay Science, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 1974), 
181.
37 Heidegger, “Überwindung der Metaphysik,” 83. EN: GA, vol. 7, 81; “Over-
coming Metaphysics,” 95.
140 the end, the truth of decline takes place; for: “Decline lasts longer 
than the previous history of metaphysics.”38
Heidegger attempts to augur a form of thinking that over-
comes philosophy—i.e., metaphysics. His preliminary and failing 
thought questions the distinction prevailing amongst—intra—
being as being [Seins als Sein] and being as a whole [Seiendes 
im Ganzen]. And this thought unfolds during the age of rising 
planetary technology and affects man, who has been ‘held fast’ 
[‘fest-gestellt ’ ] as a laboring animal.” “Technology” (as com-
pleted metaphysics) encompasses “all regions of beings, which 
respectively equip the whole of beings: objectified nature, culture 
as an operation, manufactured politics, and over-lying ideals [die 
übergebauten Ideale]. In this context, therefore, ‘technology’ does 
not mean isolated spheres of machine equipping and production 
[Erzeugung und Zurüstung].”39
Neither an attempt to return to the past, nor remaining captive 
in the present, neither pessimistic nor optimistic is the open path 
leading through technology into the future.
III 
The planetary does not only determine a particular age, epoch 
of world history, phase of development, cultural sphere, or stage 
of civilization. An event is planetary when it allows the being of 
being as a whole to become established in the history of human 
essence. Planetary are the course and status of the wandering 
and erring truth of the world, when within this truth mortals rise, 
perish, and come again. The level of this event stands under the 
sign of all that conquers everything, everything drawn into this 
rotational motion. The plan is that battleground and drafting 
38 Heidegger, “Überwindung der Metaphysik,” 71. EN: GA vol. 7, 69; “Over-
coming Metaphysics,” 85.
39 Heidegger, “Überwindung der Metaphysik,” 80. EN: GA, vol. 7, 78; “Over-
coming Metaphysics,” 93.
141room for that which no plan-maker—whether divine or human—
could realize systematically and without obstruction.
The grounds of the plan for the openness of world-being can by 
no means be taken into account like the plan of a simple drawing 
or flat image. Ambiguity and puzzlement are concealed behind 
the contours of the drawing and the colors of the image. These 
are the plans that seize and hold humanity, and humans only 
enter the scene if they have been driven on by planetary blows. 
Their homeland is uncanny [Seine Heimat ist unheimlich], as it is a 
wandering star, and because this mortal coil [Erdring] is not the 
only entrapment [Ring]; it is certainly a ring [Ring] that encircles 
everything, but it remains enclosed within a much more powerful 
struggle.
The place of the human is the planet earth. Can humanity inhabit 
this place in a harmonious and planetary way, and find its place 
and hour within this wandering space of time? The light shone by 
a non-erring star—can it allow the universal [Alles] which is one to 
appear within its radiant clearing and illuminate, ignite, and warm 
the earthly star, which is not itself a source of light?
Plain and uncomplicated, flat and trite is the way everything 
appears that exists and is produced in the dawning planetary 
epoch; planetary actions and productions that plan, level off, and 
systematize—today and tomorrow—subdue the entire earth: 
technology becomes the blow that sets everything in motion. 
By means of technology, the world-historical “essence” of the 
history of the world as well as the planetary prevalence of the 
being of beings as a whole in their becoming [Sein des werdenden 
Seienden im Ganzen] unfold. However, this essence appears as 
a non-essence and pervades in a nihilistic manner. Language, 
thought, and literature (logos and poiesis), creative production 
and empirical action (poiesis and praxis), art that has become 
technology (technê), and labor in general as the production of 
erga [works], no longer provide any evident meaning. Truth, the 
meaning of being, remains absent. The extrasensory has been 
142 degraded, the sensual has been stretched upon the faceplate, 
and everything has become a product of monstrous fabrication; 
by no means, however, will rational and artificial purposefulness 
and goal-orientation be able to truthfully overcome the meaning-
less and the aimless. Such planning and production, this activity 
and this business, these compulsions and these total operations, 
this mobilization, mechanization, and intrigues (of power), 
determine the continuing and progressive use of all produced 
and useful objects—of beings as a whole. The expedient and 
useful are consumed and exploited in an increasingly rapid 
tempo. This is in order and is part of the persevering planetary 
order.
Zeus guides all that exists with lightning bolts. The illuminating 
and destructive fate of the bolt does not open the horizon of 
the one-all anymore. “Beings as a whole are guided by the bolt,” 
Heraclitus says,40 speaking of the divine lightning bolt. Zeus has 
become Jupiter, and Jupiter has become a planet. Driven and 
beaten, but not at all guided, mortals can no longer say about 
divine being, about the holon, about that which is sacred: “The 
one, that which alone is wise, cannot be named and certainly 
cannot be given the name of Zeus”;41 they themselves strive to be 
bearers of the planetary will to power, of the will to will.
Ares no longer leads sacred battles [Kämpfe]. The Heraclitean 
polemos (“the father of the whole of beings”) has become the 
planetary state of war and only has the naked domination of the 
earth as its aimless objective.42 Beneath the planetary course 
of the stars, the struggle for the whole of the visible earth and 
its measured spaces of time remain entrapped in void nothing. 
Peace is just as profane as war, and perhaps the will to power 
has also lost its belligerent courage and can only play out in a 
belligerent state of peace.
40 Heraclitus, frag. 64. EN: “Heraclitus,” 104.
41 Heraclitus, frag. 32. EN: “Heraclitus,” 119.
42 EN: This is a reference to Heraclitus, frag. 53; “Heraclitus,” 102.
143Aphrodite—as Venus—has become a planet. Eros has turned 
into love, and love has become a matter of the imagination and 
of action. Love is replenished by the powers of self-reflection, 
executed as an act and as reproduction. Marx already conceived 
of “being together [Mitsein],” Greek: synousía, in a “technical” 
mode; he perceived it from the vantage point of the division 
of labor; the “division of labor, which was originally nothing 
more than the division of labor during the sexual act.”43 Future 
technological production of “human” creatures is not far away; 
the reproduction of the human race will be reduced to the 
parameters of total production. The planned and artificial 
breeding of “rational living beings” would merely be another of 
the many steps of physis transitioning into technê.
But after the entire void has been filled according to plan, after 
the entire surface of the earth’s crust (and the underlying layer of 
mother earth) as well as the air and the seas surrounding it have 
been processed with technological means, after the elementary 
forces—both the smallest of the small and the greatest of the 
great—have been released, i.e., “mastered”—what happens then? 
After the entire sense of these “nonsensical” goings-on have been 
realized at the planetary level—in the north as in the south, in the 
west as in the east—will meaning collapse after the decline, or 
even shipwreck, of the future world?
After the abolition of any meaning, and after the fabricated 
planetary world has become constructed in its techno-aesthetic 
mode, will the openness of meaning, the wandering and erring 
truth of the being of beings as a whole (provided all of that will 
even be described in this way and require these designations) 
reveal itself? After planetary humanity has been tormented 
to the point of exhaustion by nihilistic, meaningless, all-round 
business and the aimless practical compulsion to produce, will 
nostalgia and the yearning for faraway places be able to coincide 
with one another?
43 Marx, Die deutsche Ideologie, 28. EN: The German Ideology, 42–43.
144 The logos of Heraclitus, whose traces lead to planetary thought, 
once conceived of the world of being of worldly time as a “game.” 
He is the first—Occidental—thinker who dared to do this. Two 
and a half centuries later, during the late period of an epoch 
drawing to a close, and during the early phase of a newly dawning 
era, Nietzsche calls attention to the higher meaning of a world 
game that is neither meaningful nor meaningless. Heraclitus and 
Nietzsche are the only thinkers who dared to place the being of 
becoming on the gameboard [Spielbrett]. Perhaps the day after 
tomorrow, planetary nihilism that has been overcome will be 
able to hear its own voice anew. Indeed, Heraclitus said: “Worldly 
time is a child at play—a child with a board game [Brettspiel]: the 
kingdom of a child.”44
And Nietzsche permits the “mad” man to ask, after he has 
announced the murder of God: “How can we console ourselves, 
the murderers of all murderers? The most sacred and the 
most powerful the world has ever possessed has bled to death 
beneath our knives—who can wipe the blood from ourselves? 
What water could we cleanse ourselves with? What ceremonies of 
atonement, what holy games will we have to invent?”45 This game 
of the sacred and the profane—could it be the “world” itself, a 
world of gods and man overcome? “Around the hero everything 
can become tragedy, around a demi-god everything can become 
a satyr play; and around God everything becomes– what? 
Perhaps a ‘world’?”46
After the all of beings, the totality, the being of the becoming 
world has “lost” the meaning of its openness, after the senseless-
ness of planetary technology has fully manifested and exhausted 
itself both in terms of meaningfulness and method, perhaps the 
44 Heraclitus, frag. 52. EN: “Heraclitus,” 102.
45 Nietzsche, Die fröhliche Wissenschaft, no. 125. EN: KSA, vol. 3, 481; The Gay 
Science, 181.
46 Friedrich Nietzsche, Jenseits von Gut und Böse, no. 150. EN: KSA, vol. 5, 99; 
Beyond Good and Evil, in Beyond Good and Evil/On the Genealogy of Morality, 
trans. Adrian Del Caro (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2014), 52.
145one-all itself (the hen pánta), the holon as the holy, inspirational 
essence, and the truth of being as game will be able to unfold 
their harmoniously martial powers. Perhaps a holy-profane game 
can bring into play the “non-being” of the openness of the being 
of beings as a whole, the horizon of the rotational motion of the 
world, the difference itself of that which is distinct from being 
in genesis, the never concluded and never completed totality, 
and even the course of the planet—a deadly serious world-game 
into which mortals are playfully plunged in play. In this way, the 
harmonious and planetary essence of world-being would appear 
in the playroom of “time without aim” neither as a tragedy nor as 
a comedy, but as an “open world.”

Twelve Fragmentary 
Propositions Concerning the 
Issue of Revolutionary Praxis
I
Marxism—and the “Marxisms” that have been increasingly 
combined with other elements: Christian, bourgeois, positivist, 
scientistic, psychoanalytic, phenomenological, existentialist, 
structuralist—can still serve as incentives for certain types of 
theoretical research without, however, providing the decisive 
impulse for revolutionary praxis in highly industrialized 
societies, as this is intended in accordance with Marxian and 
Marxist schemata. Marxism and Marxisms execute moderately 
productive and inquisitive labor, they become integrated in the 
theory and praxis of their society, and they live out its life and 
death.
II
Highly industrialized society is gradually being transformed into 
a “socio-capitalistic” society, set in motion by an ever-advancing 
homogenizing technology.
148 III
In technologically undeveloped countries where Marxism has not 
avoided confusion by merging with different elements—religious, 
ethnic, nationalistic, ideological—, it has still retained the role of 
a lever for certain revolutionary changes which lead those coun-
tries to a socio-capitalistic and techno-bureaucratic status quo, to 
a planetary society according to plan..
IV
Sociological studies that call themselves Marxist, or intend to be 
Marxist, are increasingly losing their autonomy [Eigenständigkeit]; 
they become confounded with other types of research and the 
result is oversimplification. The theoretical whole of Marxism—in 
its specificity and as a totality—has ceased to exist, whereas 
theoretical Marxism is undergoing negation in a weakened and 
non-offensive form through its own self-generalization. It has 
been assimilated by the wave of amoebic progressivism [von der 
Welle des teigigen Progressismus].
V
Marxist analysis has retreated from its own potential—to an 
equal extent in capitalist countries and countries proud of their 
socialism. Marxism does not place itself in question sufficiently 
enough and does not ask radical questions.
VI
The famous “changing the world” is taking place nonetheless, 
though in accordance with a mixed and impure schema. The 
designs of innovators, of reformers and “revolutionaries” have 
themselves become transformed in and through historical 
momentum, which can only proceed with misunderstandings and 
compromises.
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Socialist movements have failed, as every radical intention “fails,” 
because it must manifest itself through approximations. Their 
conception itself was too ideological and too abstract; it did not 
think profoundly and misjudged its origins, its proper procedure, 
and its aim. As it was too utopian, this conception was con-
demned to fail the test of banality; as it was too banal itself, it 
was unable to uphold its utopia as an infantile and eschatological 
hope. From the onset, the revolutionary and socialist conception 
remained determined by that which it claimed to negate.
VIII
The so-called socialist bloc—which is already polycentric to a 
significant degree—seems to insult those who want to be open 
Marxists and socialists, democratic and liberal communists. They 
are incapable of comprehending the play of social realities, the 
role played by violence, by oppression, and by the state. They 
overestimate and underestimate what is said and done without 
rightly knowing how to interpret it.
IX
Highly industrialized societies are heading for a capitalistic 
socialism of the state [einen kapitalistischen Sozialismus des 
Staates]; they preserve their rule, power, and exploitation in 
ways that have become increasingly more mediated, and they 
let us see with grim foreboding that the complete self-admin-
istration of socialized society—the negation of dominance—is 
a myth. Through its processes of collectivization and univer-
salization, bourgeois society socializes individualism, engulfs 
and neutralizes all attacks, barely succeeds in integrating every 
criticism, emasculates and acknowledges uncompleted revolts by 
dissolving the distinction between true and false, freedom and 
unfreedom.
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The left is merely able to participate in the historical comedy 
of bureaucratic nationalization; its own tasks have become 
intermingled with general duties that simultaneously express 
individual and collective interests. When the left adopts a neg-
ative position, it achieves nothing; if the adopted position is too 
positive, the left is incorporated by the establishment. If the left 
pursues a mainstream course, it contributes to the prevailing 
mediocrity. Aggravating social antagonisms and contradictions 
does not appear to be the lot of the left, as the overall status quo 
is able to digest such contradictions and antagonisms with their 
originators all at the same time. The protests of the left remain 
ineffective and empty; they enthusiastically maintain the voice of 
a certain aspiration, but this aspiration remains imprecise.
XI
The proletariat in technologically developed countries has 
become assimilated into the general scheme of things as petty 
bourgeoisie; its being and consciousness negate themselves 
through the process which leads towards general prosperity. 
The engine of this process—whether capitalistic or socialistic—
remains profit. Complex crises cannot be predicted, and the rev-
olutionary praxis of “advanced” countries cannot be executed by 
theoreticians and professionals of a revolution that never arrives. 
Revolution does not even seem to be a remote possibility and the 
class conflict—which has become extraordinarily sluggish—does 
not have revolution as its horizon any longer. The practices of 
reform and modernization take place without magnificence. The 
“underdeveloped” countries will soon attain the achievements of 
the bourgeois French Revolution; Marxism is the instrument of 
their emancipation and industrialization.
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Marxian and Marxist theory and their practical perspectives 
remain caught between the anvil of Hegelian political philosophy 
and that which it expresses, and the hammer of the nihilistic 
diagnosis formulated by Nietzsche (liberated from appeals to the 
spirit and all romanticism). While the planetary age continues 
its odyssey, attempts to gain expression, and changes its actors. 
Negativity conceals itself during this time with no difficulty.

A Discussion about Science1
Conducted with the 
Classical Philologist Jean Bollack
Jean Bollack: Conspicuous these days is a shared concern about 
the threat posed by science, connected with the expansion 
and perfection of technological methods. Investigating the 
material occurs within parameters that exceed the powers of 
an individual researcher and by means of technical equip-
ment, statistical analysis, and the assessment of quantitative 
units. It is indeed the case that nobody can avoid this positive 
enrichment within their own field of knowledge, and in spite 
of this everyone has the feeling that their area of knowledge 
evades overall accessibility, and as a result, evades their own 
purview; and this explains another, not less conspicuous 
effort, namely, to rediscover the unity of science or even 
several distinct disciplines and give them a common goal. 
Didn’t the geographer speak of merging geography with his-
tory and sociology, and Lévi-Strauss, whose most important 
achievement—the description of kinship systems—involved 
1 EN: The German Wissenschaft, which we have here translated as “science,” 
has a somewhat broader meaning than the English word, and can mean 
scholarship in general.
154 the application of structural linguistics to ethnology, didn’t 
he believe he had foreseen a general functional theory of 
human cognition?
Kostas Axelos: Yes. But at the same time, scientific research has 
become a kind of executed technique.2
JB:  I don’t understand your “but.” Technology does seem to me 
to be one of the two main characteristics that I mentioned.
KA:  Technology is still understood in a sense that is too 
restricted. The sciences cannot take complete possession of 
technology, as technology constitutes their driving force, the 
power that guides them. In general, one regards technology 
to be the product of science. But isn’t it much rather the 
most internal impetus [Beweggrund] of science? Not only is 
the research of science carried out in a technical manner, 
but the field itself and the objective of every science are 
determined by—scientific—technology. Ethnology studies its 
object exhaustively with technical means: so-called primitive 
peoples are given expression through the technical language 
of ethnology.
JB:  That’s quite right. In the view of historians, all of world his-
tory has become the history of economics. Products and 
trade also dominate the feudal era now—one only needs to 
think of the frequently stressed significance of the studies 
by Marc Bloch about feudal society—, yes, even antiquity, 
while on the other hand obscure and shadowy individuals 
have been promoted to the status of movers of history, as 
they are resurrected like phantoms from historical statistics 
and archive research—pale and unassuming, a strange Last 
Judgment, no monarchs, no lords, no popes and cardinals, 
2 TN: See Bruzina, “Translator’s Introduction,” in Axelos, Alienation, Praxis and 
Techne, ix–xxxiii for a discussion of the special use made of “technique” by 
Axelos, as opposed to “technology.”
155but a countless horde of “rural population” and “urban 
bourgeoisie,” market and anonymity.
KA:  What isn’t offered on the market these days? Even the 
unusual has become a commodity. Time is reflected by his-
tory itself.
JB:  To that extent, research had been affected by the spirit of 
the times, before it acquired a methodology. I also admit 
that the desire for inclusion itself still lies within the sphere 
of technology. Of course, Lévi-Strauss speaks of a theory of 
fonctionnement of the human spirit: machine and automation 
are still mentioned in his last theory. And the sciences 
humaines, as one calls organized research in the humanities 
in France nowadays, are certainly always sciences of 
humanity and never for humanity [der Menschen und nie für 
den Menschen]. How does the human behave, how does their 
mind function?—these are the questions that are asked. 
And in spite of this, in my opinion, there lives in France—as 
was indicated by my summary just now—the idea of, or at 
least the desire for research that is still humane, accessible 
as a whole, and goal-oriented at the same time. Questions 
concerning object and method are consistently addressed. It 
seems to me, it is precisely in the determination of this goal 
that the whole problem is rooted. As this goal is only still 
contemplative to a marginal degree (in the tradition of the 
liberal arts), does it not necessarily intrude into the activities, 
yes into the destiny of a nation? In this regard, it is character-
istic that many commentators view science as action, as an 
activity that advances, whereas research is considered to be 
the supplementary execution of the overall occurrence. This 
is especially striking in the field of scientific research where 
reactionary interests can simultaneously constrain scientific 
investigation and economic recovery.
KA:  They advance at the same pace as contemporary science.
JB:  Not at all. I would even maintain—always the same.
156 KA:  But here, the same bears different names. You frequently 
spoke of research. That seems to me to be a very important 
point. Today, science has become research. There aren’t any 
more well-rounded, organically promoted and structured 
individual scientific disciplines. Classical physics does not 
exist. All of us know that. And it’s already begun to be the 
case that psychology, sociology, and a uniform conception 
of history are ceasing to exist. Research is the predominant 
reality; constantly renewed research that desires to know 
less than to investigate and produce effects. For this reason, 
all scientific institutes are called research institutes; for the 
same reason, the image of the scientist and scholar has 
changed radically. Even philosophers are called researchers 
and paid as such by the state. In research activity, however, 
lies the power of a technology that constantly presses for-
ward. The human as subject, and material objects as the 
focus of research, exceed the subject-object dichotomy 
which holds for the classical sciences, and they enter a new, 
apparently simple albeit four-dimensional zone.
JB:  In my view, all programs seem to confirm how much science 
has lost its national character. Statistics remain statistics, 
whether they apply to the Roman Empire or to Bantu tribes, 
whether they are calculated in Kiev or in Paris. But regardless 
of this, I did call attention to tendencies typical for France 
just a while ago—to conceive of science as human and 
utilitarian in the best sense of the word, which is not identical 
with its absolute effect, and perhaps this reflection is the 
best antidote for an anonymous effectiveness that evades 
human intervention. What, however, we can continue to 
evaluate quite positively—in my opinion—is the outstanding 
role that can still be attributed to individual persons. Don’t 
the same names reoccur in different contexts? Or are they 
merely the avant-garde of a radical efficiency?
KA:  The technological and scientific research spreading across 
the entire earth-globe [Erdball] has managed to retain its 
157own character in every country. French researchers still 
consider themselves to be humanists. But perhaps modern 
planetary research—including the French—is neither natural 
nor unnatural, neither human nor inhumane, neither 
purposeful nor without purpose. The magnificent aspect of 
contemporary science is precisely the resolution of these 
oppositions. The whole affair can appear meaningless, but it 
isn’t. But it is not all meaningful, either. It “is,” as it constantly 
dissolves, becomes fixated, and negates, and thereby sets 
the planet earth in motion. The desire you refer to, which is 
actually more a desire for the humane, seems to be a desire 
for the poetic in my opinion. While pursuing such a problem-
atical anthropology, isn’t it precisely literature that Foucault 
encounters?
JB:  You rightfully emphasize the diction of the text, and at the 
same time, you identify the problem of language. Most sub-
missions stand out due to the clarity of their composition 
and their expressive finesse, which still remain virtues of 
the French intellect. All the same, one notices a certain per-
plexity that they possess. The academic jargon, the form 
of expression of scholarly circles, sounds outmoded, and 
conspicuously often one has the impression that material 
has been borrowed from technical functions, and “l’en 
fonction de” expresses the reason—as if the ascertainment 
should receive more functionalistic than merely positivistic 
resonance. Is this a stage on the way to encoded statements 
with restricted communicativity?
KA:  In a curious way, the functionalistic application of language 
has connections to the Romanic clarté. Many times a state-
ment seems to be so clear that one cannot understand it in 
a productive manner any more. I must state quite openly: 
when one speaks of sociology today, I don’t know whether 
one means the nearly antiquated sociology of the nineteenth 
century, our contemporary dilemma that is so confused, or 
the orientation of research intended to surpass traditional 
158 school sociology. The clarity and sobriety of exposition 
also frequently prevents the surfacing of more profound 
levels of reality and developments of thought. The so-called 
philosophical reflection on a theme is not necessarily tied to 
a form of investigative and creative thought.
JB:  Well, this broadcasting series was concerned with research 
reports and only secondarily with autonomous analysis.
KA:  But shouldn’t the report itself have a research character? 
Why do so many researchers nowadays fear the accusation 
that something is unscientific?
JB:  I would say: one no longer knows the limits of scientific 
discovery with any precision, and one becomes even more 
constrained than one would actually care to be, or one seeks 
refuge in the pure correspondence of technical procedure, in 
encoded statements, as this has already begun to take root 
in the humanities as well.
KA:  All newly discovered knowledge—think of Marx, think 
of Freud—was branded as arbitrary by academic minds. 
Perhaps there are no borders between science and 
inquisitive research, if both are authentic. Borders can only 
be drawn between dogmatized and open knowledge.
JB:  Agreed. But is the scientific professionalism mentioned 
before—as the criterion for academic performance—
identical with what you mean by “dogmatized science”?
KA:  The greatest part of academic performance takes place 
within a previously determined space. In one way or other, 
academic research is coerced from the outside to open its 
horizons.
JB:  Is an open Scholasticism in your sense of the term even con-
ceivable? Mustn’t the inherited norm—as it is still handed 
down in France, for example—coexist with the collapse? 
It is characteristic that the most intellectual influences 
159of European rank in Paris—and this since the eighteenth 
century—have come about outside of the traditional 
schools of thought. Bergson was never at the Sorbonne and 
Sartre never held an academic chair. Even students lead a 
double life between the burden of university duties (with 
countless examinations) and their second free and more 
or less “present” existence. Moreover, this also explains 
the education of French intellectuals that often appears so 
divided from without (but characteristically not in respect to 
academicians; the difference is significant); they often rep-
resent tradition and revolutionary spirit at the same time. In 
cases where this discrepancy cannot be tolerated any more, 
this seems to be the reason for the attraction that orthodox 
Marxism is still able to exert, in my opinion. All of this exists 
in very stark contrast to Germany where the university still 
focuses intellectual life, even if it does not fulfill it.
KA:  An open Scholasticism doesn’t exist. However, as soon as 
Scholasticism—or all current forms of neo-Scholasticism 
(of all variations)—are experienced as such, they serve 
the function of inciting their own forceful revocation. The 
renowned physicist Louis de Broglie once related how his 
teacher told him after the first phase of his school edu-
cation that he had no talent for physics research. And 
this duel (tradition versus violent overcoming) produced 
modern physics. But a new danger exists: that achievements 
become degraded once again to generic school material. For 
example, in all universities today one studies as an object of 
research—without properly reconstruing the matter—the 
literary thought of André Breton, who is not sufficiently 
acknowledged as the founder of Surrealism, or—in Ger-
many—Hölderlin, who has become a figure of the all too 
academic history of literature and literary science.
JB:  That is an old and general fate. The thought of Heraclitus 
became Heraclitism and Plato’s became Platonism. A fate 
that was taken ad absurdum only by organized technical 
160 operation and generalized curiosity. No community has 
ever been able to avoid epigonic dogmatism. But today, 
normative dogmas that are still alive no longer exist at uni-
versities, which is perhaps something new and something 
that can be evaluated positively. Perhaps we have exited 
the old repetitive cycle of creation and codification, and 
the open quality you speak of is probably not any radically 
new foundation any more like the architectonic of medieval 
Scholasticism by Thomas Aquinas, or the methodology of 
Descartes in Cartesianism. Broglie, whom you mentioned, 
ventured into the uncertain. He cannot be the founder 
of a school of thought, as heroic as his attempt at sys-
tematization might appear. And not Einstein, either.
KA:  Certainly, the researcher of today swims in a different 
stream. It has been emphasized enough that one cannot 
and should not separate the physiological experiment from 
the organic conductor of the experiment. Here, the sub-
ject-object dichotomy is in the way to its “overcoming.” The 
human subject and objects [Gegenstände] at the focus of 
research (so-called objects [Objekte]) become negated at the 
same time and make room for the appearance of new con-
tent. Now, I repeat the question: In what relation do these 
efforts stand in respect to poetry? Do dry science and fiery 
poetry remain separate, even irreconcilable?
JB:  In this way, we come back to the theme of programs with a 
poetic presentation.
KA:  Still more important is evocative literature itself.
JB:  Yes, Foucault was a proponent of the fulminatory, 
winged Heraclitean poetry of René Char, and yet as 
an anthropologist he treated Teilhard’s protohistoric 
hypotheses and Lévi-Strauss’s structures of kinship 
systems as communicative forms. The literary expression 
is understood as conveying the meaning of the theory, so 
to speak. “From the onset,” as he phrases it so elegantly, 
161“man is doomed to meaning,” man exists in “that uncanny 
hyperbole of constantly replicated signs that constantly 
function as symbols in relation to one another, of such signs 
that mutually observe each other furtively and reply to 
one another in a language with the same vocabulary as the 
silence of the nights.”3
KA:  How strange that statement sounds about the voice of 
silence.
JB:  Everything remains unexpressed and simultaneously 
becomes communication and correspondence. Many seek 
a determination of values, the meaning of denotation, 
signification as meaning and denotation in sociology. Others 
even go a step further; language becomes a reflection that 
ascertains meaning for them. They alone are capable of 
discovering specific relations. The definition of man as homo 
loquens acquires a different sense: humanity stands before 
a matrix of symbolic relations. Just as a code remains silent 
within the speechlessness of its technical transcription, lit-
erary diction liberates ciphers that bear their own decoding 
within themselves. The bifurcation between logical thought 
and imagination dissolves, indeed, into a logic of multiple 
levels. The difference between primary and secondary reality 
disappears on the spot. In this way, the present (or future?) 
language intended to investigate the original propositions 
of the pre-Socratics returns to where neither the dark, 
perplexity, and light of Heraclitus, nor the eulogy and the 
directive of Empedocles were distinct from one another. And 
even with the Plato who founded the Academy, one finds 
myth and logos that supplement one another. In another 
such fundamental correspondence, André Breton, the 
unerring sustainer [Wahrer] of the emancipatory, who you 
mentioned previously, put—as Freud’s successor—magical 
culture and the actuality of derivative realities in their 
3 EN: As far as I am aware, Foucault ’s contribution has never been published.
162 legitimate place. In his—as one phrases it—materialistic 
theories of “objective accidents” lies the geometrical locus of 
determinative coincidences, a locus, as he himself stresses, 
that is identical with Hegel’s sovereign methodology.
KA:  That is important. Naturally, Breton interprets Hegelian 
dialectic in an open manner.
JB:  Liberated powers of imagination become “scientific” as an 
outflux of analyzable faculties within the realm of dreams 
and unrestricted mind. Human necessity becomes natural 
necessity, and thus, science and literature meet within 
“objective chance.”
KA:  How and where is the decision made today? What is chance 
and what is fate? The duel between thought and logic, soul 
and psychology, historical humanity and sociology has not 
been initiated in the least. Man as a sign with which the 
world plays appears as a number in the age of technology. 
Research based on calculation and functionalistic knowledge 
play with ever greater numbers. Literature and thought 
await the hour of their encounter. Already Hegel drew the 
distinction between reasoning thinking and speculative 
thinking. In philosophy seminars, this distinction itself is 
investigated with the faculty of reasoning thought. Up until 
now, we have spoken of researchers and scientists. But let us 
also allow a graphic artist to take the podium.
JB:  I anticipate already: you want to draw our attention to the 
remarks of the painter Braque that had ripened under 
the brilliant light of graphic observation, as he stated that 
thought and reasoning were two different things: Penser et 
raisonner font deux [thinking and reason are two things]. For 
a painter, graphic perspective and poetic sense constitute 
thinking, too.
KA:  It is no accident that the wide-ranging perspective within 
an increasingly structured, functionalized, and automated 
163interpretation of the world will attempt to see through its 
own “free” zone. Structuring, functionalization, automation 
are the driving planetary slogans in the West as well as in 
the East, in the North as well as in the South. The thought 
corresponding to this world situation can, however, tran-
scend all particular dimensions by experiencing the unity 
in diversity and giving expression to it. This new strictness 
of thought will probably—of necessity—supersede every 
codified or even codifiable logic.
JB:  Accordingly, the technicized and even automated cipher 
would achieve the same things as the poetically receptive 
diction mentioned beforehand. Just as no word or collection 
of words can stand for itself any more in a linguistics that has 
become structural, and just as the class of their denotations 
only achieves meaning through the play of relations among 
them, the system Lévi-Strauss developed for extremely 
confined societies also makes reference to an unsuspected, 
incomprehensible, and—apparently only manifested as—
mechanical interplay of more comprehensive groups. In 
this way, its already complicated schemata become con-
stellations on the illuminated screen of blinking points within 
the sphere of the inestimable (even if this visibility is made 
possible by a machine) and structure becomes automation. 
And as a result, a new light is thrown on the remark made at 
the beginning that ethnology designs our own hardship.
KA:  The thought of the future, which has already somehow 
managed to break through in our present, will also dare to 
place all scientific achievements in question. Language is 
by no means coextensive with linguistics and there are only 
questioning answers to the great questions. Are we moving 
into the realm of that “silence of the nights”? Or is the light 
dawning–and the language emerging—of new heavenly 
motions?

Epilogue
The thought experiment [Denkversuch] attempted here dares to 
seek orientation in the world game in order to give expression 
to the game “itself” and play it. In its uniformity and reference 
to the whole, such an attempt can only unfold in a fragmentary 
and spotty manner. Various modes of speech must be tested: 
scientific, poetic and intellectual—systematic and aphoristic—, 
historical and historiographical [geschichtliche und historische]. 
All of these directives can only be carried out with imperfection. 
Whether we want this or like this—or not. With and without 
success. It is and remains our task to enter the planetary age. 
Striding forwards and backwards. “Thoughts that come on the 
feet of doves guide the world,” were once the words of Nie-
tzsche.1 Do we already sense that such thoughts that guide the 
world—and still more: thoughts guided by the world—stand 
before our doors?
Mythical—or mythological—prehistory, the primitive and the 
archaic confront us with puzzles. The Eastern [Das Morgenlän-
dische], the Oriental, and the Asian stand behind us, still ques-
tionable, terrible, and fruitful, behind “our” Occident. The Greeks 
and the reconstructive-constructive Romans still stand before 
us—they question us and are questioned by us. Judaeo-Christian 
values are spreading and becoming extinct at the same time, as 
the last and final, perfected religion taken over by secularism, 
humanism, and socialism. The European and modern, modernity, 
is still an active principle, universalizing itself and remaining a 
destiny. The planetary draws us into its storm.
As humanity has been drawn into storms from time imme-
morial, we make the attempt to order everything and construe 
logical and ontological as well as ontic schemata and realms of 
1 EN: Friedrich Nietzsche, “Also sprach Zarathustra II,” in KSA, vol. 4, 189; 
“Thus Spoke Zarathustra: Second Part,” ed. and trans. Walter Kaufmann, in 
The Portable Nietzsche (New York: Penguin, 1954), 258.
166 experience. The logical not only constitutes a propaedeutics of 
speech and thinking. In its guise, the onto-theo-logical grows 
and fades, i.e., the philosophical and metaphysical: it desires to 
experience being. But being always appears as beings—God, uni-
verse, human—, and as a result the theological, the cosmological, 
and the anthropological allow questions about the divine, the 
natural, and the human to emerge and expire. The ethical, the 
political, the poetic and artistic still manage to accomplish this, 
whereas nearly omnipresent technical developments require 
technology. Every circle encircles the others and is encircled 
by them. God (divine logos), nature (the cosmic order), man (the 
beginning, middle, or endpoint) revolve in circles. Each of these 
three powers can be the beginning and be identifiable at the 
end. Divine logos (and a “logical” God), cosmic nature, as well as 
thinking and acting man are the only three thoughts which seem 
to be at the disposal of humanity in order to experience being 
and Dasein, or everything and nothing in either a hard or approx-
imate manner. Historical epochs as well as diverse theoretical 
and practical dimensions have worked them out. Nevertheless, 
they remain unthought-of. Each of these “three” powers appears 
as the secret that evolves into the other. Even when one places 
them together, encloses them in a revolving circle, or com-
prehends them as the circle itself, they fail. Beginning and end 
blend without clarity. The Greek and Judaeo-Christian, Hegelian, 
evolutionary, or Marxist three-step cannot rid themselves of 
their limp. Does it begin with divine or dialectical logos or a “log-
ical” God, and proceed from there to a history of humanity that 
generates, investigates, and recognizes everything? And so forth 
. . . The implicitly or explicitly dominant pattern of thought here is 
too trivial.
Within and as a world history that encompasses cosmic nature 
and the history of humanity in one ring and one struggle [Ring 
und Ringen]—although each of these (two?) powers encloses the 
other—, belief and action, speech and thinking, work, love, battle 
and death unfold, or interpreted in one problematical word: play 
167[Spiel].2 Myths and religion, literature and art, politics, philosophy, 
science and technology—technicized natural sciences and 
humanities—are their reifications and institutions. Proceeding 
from the family, to other concentric and well-defined institutions, 
to eccentric and combinatory games, up to the future world state, 
everything called “life” manifests itself. We have not yet expe-
rienced the gravity and void of institutions, nor fathomed their 
past, present, and future.
What—or who—will be brought into the game of motion—of 
time, of errance? Who, or what, or which ones will be put at risk 
within the space of game and time known as humanity and the 
world? In respect to which origins and which future? A matrix 
of convergent questions, as well as productive and receptive, 
repetitive and problematical conquests, compel us towards “new” 
thought experiments and experiences of the world. Urgent ques-
tions are involved here, even in contexts where the answers have 
become untenable. This about a more radical understanding of 
truth, and about constellations that triumph as reality and then 
perish, and which do correspond to errance.
This is about overcoming metaphysics, the supersession of that 
foundation, and of that meaning—and at the same time: of the 
nihilism—which negates being, foundations, meaning, and it 
itself. This is about overcoming subjectivity and objectivity. This 
is about the end of history and traditional humanity. These ques-
tions can contribute to the openness of the game and to new 
closures.
But whose affair is this mode of thought nowadays, and how 
are the world game and constituted worlds experienced? Which 
individuals, which nations, and which world history do not avoid 
this challenge? Which stars perish, which constellations ascend 
and shine?
2 TN: Italics added by the translator for the sake of clarity.
168 Two modern summits of the European Occidental world, France 
and Germany, do they think and are they alive? Thinking—if such 
a thing does indeed exist—has not been a French problem since 
Descartes and Pascal. Germany, in its nostalgia for Greece, has 
taken it up. But life—or that which one considers to be life, so 
perplexing and gigantic—does not appear to be a German reality. 
After he has abandoned Greece with disappointment and arrived 
amongst the Germans, Hyperion writes to Bellarmin: “I cannot 
imagine a people more torn apart than the Germans. You see 
craftsmen, but no humans, priests, but no humans, masters and 
slaves, young and mature, but no humans—isn’t it like a bat-
tlefield where hands and arms and limbs lie about in pieces all 
on top of one another, whilst the shed blood of life sinks into the 
sand?” Is the game denied to Germany? But which game? “Your 
Germans like to halt at the most essential, and for that reason 
there is also so much bungling effort among them, and so little of 
the free and truly joyful.”3
Above France and Germany stands Europe, neither being nor not 
being, as well as its two branches, America and Russia, drawn 
into a common planetary melting pot. The same process is also 
occurring in all other parts of the world. Does this mean: world 
history above everything? Does the world game “stand” in it and 
“above” it, and is it open for the planetary thought of tomorrow? 
The game pervades all of world history, unsettling and igniting, 
dissolving and smashing. It bears and then squanders a few 
names and ventures. Does the world assemble everything in its 
playful mode? Everything appears and breaks apart within the 
game of world and humanity. “Is” the game only one of the puz-
zles of the world, or “is” the world only a form of the game?
3 EN: Hölderlin, “Hyperion oder Der Eremit in Griechenland,” 168; “Hyperion, 
or the Hermit in Greece,” 128.
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Remarks
Marx and Heidegger: Guides to a Future Way of Thought
The largest part of this text was presented during a two-hour 
guest lecture on 12 July 1957 in the Auditorium Maximum 
of the Freie Universität Berlin; on 13 July 1957, a colloquium 
was held on the same subject matter in the Philosophical 
Seminar; and on 27 January 1966, the latter was repeated in 
the Neue Aula of the Universität Tübingen.
Theses on Marx: Concerning the Critique of Philosophy, of 
Political Economics, and of Politics 
First published in Die Neue Rundschau, Frankfurt am Main, 
Issue 2, 1961. A French version appeared in the journal 
Arguments, Paris, No. 7, 1958 and was included in the book 
Vers la pensée planétaire. Le devenir-pensée du monde et de 
devenir-monde de la pensée, Collection “Arguments” (Paris, 
Éditions de Minuit, 1964).1
 Concerning the Experience of the World: On Heidegger
Unpublished.
The Planetary: A World History of Technology
A lecture held on 13 June 1956 at the Kant Society in Berlin. 
It was repeated on 21 June 1957 at the Universität Freiburg 
im Breisgau in the context of general studies as well as on 
22 June 1957 at the Fürstabt-Gerbert-Haus for students of 
the Saint Blasien University Sanatorium (in the Black Forest). 
Certain parts were not presented at the respective events.
1 EN: The French text was previously translated by N. Georgepoulos as 
“Theses on Marx,” in Continuity and Change in Marxism, ed. N. Fischer, N. 
Georgopoulos and L. Patsouras  (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 
1982), 66–70.
176 Twelve Fragmentary Propositions Concerning the Issue of 
Revolutionary Praxis
First published in the Tübingen Student Newspaper Notizen, 
November 1965.
A Discussion about Science
Closing discussion conducted with the classical philologist 
Jean Bollack following the radio series “Problems and 
Performances of Modern French Science” in the scientific 
evening program of Sender Freies Berlin on 6 August 1957. 
The nuclear researcher Delcroix, the physiologist Cahn, the 
geographer Roncayolo, the ethnologist Lévi-Strauss, the eco-
nomic analyst Sauvy, and the philosopher-anthropologists 
Ricoeur and Foucault had spoken about their work, their 
successes, and their doubts.2 
2 EN: While Claude Lévi-Strauss, Paul Ricoeur and Michel Foucault are well-
known, the other figures are more obscure. These are likely to be Jean-Loup 
Delcroix, Théophile Cahn, Marcel Roncayolo, and Alfred Sauvy. As far as I am 
aware the other conversations have not been published.
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Φιλοσοφικές Δοκιμές [Philosophical Essays]. Athens: Papazeses, 1952.
Marx penseur de la technique. Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1961. 
Alienation, Praxis and Techne in the Thought of Karl Marx. Translated by 
Ronald Bruzina. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1976.
Héraclite et la philosophie. Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1962.
Vers la pensée planétaire. Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1964. 
Part of “Introduction à la pensée planétaire” (20–24) and the whole of 
“L’interlude” (321–28) translated by Sally Hess. “Planetary Interlude.” Yale 
French Studies 41 (1968): 6–18.
“Thèse sur Marx” (172–77) translated by N. Georgepoulos. “Theses on 
Marx.” In Continuity and Change in Marxism. Edited by N. Fischer, 
N. Georgopoulos and L. Patsouras, 66–70. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: 
Humanities Press, 1982. See also the first chapter in part two of the 
current volume.
Einführung in ein künftiges Denken: Über Marx und Heidegger. Tübingen: Niemeyer, 
1966. 
Introduction to a Future Way of Thought: On Marx and Heidegger. Edited by 
Stuart Elden. Translated by Kenneth Mills. Lüneburg: Meson Press, 2015.
Le Jeu du monde. Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1969. 
Arguments d’une recherche. Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1969. 
Pour une éthique problématique, Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1972. 
Entretiens, réels, imaginaires et avec soi-même. Montpellier: Fata Morgana, 1973. 
Horizons du monde. Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1974. 
“Le jeu de l’ensembles des ensembles” (77–84) translated by Beverly 
Livingston. “The Set’s Game-Play of Sets.” Yale French Studies 58 (1979): 
95–101; and by R. E. Chumbley. “Play as the System of Systems.” Sub-
Stance 8, no. 4 (1979): 20–24. 
“Marx, Freud et les taches de la pensée future” (87–99), translated by 
Sally Bradshaw, “Marx, Freud, and the Undertakings of Thought in the 
Future,” Diogenes 72 (1970): 96–111.
Contribution à la logique. Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1977. 
Problèmes de l’enjeu. Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1979. 
Systématique ouverte. Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1984. 
“Le monde: L’être en devenir de la totalité. Cela” (40–54) translated by 
Gerald Moore. “The World: Being Becoming Totality.” Environment and 
Planning D: Society and Space 24, no. 5 (2006): 643–51.
Métamorphoses: Clotûre-ouverture. Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1991. 
L’Errance érotique. Brussels: La Lettre volée, 1992. (Reprint of Vers la pensée plan-
étaire, 273–96.)
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